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ABSTRACT 
This study concentrates on the pricing of seaport infrastructure which includes port 
charges on the use of access channels and berth facilities. A closer examination of 
published port tariffs reveals that the port entry and berth use-related port tariffs, 
often referred to as channel dues and berth occupancy charges, are differentiated 
based on vessel volume (Gross Tonnage, Gross Registered Tonnage and Length 
Over All), ship type (container ship, general cargo ship, tanker) and traffic type 
(foreign-going vessels and coastal vessels). These two charges are one of the main 
revenue sources for a port authority; however knowledge of the design and 
imposition of these charges is currently opaque, but nevertheless very useful to port 
users. This thesis explores the determinants of port infrastructure charges that 
underpin port pricing policies in world ports. The main objectives of the study are:   
(a) Identify and conduct an econometric analysis of the effect of various factors
on seaport infrastructure charges.
(b) To assess the applicability of competing pricing models (pricing approaches)
currently used by seaports in different countries and regions in the world.
(c) To assess the determinants of port infrastructure tariff design and practices in
world seaports and discuss their implications for port management.
This thesis brings to notice that, despite the discussion on port pricing theories such 
as cost-based, market based and cost-benefit theories, the empirical research on this 
topic remains very limited. Thus, with identified research gaps such as the 
determination of the level of knowledge that port authorities have in tariff design and 
their applicability, the thesis investigates the underlying factors influential to the 
vii 
design and practice of port infrastructure tariffs using both quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches.  
  First, the determinants of port infrastructure charges are studied empirically using 
data from 159 ports worldwide by employing the ordinary least square and 
simultaneous equation system method with channel dues and berth occupancy 
charges as the dependent variables. The result indicates that the pricing of seaport 
infrastructure is primarily cost-based but other factors are also relevant to the port 
pricing models currently used by seaports. Among those factors in particular, 
demand and the type of port management and governance model have been found to 
significantly impact the level of port infrastructure charges.  
 Second, to complement and triangulate some of the results found in the 
quantitative model, this thesis examines the primary data collected through an online 
survey of 67 international seaports to focus on the practical processes and strategic 
issues in infrastructure tariff design and practice. The questionnaire was sent to 
higher level seaport managers working in the areas of port tariffs. The contact details 
of port managers were obtained from the official port websites of respective port 
organisations. SPSS and AMOS statistical software were employed to analyse the 
data. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were 
used to identify the factors influential to the selection of infrastructure tariff models, 
the tariff level and the tariff revision process. The results showed that the influential 
factors in infrastructure tariff design are: a) demand, b) knowledge of pricing 
theories, c) pricing objectives, d) port cost considerations, and e) dynamics of port 
and shipping sectors (competition and ship size). Further, an analysis into the factors 
influential in infrastructure tariff practices of seaports suggested that tariff policies, 
viii 
transparency in tariff setting, tariff regulation and stakeholder participation in tariff 
affairs are highly significant.  
 Third, the content analysis of two open-ended questions included in the 
questionnaire to seaport authorities revealed that tariff revision practices vary 
substantially across ports and regions in the world. Some ports revise tariffs regularly 
while others seldom do so. Furthermore tariff revision procedures and the parties 
involved in the process also vary across ports; some ports have highly bureaucratic 
procedures for tariff revision and others determine their tariff revision decisions 
independently. Many seaport authorities are not aware of all the basic pricing 
approaches and their applications, and expressed a wish to receive training and 
support in tariff design and revision. Based on the results of the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, the implications for port management and governments are 
discussed and, given the exploratory nature of the study, the implications for future 
research and its limitations are also presented.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis develops a generalised framework, which will be used to analyse the 
determinants1 of port infrastructure charges using the regression analysis method and 
influential2 factors in tariff designing and practice using factor analysis. An extensive 
review of the current port pricing models is also conducted using an online survey of 
international ports. Policy recommendations are made for port managers and policy 
makers based on the results of an econometric analysis of secondary data collected 
from various sources and a factor analysis of primary data collected from the 
international port survey. This chapter provides a rationale for the research on 
seaport pricing including the background, objectives,  research questions and 
hypothesis, the significance of the research and the methodological approach that 
will be used to analyse the factors influential to seaport infrastructure tariffs design, 
the tariff setting process and practices. Port infrastructure tariff “design” here means 
that setting up of port tariffs before implementation which includes the basis, level 
and composition of the charge. That may include parties participating, procedure, 
type of tariff, the basis of charge, discriminatory or not based on different parameters 
such as vessel size, traffic type and cargo type. Tariff practices are the ways that port 
authorities implement designed tariffs which may be affected by various other factors 
such as port users, regulators, transparency issues and port stakeholders. 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Seaports or ports, be it the oldest ones in the world such as 'Byblos Port' in Lebanon 
or 'Lothal' in India3, or the most up-to-date ones such as Singapore and Rotterdam, 
are critical to world trade as 80% of world trade by volume and 70% of world trade 
by value is transported by ships through ports (UNCTAD 2014). Thus the ultimate 
goal of all seaports throughout the world has been to provide efficient port services 
for vessels and to maintain the safe, reliable flow of cargo through the ports 
(Nagorski 1972). Seaports also play a critical role in regional trade systems allowing 
smooth interaction among economic and geographical units (Wang, Ng & Olivier 
2004). An efficient seaport operation is therefore a prerequisite to maintain the global 
                                                 
1
 Determinants is a factor which decisively affects the nature or outcome of something, in that sense 
determinants of port infrastructure pricing in this thesis means, what has affected the level of port 
infrastructure charges to be different across world ports. 
2
 Influential means having or exercising influence over something, in that sense influential factor are 
those factors which have influenced the designing and practice of port infrastructure tariffs . 
3
 Byblos is considered to be the oldest city in the world (Krabbe 2001) and, according to recent excavations, 
Lothal appears to be a harbour city where seaborne trade may have originated (Prasad 1977). 
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competitiveness of the commodity market. In that sense sea ports, being nodal points 
in the global logistics chain, play a pivotal role in allowing international markets to 
function and integrate. Despite their critical role in national and global economies 
and trade, seaports are confronted with several challenges.   
 First, from the shipping industry’s perspective markets, technological and 
structural changes have exposed seaports to intense competition. Increase in ship 
size, the formation of strategic shipping alliances, alteration of service schedules and 
restructuring in shipping networks and the need to utilise the port’s full capacity have 
all reduced the contractual power of ports and terminal operators (Ferrari & 
Benacchio 2002), all of which have in turn resulted in fewer port calls. Intense 
competition among seaports is thus an inevitable market outcome as seaports 
strategize their planning process against each other in order to secure profit and 
increase market share. The increasing inter-port competition has produced a new 
dimension to the seaport industry. Further, transhipment hubs have been developed 
to respond to increasing vessel size.   
 Second, seaport congestion can seriously affect the service quality and 
performance of a port and the overall exporting and importing cost. To address the 
congestion issue a typical seaport either has the option of expanding its capacity by 
investing in additional berths and other superstructures or charging congestion levies 
to reduce the traffic to an optimal level. Although these strategies are theoretically 
sound and should generate expected outcomes, investment in capacity expansion 
(which can be costly) and charging a congestion levy are practicable only if ports 
have adequate capital to invest and a substantial market power within the port area or 
region. 
 Third, the above mentioned recent structural changes in the seaport industry, 
especially port ownership, form a new dimension in the seaport operation. 
Ownership structures have been subject to reforms after the 1980s in order to adjust 
to changing circumstances in the port sector. This was partly due to the belief in 
neoliberalism that restructuring would improve port performance and efficiency. In 
this regard devolution and the transfer of public assets to the private sector, public- 
private partnerships and concessionary agreements have influenced ports around the 
world to move from direct public management to autonomous, complex business 
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entities with mixed forms of ownership and administrative models (Theys, 
Notteboom, Pallis & De Langen 2010). The core objective of reforming port 
ownership is to achieve a higher technical efficiency, economic benefits through 
competition, lowering bureaucracy and reducing public investments (Xiao, Ng & Fu 
2010). Although port management is reformed, the private sector is allowed to 
participate in port activities only to a certain degree, operating beside public sector 
port institutions that maintain a higher degree of control over the overall port 
activities. Port development and reform in China is a clear example of this change 
whereby the terminal- level operation in ports is largely managed by a private 
operator, while the national- level port development and planning are entirely under 
the control of a public sector authority.  
 Last, as return on investment is the key criterion for assessing financial 
performance, port managements need to sustain the technical and operating 
efficiency of seaport infrastructure/superstructure facilities or to adopt advanced 
technological applications wherever possible. The financial position of seaports is 
also determined by the operating revenue that is conditional upon the level of seaport 
service operation, the price charged for seaport infrastructure and superstructure 
services, and the elasticity of demand for seaport services. Public port authorities 
often face capital inadequacy. In the absence of  public subsidy, public port 
authorities are required to pay attention to the commercial viability of port operation 
and keep a close rein on any bureaucratic extravagancies that are commonly accepted 
as associated with public sector agencies (Dowd & Fleming 1994). The commercial 
viability of port operation is primarily determined by operating revenue from 
providing port services, which is fundamentally conditional upon the price charged 
for each port product. Thus a clearly articulated pricing strategy is a prerequisite to 
the success of a public port authority.    
 Contemporary seaports operate in a newly framed, globalised environment where 
combined transport, logistics, information flows and innovation, concentration and 
integration lead the market and each business in it.  Within this framework seaports 
have become much more dynamic following the three principles of port 
development: European, Anglo Saxon and Asian. Until the late 1970s, the economic 
model based on Keynesian thinking, also known as the European view on port 
development, formed the basic idea for the ownership, infrastructure, investment, 
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pricing policy and management of seaports. The fundamental thinking on seaport 
policy formulation and seaport development was the European view that followed 
the Keynesian approach of state intervention and national planning. The seaport 
development model was therefore based on state intervention. Public seaport 
authorities undertook investments mainly for regional economic development 
purposes by arriving at a criterion to determine seaport infrastructure pricing i.e. a 
model based on the marginal cost pricing principle, from which emerging deficits 
were fully financed by governmental subsidies. In the 1980s, Neoliberalism was 
adopted to liberate the sector and promote private ownership and participation in the 
sector. This was defined as the Anglo Saxon view and overset existing models, 
employing a new basis for the port production (Pardali 2008). As such ports models 
under Anglo Saxon view overlaid some of the established port models under 
European view and formed a new basis for port development and port privatisation 
schemes around the world is a vivid example of this change.   
 However the influence of seaport pricing and its policy on the operational 
objectives of seaports is understated. According to Dowd & Fleming (1994, p.31):  
 'Port's pricing approach should be supportive of the Port's overall objectives, be 
consistent with the Port’s development and planning philosophy, and be a logical 
extension of the Port's investment criteria and policies'.    
 An analysis of port pricing policies and practices clearly demonstrated that, in the 
context of European Union (EU) ports, port financing and charging practices are 
substantially diversified (Haralambides, Verbeke, Musso & Benacchio 2001). The 
intricacy of disentangling issues in port pricing is not only associated with port 
management and operation, but also the macroeconomic context and the dynamic 
nature of the market structure within which seaports function. Many studies have so 
far focused on optimal pricing for transport infrastructure and services. Among these 
optimal pricing for seaport infrastructure and services still remains the most 
debatable area in port economics. In spite of the shift in economic philosophy 
concerning port development and operation, economic research has concentrated on 
port pricing, port capacity and evaluating investment policies that were undertaken 
(many of the studies on this topic date back to the 1960s). The changing view of port 
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development and operation can be seen from the differences between early and 
recent studies on port pricing.  
 Although studies on port pricing dating back to the 1960s remain influential, port 
pricing practices that have been widely used recently are mainly propounded by three 
crucial policy documents. The first is by UNCTAD (1975) on 'port pricing' that aims 
to produce a level playing field for the public, private and foreign seaport entities in 
the world. The second is the European Commission's (1997) Green Paper on ports 
and maritime infrastructure operation and pricing in the EU context, and the third is 
the European Commission's (1998) White Paper that widens the horizon to include 
all transport infrastructures within the EU. Existing research on port pricing mainly 
concentrates on pricing policies and their impacts on maritime transport. While ports 
rely heavily on infrastructure charges as the main source of revenue and therefore 
port pricing as one of the main tools to help them achieve financial goals, little 
research has been done to study how ports set their tariffs and what factors are 
influential to their tariff design and practice.  According to Meersman, Van De 
Voorde & Vanelslander (2002, p.2) 'pricing by ports and operators within ports is 
historically determined and it is often quite a complex and opaque matter, and as 
such is sometimes perceived as archaic'. Similarly, Strandenes & Marlow (2000) 
noted that 'there is no single solution to the port pricing problem'. While Heggie 
(1974) suggests that port pricing should reflect port costs including capital and 
operating costs, Ashar (2001) argues that a port's strategic environment should be 
considered when establishing port prices, including identifying the relevant market 
segment for the port, defining costs and performance indicators and estimating the 
comparative values for each market segment, and developing and assessing global 
pricing strategies. Further Perez-Labajos & Esteban Garcia (2000) showed that ports 
can set their tariff levels in order to maximise economic benefits and determine the 
efficient unit profit of the services offered and their sensitivity. Xiao, Ng & Fu 
(2010) explained the effects of the interdependence of port ownership, inter-port 
competition, capacity investment and port pricing.  
  The need for a sound port pricing theory has been thoroughly discussed in the 
literature (Ashar 2001; BTE 1989; Commission of the European Communities 1997; 
Dowd & Fleming 1994; ESCAP 2002; Haralambides 2002; Meersman, Van De 
Voorde & Vanelslander 2002; Meersman, Van De Voorde & Vanelslander 2003; 
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Perez-Labajos & Esteban Garcia 2000; Psaraftis 2005; UNCTAD 1975; UNCTAD 
1995a), yet existing studies on the topic tend to be descriptive which are limited to 
view points based on observations and policy documents  and many are also case 
studies that represent local or regional port4 systems. The viewpoints and quantitative 
justifications discussed in these studies on port pricing are often inextricably mixed, 
and take a narrow view of the port pricing issue. More factors need to be considered 
when analysing port pricing. The determinants of port tariffs and the structure of port 
tariffs have not been given due consideration in port research while many researchers 
agree that  ‘research  into  pricing  behaviour  within  ports  certainly has some way 
to go' (Meersman, Van De Voorde & Vanelslander 2002, p.16). Moreover the 
boundaries of port pricing research are restricted to regional studies mainly 
concentrated in the European port region. The need to extend this boundary to 
encompass port pricing in seaports throughout the world is justified by this thesis. 
The framework for such a research study needs to be based on a multi- faceted 
perspective of the variables which affect the basis and level and composition of port 
charge (tariff design) and port pricing decisions (tariff practices).  
1.3 THE OBJECTIVES AND THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
This study primarily concentrates on the pricing of seaport infrastructure services 
including berth conservancy services and access channels. The main reason for this 
limited scope is threefold. First, seaport pricing can be based on the traditional public 
infrastructure pricing that does not consider the supply cost. Second, these charges 
are often universally applied to international seaports and are directly comparable 
unlike cargo handling charges and terminal charges which tend to be more market 
driven. Third, the debate on port pricing primarily concentrates on pricing port 
infrastructure and facilities. The most appropriate port tariffs for the utilisation of 
port infrastructure are channel dues and berth charges. For that reason in-depth 
quantitative and qualitative treatment is given to only to these two tariff items.  
 The fundamental aim of this thesis is to describe the determinants of port 
infrastructure charges that underpin port pricing policies in world ports. Several 
factors are pivotal when investigating a pricing policy for a particular product or a 
service from economic point of view. Tyndall (1951) postulates several factors 
which are of vital importance when analysing a pricing policy of a particular 
                                                 
4
 Reg ional ports in this thesis refer to ports situated in a specific port region.  
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industry. The first is the nature of the cost function for different amounts of products 
to a particular user, the structure and the number of consumers when the product per 
user is constant. Industries such as seaports involve large capital outlays, continuous 
maintenance costs and various overheads. Since capital costs are largely sunk and the 
pay-back period is relatively long, seaport authorities often try to consider the 
operating costs of seaports in their cost function. Additionally, seaports provide 
products which are jointly used by port users, thus allocation of user cost with an 
appropriate price over a series of port users is a difficult exercise.  
 The second is the nature of the demand function of different classes of consumers. 
Port users comprise different classes of vessels with specific cargo carrying 
purposes. The composition of port user clientele determines the type of demand for 
the port and its services, which in turn determines the revenue from each port user.  
Port authorities are required to properly consider the port clientele and strategise the 
pricing structure in accordance with the use of port infrastructure and services by 
different port users.  
 The third is the compliance of the existing price structure with the aforementioned 
factors. Seaport pricing policies in countries are seen to be characterised as policies 
that have significant differences in terms of the basis, regulation and management of 
charges. The pricing characteristics may be similar in some regions or have some 
differences depending on the specifications of the seaport's infrastructure, ownership, 
competition level, the nature of the port's clientele and trade flow and the 
geographical location of the port.  
The aforementioned review of the relationship between port infrastructure pricing, 
and port development and competition highlights the importance in port pricing. The 
review also shows several salient challenges in efficient port infrastructure pricing 
despite extensive descriptive research already conducted so far on the topic. This 
study aims to investigate the port infrastructure tariff from economic and policy 
perspectives. In particular, it tries to achieve the following three objectives: 
I. Identify and conduct an econometric analysis of the effect of various factors 
on seaport infrastructure charges.  
Seaport pricing research so far largely concentrates on port pricing policy and 
principles, and gives little attention to the nature of seaport infrastructure and seaport 
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infrastructure charges. Thus an econometric analysis of port charges considering the 
relationship with the costs arising from infrastructure investment, maintenance, port 
demand, operation and port management, and institutional set up is essential to the 
understanding of port infrastructure pricing. Such an analysis will also consider the 
effect of other factors such as the ownership and administrative structure of ports. 
Thus, the analysis would determine whether and how various factors such as port 
ownership, administrative structure, port demand and location may affect the tariff 
level. This study uses secondary data from seaports of different types in different 
countries and regions in the world to analyse port infrastructure charges using the 
simultaneous equations regression method in order to help identify the key 
determinants of seaport infrastructure charges.  
II. Assess the applicability of competing pricing models (pricing approaches) 
currently used by seaports in different countries and regions in the world. 
There are many pricing models currently referred to by economists and used by 
ports, and it is important to investigate the applicability of these models. This study 
investigates the applicability of port pricing models through a survey of international 
ports. An online survey instrument is employed to collect data and information on 
the pricing models currently used by ports and their knowledge of other pricing 
models and their applicability. Standard methods of sampling are applied to 
minimise systematic and non-systematic data collection errors. A trial run of the 
questionnaire is conducted before the formal survey is undertaken. To achieve the 
above mentioned objective, data are coded, pre-processed and analysed using 
univariate and multivariate statistical methods. 
 
III. Assess the determinants of port infrastructure tariff design and practices in 
world seaports and discuss the implications for port management and policy 
makers.   
It is expected that the results of the analyses described in the previous objectives will 
shed light on the functionality and applicability of the existing port pricing models. 
Therefore the third objective of this research is to apply those results to the port 
industry given its distinctive characteristics regarding ownership, administrative 
structures, inter-competition and demand, objectives and institutional features (such 
as the level of knowledge of port authorities, transparency, stakeholder participation 
in tariff setting and tariff revision mechanism). To this end, an online survey of port 
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managers is conducted to canvass their views on the aforementioned factors. The 
data collected from the survey is analysed to reveal the level of knowledge of ports 
and infrastructure pricing approaches presently used and current tariff revision 
practices and considerations. It is hoped that the study will not only help to achieve a 
better understanding of port infrastructure pricing but also translate this into actions 
available to the port industry to assist with the achievement of the broader social and 
economic goals of their national economies.  
 Scholarly contributions on port infrastructure pricing in world port industry 
context are rather limited. More importantly there is a lack of identification of factors 
influential to infrastructure tariff design and tariff practices. This extensive study on 
port infrastructure pricing examines how tariff designing and tariff practices are 
affected by various factors including the ownership structure and institutional 
arrangement, competition element, regulation, port users and furnishes this 
limitation. In doing so it helps to formulate a basis for seaport infrastructure pricing, 
for both tariff design and practices, based on the above factors. This also helps to 
identify issues in port infrastructure pricing policy by reviewing the basis for 
infrastructure pricing adopted by international ports. It is also expected that 
individual ports are able to review their port infrastructure pricing regime against the 
significant determinants of port infrastructure tariffs found in this study.   
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
As mentioned earlier, the first objective of the research conducted in the current and 
subsequent chapters is to assess the knowledge and applicability of competing 
infrastructure pricing models held by international seaport managers. Despite the fact 
that, as noted by Haralambides et al. (2001), there is a lack of knowledge and 
information regarding port infrastructure pricing, there has been little empirical 
research into the existing knowledge of seaport managers about port infrastructure 
pricing principles, and the extent to which they are applied in tariff design. Given the 
many existing pricing models currently referred to by existing port pricing studies, it 
is of paramount importance to investigate their applicability. This study, using 
primary data collected from the survey with the participation of seaport managers, 
assesses the existing level of knowledge held by port organisations of port pricing 
theories and approaches, and inquires into the extent of the use of this existing 
knowledge within the port organisation when formulating and designing port 
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infrastructure tariffs for their respective seaports. In order to achieve the first 
research objective mentioned above, the following three research questions are 
proposed.  
Research Question 1: What is the level of applicability of pricing approaches in the 
development of the port infrastructure pricing models?  
The main debate concerning port infrastructure pricing is centred on the need for port 
infrastructure tariffs to be cost-based. However, formulating cost-based tariffs 
depends on the extent to which port authorities compile and account for port costs, in 
turn, the occurrence of such an exercise is conditional upon the level of knowledge 
and technical competencies of the port management. The level of knowledge that 
port authorities possess concerning port pricing theory determines the extent of their 
ability to adapt these theories in practice. Thus, it is imperative to understand, from 
the perspective of the port authority, the awareness and the level of knowledge held 
by port management about port pricing theory and principles. In addition, to 
complement the aforementioned, it is also important to understand the extent to 
which port pricing theory and principles are presently used in order to verify past 
research findings, such as  Notteboom & Winkelmans (2001, p.82) who state, 'most 
port authorities are maintaining remarkably arbitrary tariff structures, based on 
discrimination by demand factors rather than on anything to do with costs'.  
Thus, the primary data analysis investigates the knowledge and the applicability of 
port pricing principles and their use in practice by testing for the following Research 
Hypotheses (RH):  
RH1: Seaport authorities possess substantial knowledge on port pricing theory and 
principles. 
RH2: Seaport authorities to a larger extent apply port pricing principles in port 
infrastructure tariff design. 
RH3: Seaport authorities often attempt to formulate efficient cost based port 
infrastructure tariff design. 
RH4: The majority of seaport authorities follow a structured procedure for port 
infrastructure tariff design and revision.  
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 The second objective of the research presented in this and subsequent chapters is 
to identify the key factors influential to the determination of infrastructure tariff 
design (the process and practice). To achieve the second research objective, a 
conceptual framework is constructed to assist the development of a questionnaire for 
a survey of international seaport managers. The data co llected from the survey are 
then analysed to identify the extent to which the port institutional setup, demand, 
infrastructure financing, policy and wider industry-related factors such as 
competition and vessel technology, influence port infrastructure tar iff determination. 
As shown in the literature review in Chapter 2, the port pricing literature so far 
largely concentrates on port pricing policy and principles. In the determination of 
port infrastructure tariffs little attention has been given to the nature of port 
infrastructure management, its institutional set up, the influence of port infrastructure 
users, the port’s competitive environment and the spatial distribution of ports. Thus, 
it is essential to understand the factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design 
from the perspective of the seaport organisation. This also complements and helps to 
validate the results of the secondary data analysis of port infrastructure tariffs 
presented in Chapter 3 on the determination of the level of port infrastructure tariffs. 
This research objective is achieved by addressing the following Research Question 
(RQ) II with the support of one research hypothesis:  
Research Question 2: What are the factors influential to port infrastructure tariff 
design?  
The determination of port infrastructure tariff design and its influential factors have, 
to date, not been given much consideration in port research. Furthermore, this has to 
be understood in a wider context with an investigation based on ports from different 
regions of the world. In the light of the knowledge held by port authorities of port 
pricing theory and the extent to which this is applied in pricing port infrastructure, 
the internal and external factors that affect port infrastructure pricing are 
investigated. This enables an understanding of the determinants of port infrastructure 
pricing within a broader context. The fundamental question that the research attempts 
to answer is how port infrastructure pricing designs are determined. In this respect 
the extent to which the cost of providing port infrastructure, port demand, port 
governance structure, port competition, port finance level, government policy and 
shipping market dynamics play in determining port infrastructure tariffs design needs 
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to be examined. In order to address this research question the following hypothesis is 
tested:  
RH5: Port infrastructure tariff design is influenced by the port’s organisational 
objective, costs, financial position, demand related aspects, competition and 
government policy and regulation.    
 The third objective of the primary data research is to identify key factors affecting 
port infrastructure tariff practices. It is expected that the results of the analysis 
obtained from the previous steps will shed light on the applicability and functionality 
of various port pricing models and factors influential to its tariff design. Therefore 
the next step in this research is to apply those results to international ports in general 
given the sector’s distinctive characteristics regarding ownership and financial 
structure, institutional arrangement, market competition, the economic role of ports 
and their relationships with other sectors. A content analysis of the results of the 
questionnaire is conducted to examine various aspects of port infrastructure tariff 
practices including the differences and inconsistencies in port infrastructure tariff 
policies, the level of transparency, the level of stakeholder participation in tariff 
affairs, tariff discrimination and the revision of port infrastructure tariffs. This 
analysis should contribute to a better understanding of port infrastructure pricing 
practices and also provide a framework for ports to achieve their broader social and 
economic goals. 
Research Question 3: What are the factors affecting port infrastructure tariff 
practices?  
Port charging practices have been found to vary substantially and to have diverse 
effects on port operations (Bennathan & Walters 1979; Psaraftis 2007; Wilmsmeier 
2007; Zachcial, Kramer, Lemper & Duhme 2006). The underlying factors 
responsible for such varied charging practices have not been empirically identified, 
although there are some analyses purely based on intuitive judgements. Thus, the 
following hypotheses are tested to help answer the third research question:     
RH6: Port infrastructure tariff practices are influenced by port stakeholders, the 
level of transparency, port autonomy, regulatory regime, port user behaviour 
and the competitive environment that the port operates in.    
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RH7: The differences in the ownership structure and the administrative structure 
have significant influence on port infrastructure tariff practices.    
The three research questions presented above derive from two research gaps 
identified in the existing port pricing literature. The first is the lack of an empirical 
assessment of the extent that port pricing principles and port pricing practices are 
converged. The second research gap is in identifying the determinants of the port 
infrastructure pricing models that are presently applied by seaports and the factors 
that affect the port infrastructure tariff practices of seaports. This study conducts an 
empirical investigation of port infrastructure tariffs, and so addresses these two 
research gaps, and contributes to the existing body of knowledge on port pricing. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Academic research on seaports often concentrates on a specific area of port 
management and operation. Studies on port pricing so far are primarily characterised 
by more conceptual studies on pricing models based on microeconomic principles. In 
Pallis, Vitsounis, De Langen & Notteboom (2011), port pricing research is classified 
as 'port policy and regulation' research with often descriptive research and a limited 
empirical analysis, while in Woo, Pettit & Kwak (2010) it is classified as 'port 
management and strategy' research. According to Xiao, Ng & Fu (2010), there has 
been limited quantitative empirical research on the topic that is based on a sound and 
valid methodological framework. Thus, this study seeks to address this issue in the  
literature by developing an analytical framework that can be used to analyse port 
infrastructure pricing. It also studies the port infrastructure tariff design process and 
practices used by international seaports and based on the results of analysis may 
provide recommendations for port management and policy makers.  
Contributions to port authorities, users and regulators: 
Port infrastructure is fundamental to the smooth operation of ports and the mobility 
of cargo and passenger vessels. The resulting effic ient operation of port services 
guarantees the proper operation of the internal markets that ports serve. For port 
infrastructure to be operated efficiently the continuous maintenance and upgrading 
according to the requirements of the shipping industry is a pre-requisite and the 
extent to which port authorities are able to achieve this goal depends on their 
financial capacity. The financial position of the port entirely depends on the port 
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pricing policy adopted by the port organisation. Thus pricing policy formulated by 
the port is decisive in offering the most desirable price for port users. According to 
Tyndall (1951, pp. 342),  
 'The increasing role of government both in actual production and in the 
 regulation of industry makes it increasingly important that the public 
 administrator have a clear concept of the most desirable price structure and 
 the role of the price theorist in this area is to provide the administrator with a  
 theoretical framework for attacking this problem'.  
As such, seaport infrastructure pricing has long been the policy topic in organisations 
responsible for smooth functioning and the management of maritime transport. The 
policy directives of UNCTAD on port pricing and the EU on fair competition in 
maritime transport within Europe are the most popular examples in this regard. It has 
been agreed that there is a need for improvement in seaport infrastructure pricing. 
Therefore, developing a framework for infrastructure tariff structure for seaports is a 
timely important and significant exercise given the incredibly mixed nature of policy 
directives on the subject. The methodology proposed by the study allows for an 
analysis of the effect of various factors on port infrastructure tariffs.  
1.6  PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY  
1.6.1 PORT PRICING FROM A MULTI-FACETED VIEW 
Seaports are similar to firms offering multi-products; a range of port services are 
provided to port users under different institutional and management structures, 
competitive environments and geographical locations (Wilmsmeier 2012). Thus port 
prices in general can be influenced by the same factors which may be internal or 
external to the port. Within the port jurisdiction the port cost situation, port 
governance and the seaport policy pursued impacts on the way the port sets prices for 
its infrastructure and services. Beyond the port’s control perimeter, the market 
environment within which the port operates (which includes the port market, 
geographical location and shipping market) exerts some influence on the port’s 
pricing decisions. The Figure 1.1 summarises the key factors influential to port 
pricing policy that are explained below.  
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Figure 1.1: A multi- faceted view of port infrastructure pricing.  
 
Source: Developed by the author.  
Impact of port competition, dynamics of foreland seaport industry and port terminal 
operation on port infrastructure pricing 
Similar to other sectors, the port sector is exposed to competition. The level of 
competition in the port sector is primarily determined by characteristics such as the 
geographical location of the port, the number of ports in the region under 
consideration and the extent to which port hinterlands are overlapped, the nature of 
the shipping market each port serves and the level of regulation of port activities by 
the government. Competition may also exist within a port that has more than one 
terminal operated by different operators, often private companies. Within ports, 
occupation of terminals by two or more private sector terminal operators has 
produced intra-port competition for capturing port traffic. As discussed earlier, the 
formation of a network of terminal operators within port foreland areas and regions 
has created a new form of port market in which port authorities can respond by 
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reforming tariff policies. These terminal operators strategically occupy port terminals 
in a port area and operate within a system of hub and spoke so as to guarantee that 
their facilities are fully utilised. The simultaneous occupation of terminals in feeder 
ports and hub ports secures the operators cargo handling business while the 
respective seaports receive adequate vessel traffic.  
Dynamism of the shipping industry  
The dynamics of the global logistics networks and the international nature of 
shipping operations have subsumed seaports in terms of their significance, role and 
institutional arrangements. Nevertheless seaports often strive to establish their 
position and identity in the global logistic chain by incorporating 'corporate 
governance' within the port jurisdiction. Also seaports around the world endeavour to 
establish efficient and cost effective port services in the face of expanding 
international trade. In this regard, seaport authorities have begun to reshape the 
organisational setup of seaports. For instance major seaports in India have considered 
a series of reforms in order to establish flexible organisational models ranging from 
the existing port authority system to a more corporatised model with corporate 
governance (WTO 2001).  
 In the presence of mergers and acquisition among shipping lines, inter-port 
competition and the desire of seaports to increase port efficiency, an integrated 
package of lower port charges along with new value-added services for vessels and 
adequate port infrastructure is vital if a seaport wishes to gain competitive advantage 
over its rivals. The increasing influence of global shipping alliances on seaports has 
also resulted in the declining dominance of ports in the maritime network and most 
ports can no longer be considered as monopolists. It is important for a seaport to 
account for the factors that affect the competitiveness of the port from the 
perspective of the shipping lines. The port selection decision taken by a shipping line 
can greatly affect the performance of a port in both operational and financial terms. 
Tongzon & Sawant (2007) claim that port charges and the efficiency of port services 
are among the important factors influencing port selection by shipping lines. Fung 
(2001) revealed that the prices ports charge to shipping lines and the extent to which 
they facilitate the requirements of shipping lines are functionally related to the 
market share of ports serving overlapping port markets. This implies that port tariff 
structure has a significant impact on the port costs of shipping lines, and port 
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authorities need to be aware of the impact of their charges on shipping companies 
especially when they are revising their tariffs and setting tariffs for new services.  
Cost recovery in port infrastructure investments  
According to Braeutigam (1980) a port should set its tariffs based on the costs of 
running the port as well as its characteristics, e.g. economies of scale and the 
presence of joint and common costs. Since the use of port infrastructure demonstrates 
lowering unit cost of production with time, port charge can be set to represent fall in 
average cost of infrastructure. Further, since maintenance costs of some port 
infrastructure are joint/common, for instance, deepening channel and berth alongside, 
the setting port channel dues and berth occupancy charge need to consider these two 
cost as common and the charge need to reflect it. Financing port infrastructure with 
public funds is rationalised on the basis that port development generates 
macroeconomic effects on the economy from which tax payers are indirectly 
benefited. However the need to recover the cost of port operation is at the forefront 
of the port authorities especially if the construction of port infrastructure has been 
financed from loan facilities. The influence of these two scenarios on determining 
port charges is a matter of concern for a port authority.  
 The methodological frame work presented in this study considers only certain 
aspects of the above multi- faceted view of port infrastructure pricing. These aspects 
are referred to as determinants of port infrastructure pricing. The next section briefly 
presents the methodology adopted in the study.        
1.6.2 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are three aspects to the methodological framework to be adopted by this study. 
First is the need to understand the present port infrastructure pricing policy and 
related issues; the study takes into consideration the nature of infrastructure pricing 
policy and related practices and issues. This will be undertaken from the information 
gathered from an extensive literature review on port pricing, which will be presented 
in Chapter 2.  
  Second, the study develops a quantitative framework from which the relationship 
of port infrastructure charges to port costs, port demand, the administrative structure, 
trade flow and the port area or region are estimated. To achieve this objective, the 
study develops an econometric model explaining the relationship between port 
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infrastructure tariffs and the key influential factors such as ownership structure, port 
infrastructure specifications and prices of infrastructure related services. The 
econometric analysis is carried out using an equation system for two main types of 
port infrastructure tariffs, namely berth due and channel due as the dependent 
variables, and the data are collected from 159 major ports.  
  Third, the study also attempts to examine how port infrastructure tariff design is 
influenced by the port management’s knowledge of the issue and applicability of port 
pricing approaches, cost recovery consideration, port demand, port tariff objectives, 
inter-competition and shipping market dynamics. In addition, the study seeks to 
analyse the key factors influential to port infrastructure tariff practices such as the 
level of transparency, stakeholder participation in tariff setting, tariff regulatory 
control and a port’s tariff policy. The analysis is carried out using data gathered from 
an online survey of 67 international seaports across different regions. Both 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) methods 
are used to aid the analysis. The conceptual framework, data analysis and results, and 
the discussion are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively.  
1.7 DATA AND INFORMATION COLLECTION 
Data and information on port tariffs is usually published annually by more 
established seaports. In order to analyse the present tariff structures operating in 
contemporary seaports, the published tariff structures of 159 major ports in the 
world, including top performing container ports have been collected from various 
official data domains including the respective web sites of each ports, the Ports and 
terminals Guide, a publication by Lloyd's Register Fair Play Ltd (2011). The types of 
data required for collection for this econometric analysis are presented in the Table 
1.1 below.  
Table 1.1: Data requirements for econometric estimation.  
Channel related 
data 
Berth related data Port demand data General port data 
Channel dues 
Channel length  
Channel depth 
Channel width 
Berth dues 
Berth length 
 
Trade flow Port ownership 
Port administrative 
model  
 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
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For the analysis of factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design and practices 
a structured questionnaire was sent as an online survey to 450 world seaports 
representing major port regions. A detailed explanation of sample selection and 
questionnaire design is presented in Chapter 4.   
1.8 THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of the existing literature on seaport 
pricing, especially that of port infrastructure. This includes the main port pricing 
principles; a review of the literature related to port pricing process, policy and 
practices will also be covered in Chapter 5.   
Chapter 3 elaborates on the conceptual and methodological framework introduced in 
Chapter 1 and presents an econometric analysis of the relationship between port 
infrastructure charges i.e. channel dues and berth dues to port costs (using 
infrastructure specifications as proxies), port ownership, port administrative 
structure, port demand and port region.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodological approach in which the objectives, research 
hypothesis, conceptual framework, questionnaire design, sample selection and data 
collection are explained. 
Chapter 5 explains the data analysis process and presents the analysis results. In this 
chapter the survey data are analysed using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  
Chapter 6 is primarily devoted to a discussion of the results and their implications. 
Firstly, the results presented in Chapter 4 on factors influential to infrastructure tariff 
design and practices are discussed. Then a comparative analysis is presented of the 
results obtained from the econometric estimation of port infrastructure charges in 
Chapter 3, and the results derived from the EFA and CFA concerning the factors 
affecting port infrastructure tariffs obtained in Chapter 5. Lastly, the implications of 
the research findings on port management are discussed and some directives for port 
management are provided in terms of port infrastructure tariffs.  
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Chapter 7 discusses the limitations of the study, the implications for future research 
and provides a summary of the study. 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The growth of international trade followed by the growth of the shipping sector has 
resulted in a rapid pace of development and a higher level of competition in the port 
sector. Ports have also improved service quality with the adaptation of latest 
information technology (IT) and cargo handling technology. To contend with these 
changes it is important that ports have pricing strategies that are able to cope with the 
dynamism of international trade and commodity flows. Further a greater consensus 
and concern among ports regarding the restructuring of port pricing strategies to 
include justifiable port investment and cost recovery considerations has developed in 
major port regions of the world (Juhel 2001).  
 A recent policy level initiative concerning this matter is the European 
Commission’s proposition on adopting a common approach to pricing port 
infrastructure in order to ensure that the real costs of port services are borne by port 
users (Abbes 2007). Following this initiative, seaport infrastructure pricing and its 
dynamic nature were subjected to extensive research from technical and policy 
perspectives. However, there are different views concerning the approach that a port 
infrastructure pricing system should take. The European Union's Green Paper 
(European Commission 1997) identified three approaches to port infrastructure 
charges with regard to cost-based pricing: marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing  
and charging for operating cost recovery. The classification was further extended by 
Strandenes & Marlow (2000) as cost-based pricing, congestion pricing, strategic 
pricing and, with the incorporation another version of the pricing principle, 
commercial pricing which could be applied to private port operators. However Abbes 
(2007) classified port pricing into two major categories.  
1. Cost-based pricing strategies such as: marginal cost pricing (Bennathan & 
Walters 1979; Goss & Stevens 2001; Haralambides 2002; UNCTAD 1975), 
operating cost pricing principles (ESCAP 2002) and multi-part tariffs 
(Bennathan & Walters 1979).  
2. Alternative pricing strategies such as: strategic pricing (Ashar 2001; 
Bennathan & Walters 1979; UNCTAD 1995a), discriminatory pricing 
(Bennathan & Walters 1979) and commercial pricing (Strandenes & Marlow 
2000). 
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Bichou (2009) divides port pricing strategies into three groups, namely cost-based 
pricing, congestion pricing and strategic pricing.  
Although there are several types of port pricing strategies, they are derived from the 
same economic principles, particularly the principle that prices should be set based on 
market forces, competition and other relevant factors affecting the environment in 
which the port operates. For example, prices can be set to maximise profit or the users’ 
welfare. Alternatively, to ensure the port’s financial sustainability, prices can be set to 
ensure that revenue covers at least the cost of providing services, including capital 
expenditure and operational costs (Bennathan & Walters 1979). Note that this, in 
principle, requires that a minimum, break-even capacity utilisation rate is met.  
 To maximise economic and social benefits, the port would need to identify and 
promote the movement of specific commodities that are strategically important to the 
economy or region it serves. In this context the port functions as an economic 
multiplier to promote production, distribution and consumption through which 
favourable economic growth and development is expected to be achieved (Coto-
Millán, Mateo-Mantecón & Castro 2010; Coto-Millán, Pesquera & Galán 2010a; 
Coto-Millán, Pesquera & Galán 2010b). Note that where prices are set solely for the 
purpose of recovering the supply costs i.e. the operating cost of the port services, they 
may be adjusted on an arbitrary basis, and thus may not be aligned with the port’s 
objective of ensuring competitive operation.  
 This chapter presents an evaluation of the literature on port pricing, particularly 
research on port pricing approaches and their application. Section 2.2 reviews port 
pricing in world context. Section 2.3 elaborates on the nature of port infrastructure 
charges. Section 2.4 reviews the cost-based port pricing strategies including marginal 
cost pricing, average cost pricing, average variable cost pricing, congestion pricing, 
multipart tariffs and cost of service pricing. Section 2.5 reviews alternative pricing 
strategies including strategic pricing, input and output pricing, discriminatory pricing 
and commercial pricing. Section 2.6 reviews the literature available on cost based 
pricing and alternative pricing strategies as represented by strategic port pricing, input 
pricing, value of services pricing and commercial pricing. The objective of the review 
is to determine which pricing approaches are suitable for an empirical investigation. 
The investigation is presented later in this thesis.       
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2.2 PORT PRICING IN A WORLD CONTEXT 
Pricing is one of the key decisions facing economic agents as it directly and greatly 
affects two key aspects of business, namely profitability and competition. Generally 
several factors can affect the pricing of a product or a service in commodity markets, 
including: market demand, competition (market structure), availability of substitutes, 
corporate strategy, the quality of the product or service, production costs and the 
policy. While these factors should in general apply to the port sector, the extent of the 
effect of each factor on port pricing will vary because of the strategic nature of the 
seaport industry and the nature of port costs; port operation is capital intensive and 
capital investment is highly irreversible. Moreover, as ports are often regarded as  
public assets their funding depends on public finance. However, due to the availability 
of capital market directives and the financial support of international monetary and 
development agencies, private sector participation in seaport operation has been the 
novel trend over the last decade. The role of the government in the provision of 
seaport infrastructure has been limited to official delegations and the signing of 
agreements for seaport infrastructure projects that feature public and private 
partnerships.  Public and private partnerships now play a greater role in large scale 
infrastructure projects especially in the transport sector. In these circumstances there is 
often a contradiction between public socio-economic objectives and private financial 
objectives, with tariff policy one of the main conflicting issues (Boeuf 2003). This, 
together with increasing demand and competition on the sector, has led to extensive 
changes in the sector and in the way in which port services are priced.  
 Following the aforementioned changes, the institutional position of seaports in the 
world has entered a far-reaching reform period (Peters 2001) that, according to Wang, 
Ng & Olivier (2004), has three significant features. First, seaports are now required to 
provide more standardised port services to facilitate production units in the global 
supply chain. Countries need to strategize their transport policies and infrastructure to 
meet the requirements of not only domestic demand but also the increasing demand 
for transhipment of cargo. Containerisation which revolutionised the nature of 
maritime freight transportation caused a substantial degree of standardisation of port 
services in order to be competitive over adjacent container handling ports (OECD 
2009).  
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 Second, the emergence of multinational port terminal operators has created pressure 
for ports to adapt to the changing business environment. Since the strategic behaviour 
of shipping alliances determines which port or port terminal to call, terminal operators 
are significantly affected if one alliance is in operation in a particular maritime 
corridor. The ultimate survival plan for terminals is to confront each other by way of a 
price war which features oligopolistic behaviour between terminals and it is achieved 
by lowering tariffs (Heaver, Meersman, Moglia & Van De Voorde 2000). Strategic 
behaviour of liners has resulted in competition between ports and within ports that 
have multiple terminals. A recent research study by Drewry Shipping consultants 
(2002) shows that the tariff diversification among a range of ports is highly significant.  
Table 2.1: Tariff Diversification among different regions in the world ($/TEU).  
Region 
Gateway (ship’s hold 
to stack to track or 
vice versa) 
Transhipment 
(tariff per cycle) 
North America 312 130 
North Europe 120 152 
South Europe 113 76 
Far East 164 163 
South East Asia 92 104 
Middle East 106 85 
Latin America 174 201 
Australasia/Oceania 130 196 
South Asia 106 85 
Africa 256 99 
East Europe 144 183 
South East Asia 113 76 
Source: Adopted from Drewry Shipping Consultants (2002) and Ferrari & Benacchio (2002) 
 As shown in Table 2.1 there is a significant diversification of port terminal tariffs 
worldwide. This implies the varying degree of competition between ports across 
different regions in the world (Ferrari & Benacchio 2002) and the resulting tariffs 
being the result of the market forces of demand and supply, competition and 
institutional factors. To be competitive, ports should be able to handle any additional 
vessels calling at the port and the ability to do so is a direct function of the port 
capacity and its cargo handling efficiency. Thus, apart from terminal- level cargo 
handling charges, terminal operators can have significant impact on the port 
infrastructure charges and their levels as they are deterministic in total shipping costs.  
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 Third, seaports often attempt to restructure their position as value-adders to the 
global logistics chain by increasing their efficiency and productivity such that the 
dwell time of cargo and ship turn-around times have substantially improved. Sectoral 
reform necessarily involves modifying port governance frameworks in order to 
promote the ability of the port management to increase the economic viability of the 
port operation independently. One of the basic adjustments is the separation of capital 
investment on ports from state finances and establishing the self-responsibility of port 
management for profits and losses (Sun, Wu & Skeel 2010). Various forms of state aid 
provided to seaports by EU member states was primarily aimed at restructuring ports 
and port facilities and strengthening against contemporary challenges (Pallis & 
Tsiotsis 2007).  
 On the other hand, seaports in developed and developing countries have been 
passing through several stages of structural change, yet some specific features of 
seaports in general are inextricably mixed. For instance many seaports are still owned 
and operated by governments or statutory bodies of governments. Ports in the USA are 
'landlord ports' mainly functioning as 'public enterprise' under the port administration 
of public sector port authorities (ADB 2000; Fleming & Baird 1999; Guan, Yahalom 
& Sha 2010). Many ports in Western Europe feature similar structures. In developing 
countries, port operation has shown some degree of restructuring but the port sector 
has been relatively lagging behind more industrialised counterparts such as Singapore, 
Port Klang and Dubai. On the contrary the emergence of private ports has been a result 
of port restructuring in many developed nations such as the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand. Private port entities emerged in the UK, including all 23 ports owned by 
Associated British Ports, as well as the ports of Liverpool, Manchester and Felixstow 
(Cullinane & Song 2002). The port of Felixstow shows a major structural shift in the 
UK transport policy directives in terms of transferring ownership from public to 
private (Baird 1999) and, as an example in a developing country, the port of Ambarli 
in Turkey underwent a similar process (Birsel & Cerit 2010). Similarly some of the 
major ports in Australia and all the major ports in New Zealand have been transferred 
to private sector (Everett 2009; Tull & Reveley 2001). Furthermore about 55.3 % of 
seaport entities in the EU are private sector companies which suggests the states' 
withdrawal of investment in port infrastructure and services (Paixao Casaca, Carvalho 
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& Oliveira 2010). In the world scale, seaports in over 50 countries were privatised 
between 1991 and 1998 (Ashar 2001).  
 The aforementioned facts, inferences and figures suggest that port governance and 
port operation has become more dynamic in nature with private sector participation 
and in response established ports, emerging ports,  and new ports are required to be 
equipped with the appropriate and necessary apparatuses to  face market challenges. 
One of the most debatable topics in this regard is the seaport pricing policy for port 
infrastructure services. Given the institutional changes within the seaport sector with 
private sector participation in terminal operation and other cargo related seaport 
services, how a port policy addresses the pricing issues of seaport infrastructure 
remains unsolved to date. 
 As mentioned earlier many port regions are affected by the Anglo Saxon and 
European views and do not have an appropriate seaport pricing policy. One of the best 
examples of this is the debate about whether a pricing policy reflects the true cost of 
providing port services in European port industry. The pricing policy is expected to be 
capable of establishing fair competition in the seaport industry in the European Union. 
This also raises the question whether contemporary seaports have been engaged in 
unfair competition. Undertaking research to consider seaport pricing along with port 
demand, competition, ownership and administrative structure, cost and financing and 
the tariff objectives will provide a new insight in to the seaport pricing policy 
formulation which aims to establish fair seaport competition. Moreover an 
investigation into the existing level of pricing knowledge of port authorities and its 
applicability in tariff design and other factors influential to tariff practices such as 
tariff policy, transparency, stakeholder participation and regulatory control over tariff 
will also provide new insights in to the sea port pricing practices.  
In contemporary seaports there is a clear distinction of roles, ownership and 
operation which exist mainly in the vertical direction of the seaport value chain, while 
players in the total logistics chain tend to be vertically integrated. Table 2.2 
demonstrates ownership and operational status in term of public and private sectors.  
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Table 2.2: Ownership and the Operational structure of Seaports.  
  
Ownership Operation 
Infrastructure 
  
 
Navigation aids G G 
 
Access channel G G 
 
Port basin G G 
 
Berths G G/P 
 
Terminals G G/P 
Superstructure 
                                 Cargo handling machinery G/P G/P 
Port Services 
  
 
Stevedoring G/P G/P 
 
Pilotage G/P G/P 
 
Towage G/P G/P 
  Mooring G/P G/P 
G= Public sector  P= Private sector 
  Source: Created by author 
According to Table 2.2 the ownership of port infrastructure is clearly under the public 
sector (government) and often a port authority representing the government has the 
jurisdictional powers on the ownership. The most accepted neoclassical view is that 
port infrastructure is financed through government funds which are often from 
taxpayers’ money. Therefore the cost of the provision of infrastructure does not need 
to be recovered for the reason that ports benefit the economy by way of facilitating 
international trade, generating employment directly and indirectly, and thereby 
generating regional development impacts. Nevertheless the question is what happens if 
port infrastructure is financed through long term credit facilities from international 
financial agencies and the developed infrastructure are hosted by private sector 
operators? These loans are paid by the government using the foreign exchange 
earnings of exporters and other foreign exchange sources. Should the burden of loan 
repayment be passed onto the group of consumers who indirectly benefit from the port 
service, or onto the direct users of the port services whose objective for consuming 
port services entails setting profit maximising prices for the services offered to cargo 
owners at ports?. This remains debatable. As the pricing is the most strategic element 
of the seaport policy the pricing of port infrastructure and related services requires a 
comprehensive multi- faceted approach that deviates from the customary research 
approach that often deals with the pricing of seaport infrastructure at discrete within 
the port sector research.  
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 The degree of involvement of public authorities in port service provision largely 
depends on the seaport policy used (Verhoeff 1981). The degree of involvement is 
considerably higher in countries where seaports and port services are considered as 
national assets and lower for some countries where port activities are considered to be 
economic activities with adequate returns on investment made on infrastructure and 
superstructure. The degree of public sector involvement also depends upon many other 
aspects of the institutional set-up of the port. Among these, corporate governance, 
commercialising port business, standardising procedures and reforming tariff policy to 
be on a par with the demands and the requirements of the commercial shipping 
industry are critical areas of concern.  
 Tariff structures of seaport infrastructure in ports have traditionally been formulated 
and implemented with certain changes from time to time. The tariff structure for ports 
can be analysed from three perspectives. The first is derived from the basis of tariffs. 
The commonly accepted basis is gross tonnage of vessels (GT) or net tonnage of 
vessels (NT). During the course of time ship technology has changed as has the size of 
ships, with an obvious great influence on the tonnage of ships. Thus the question is: to 
what extent does the tariff structure represent the variability of the size of the ships in 
terms of gross tonnage and also the variability of the change in the tonnage classes of 
vessels over a time?.  
 The second is based on the management of the tariff structure. Contemporary 
seaports are more dynamic, and operate as commercial entities while appreciating 
'corporate governance' within the port and the port authority. Thus, to what extent 
seaport tariffs are used as a tool in the commercialisation of the port operation is a 
matter of concern. Third is the cost relatedness of the tariff structure. Formulating a 
pricing policy based on the cost structure combined with particular elements of these 
ports (such as port ownership, competition and sea port policy) is a vital task and the 
task is tedious in the absence of an emphatically tested, sound pricing model. The 
charges for the port infrastructure and services rendered by publicly managed 
channels, basins, terminals, quays, warehouses and berths of many ports are collected 
based on approved published tariffs. Analysis of the tariff structure indicates a 
multitude of charges for the various services rendered, and is apparently not a cost-
based tariff.  
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 Price competition is one way that port authorities can be exposed to seaport 
competition (Verhoeff 1981). If public authorities are in a position to subsidise port 
service operation, port services can be under-priced against competitors. Therefore a 
general proposition can be made that, as public authorities move away from port 
service provision, the significance of price competition diminishes. The charging 
structure of ship dues (dues on port infrastructure use) gives rise to two propositions. 
First, a port may adopt low prices for larger vessels and a relatively very high charge 
for smaller vessels calling at the port. The main objective of this policy may be to 
attract larger vessels and therefore more cargo (both container and general cargo).  
Despite the fact that port tariffs are not revised for considerable periods, ports aim for 
higher yields. The port pricing policy in use may contribute largely to this 
achievement. It is for this reason that investigating the determinants of port 
infrastructure tariffs is a timely exercise.  
 The pricing scenario for ports may give rise to a few key areas of investigation. 
First, has the worldwide port industry benefited from a different port pricing policy?. 
For example, charging larger vessels a low ship due and smaller vessels a higher ship 
due. Second, has the port authority considered the growth in the size of vessels 5, 
especially feeder vessels in designing the pricing policy? Third, the applicability and 
the appropriateness of the port’s infrastructure pricing approaches needs to be 
researched in the light of the dynamic shipping industry which, according to 
UNCTAD (2014) exhibits increases in the size of vessels but a decline in the number 
of shipping companies and shipping calls.  
 The knowledge behind the tariff policy is the intent that lower tariffs (port dues) 
give incentives for more ships to call at the port and ultimately attract investments for 
industries. Therefore it appears that tariff policy is more likely to be oriented towards 
the goal behind economic development and the port is mainly concerned with its 
social function. The concept in the present context is considered to be traditional as the 
economic environment within which ports operate becomes more competitive and 
more ports behave in an oligopolistic manner. The concentration of market power by a 
port for cargo/transhipment cargo might influence the pricing decision. The market 
power of a market participant is not permanent and it depends on the ability of the 
                                                 
5
 According to Dynamar report (2007) the worldwide average size of a feeder ship run by common 
carriers is just 690 TEUs and the feeder container vessels are possibly 3000GT.  
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player to influence the price, quality of services produced and the nature of the product 
on offer. Seaports are dynamic service providers and tend to be proactive in addressing 
shipping market requirements due to changes in ship technology. Various marketing 
strategies are implemented in order to become a special point of contact for larger 
carriers with larger volumes of cargo and as result price wars or quantity setting 
competitions between seaports emerge as one of the dynamics of port operation and 
management. 
2.3 THE NATURE OF PORT INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES 
Traditionally ports were considered as public assets. Therefore port pricing was based 
on the principle of public good pricing, with the objective being to maximise social 
welfare (Strandenes & Marlow 2000). As a result the pricing of port infrastructure in 
most ports around the world was under the purview of public statutory bodies, in most 
cases port authorities. However, this view has changed radically as a result of recent 
waves of port reforms and the greater active participation of the private sector and 
transnational port operators in the sector. Initial port reforms required that the cost-
recovery approach to pricing be taken to lessen the financial burden on governments 
and ultimately on taxpayers. Subsequent port reforms allowed a more active role for 
the private sector in order to promote more competition in the sector and the use of 
external funding. These reforms have put pressure on ports to develop new pricing 
strategies that address their market position and enable them to achieve their corporate 
financial goals. 
 A port tariff structure consists of a collection of charges paid by port users, both 
cargo and vessel owners. Port tariffs are the main source of income for port 
authorities. The design of a suitable tariff structure is a necessary first step in port 
pricing. Tariff structures tend to differ substantially across countries and regions as a 
result of the variations in port governance models, national port policies, accounting 
and financing practices, and the objectives of port managements. Often, port 
infrastructure tariffs are identified depending on the type of infrastructure or service 
provided, e.g. channel dues, berth dues, pilotage, wharfage etc.  Port tariffs also vary 
depending on the scale factor or charging unit that is used as the base on which the 
tariff is set. For example, some countries use Net Registered Tonnage (NRT)6 as the 
                                                 
6
 Net Registered Tonnage is the Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) minus the spaces of the ship which 
do not provide earnings. 
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scale factor for channel due and berth hire, while others follow the International 
Tonnage Certificate of Vessels established by the London Tonnage Convention in 
1969 and use Gross Tonnage (GT). The use of the different scale factors is partly 
because NRT can be easily manipulated by a small change in the ship design, while 
GT or GRT more accurately represents the total volume of vessels. For many ports in 
the world which are operating in a competitive environment, determining the scale 
factor as a basis for port charges has been given a high priority. As a general 
examination of the use of different scale factors as the basis of various port charges, 
Heggie (1974) presented a comparison of the port charges for nine selected ports using 
different scale factors: NRT, GT, draft, Length Overall (LOA), the distance travelled 
(for pilotage), cargo tonnage and duration of service. For port dues, the most 
commonly used scale factor was either the NRT or GT of vessels. Nevertheless the 
sample size (nine) of the selected ports was too small to make any firm conclusions 
regarding the scale factor used for port dues and, as the study was conducted in 1974, 
the scale factor has presumably changed following port tariff reforms at each port 
studied.  
 As shown in Bennathan & Walters (1979), the common base for charging channel 
dues and berth hire in many developing countries is Net Registered Tonnage (NRT)7. 
Alternatively, Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) is used as the scale factor for other 
ports such as Hong Kong and Port Kelang (Malaysia). The length of the ship (LOA) is 
also used as the scale factor for berth hire but is not employed by most ports in 
developing countries. Charging on the basis of the length of the ship is clearly related 
to the cost to the port to provide an adequate quay length or manoeuvring basin. 
Another efficient basis for port dues or berth hire is the draft of the ship though this 
factor involves measurement difficulties. The port of Rotterdam applied the draft as a 
charging basis for port dues. Zachcial et al.(2006) showed that the Port of Rotterdam 
charged harbour dues based on two user categories: seagoing vessels and inland 
vessels. Seagoing vessels were charged based on ship size (GT) and the amount of 
cargo loaded and discharged during a visit. Inland vessels were charged based on 
several factors: deadweight tonnage for cargo vessels, surface area for passenger 
vessels, and GT for sea going fishing vessels; all of which suggest that there was no 
                                                 
7
 Net Registered Tonnage is the Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) minus the spaces of the ship which 
do not provide earnings. 
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common specific framework that formed the base for charging harbour dues for inland 
vessels.    
 Port infrastructure pricing practices have also led to several issues in port tariff 
design especially the basis on which port tariffs are fixed. For instance considering 
ship characteristics such as GRT, NRT, Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT), GT, Net 
Tonnage (NT) or draft of the ship as the basis for berth hire required formal 
justification8. ISL (2006) mention that GT has been used as the basis of port charges 
for almost 25 years across the European Union (EU), with the notable exception of 
French and Polish ports, which use a vessel's length, breadth and draft instead. The 
absence of a common basis may lead to another proposition that the port can fix 
different rents for different berths by taking in to account the rate of return of the 
investment made to provide the berth, which is easily calculated using the accounting 
cost. At the Port of Colombo (Sri Lanka) berth hire is charged as dockage per 100 GT. 
In addition a rental charge is levied for occupying a berth at a wharf, which starts one 
hour from the completion of discharging /unloading. Yokohama port (Japan) exempts 
a wharfage charge if dockage is charged, but charges rental for the use of land per 
square meter-month (ESCAP 2002). However the basis for the rental charges is not 
transparent. The evidence in the literature concerning the important scale factor and 
port tariff nomenclature used in other port regions is scarce.  
 When studying port pricing model determination the structure of port charges 
should also be considered, as well as the nomenclature  of port charges and the 
important scale factor used to set port charges. An analysis of the port tariff structures 
of major ports in each region shows that the tariff structure is relatively varied but 
there are some commonalities. As shown later in this study, a comparative analysis of 
port/channel dues collected from 118 ports suggests that tariff nomenclature for 
port/channel dues tends to be significantly varied, although the purpose of the charge 
is necessarily the same. GT is used most widely as the scale factor for port charges. 
The nomenclature that the system of names used to refer port infrastructure charges 
and the scale factor of port dues on vessels used in selected world ports in major port 
regions is shown in Table 2.3.  
                                                 
8
 These measurements have evolved with International Maritime organisation (IMO) conventions i.e. a 
transition from the trad itionally used terms gross register tons (grt) and net register tons (nrt) to gross 
tons (GT) and net tons (NT). 
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Table 2.3: Nomenclature and the scale factor of port infrastructure tariffs of selected 
world seaports. 
Port Region Port Name 
Conservancy Charge Berth Occupancy Charge 
Name Used Basis Name Used Basis 
Western Europe Antwerp Tonnage Dues  GT Berthing Dues  GT 
Western Europe Hamburg Port fees GT 
Berth occupancy 
charge 
GT 
Western Europe Rotterdam  Sea Harbor dues GT Quay Dues LOA 
Western Europe Bremerhaven Tonnage Charge GT Berth charge GT 
Western Europe Felixstowe Ship Dues GT Berth charge LOA 
Western Europe Constanza Port Access Tariff GT Quay Tariff LOA/GT 
Western Europe Piraeus Mooring charges  GT Berthing Charge LOA 
Western Europe Valencia Navigational aids charge GT Vessel Charge GT/hour 
Western Europe Barcelona Navigational aids charge GT Port dues(berthing) GT 
South East Asia Busan Port Due GRT Berth Hire GRT 
South East Asia Hong Kong Port facilities and light dues  GT Anchorage dues  GT 
South East Asia Kaohsiung Buoyage NT Dockage NT 
South East Asia Laem Chabang Port dues GT Berth Hire GT/hour 
South East Asia Penang Port Dues LOA Berth Occupancy LOA/Hour 
South East Asia Tanjung Priok Navigation tariff 
Fixed fee+ 
GT 
Berth charge GT 
South East Asia Tokyo Port Dues GT Wharfage Per hour 
South East Asia Ho Chi Minh Tonnage GT Service charge GT/hour 
South East Asia Manila Port Dues GRT Dockage GRT 
South East Asia Yokohama Port Dues GT Wharfage GT/hour 
North American Long Beach - - Dockage LOA 
North American Los Angeles - - Dockage LOA 
North American New York - - Dockage LOA 
North American Savannah - - Dockage LOA 
North American Vancouver Harbor dues fee GRT Berthage Fees LOA 
North American Oakland - 
 
Dockage LOA 
North American Houston Harbor fee LOA Dockage LOA 
North American Virginia - 
 
Dockage LOA 
Africa Mombasa Port and harbor dues GT Dockage LOA 
Africa Durban Port Dues GT Berth Dues GT 
Australasia Melbourne Channel fees GT Berth Hire Per hour 
Australasia Sydney Navigation service charge GT Site occupation charge Per hour 
South West Asia  Dubai Port Dues GT/GRT Berth charges GT 
South West Asia  JNU Port Dues GRT Berth Hire GRT per hour 
South West Asia  Salalah Port Dues GRT Berthing Charge Per GT  
South West Asia  Colombo Entering Dues  GT Dockage GT 
South West Asia  Jeddah Port Dues per call Berth charge GT 
South West Asia  Sarjah Port Dues GRT Berthing GRT 
South West Asia  Port Said Port Dues GRT Berthing Dues  GRT 
South West Asia  Bandar Abbas Port entry dues GT Wharfage per ton  
South American Santos Port infra fee GT Berth fee LOA 
Source: Compiled by the author based on tariff published by 118 ports included in the 
appendix XIII (tariffs are published in official web sites of port authorities). 
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Table 2.4: Seaport infrastructure, services and tariff structure. 
** included by the authors based on the tariff review of 118 sea-ports 
Source: Adapted from ESCAP (2002) and UNCTAD (1995). 
The current study found 72% of the ports studied use GT/GRT as the scale factor 
when calculating port channel dues, with 53% adopting the same scale factor for berth 
occupancy charges. Only 21% of ports use vessel LOA as the scale factor when 
calculating the berth occupancy charge. UNCTAD (1995a) and ESCAP (2002) 
recommended that ports need to standardise their tariff structures in order to improve 
their business efficiency and transparency. The main objective of the standardisation is 
to produce a tariff structure that represents a general value-chain of a virtual seaport 
TARIFF AND THE TARIFF BASE
General tariff
Aids to navigation
Conservancy, port dues:
Charging unit - Vessel GT, GRT, NRT, LOA**, Length*Beam*Draft
Differentiation - Type of vessel, GT**, GRT**, ship type**, traffic type**, LOA**
Service tariff
Pilotage
Pilotage:
Charging unit - GRT/hour**, GT**, Vessel movement
Differentiation – GRT**, GT**, LOA**, Ship type**
 Towage
Towage:    
Charging unit - Hours/Vessel movement  
Differentiation - Vessel GT*, GRT, NRT,Length*Beam*Draft                                                                                                                
Service tariff
Berthing/mooring
Berthing/Unberthing, Mooring
Charging unit - Vessel movement
Differentiation – Vessel GT*, GRT, NRT, Length*Beam*Draft
Facilities tariff
Berth Infrastructure
Berth Hire:
Charging unit – GT**, GRT**, Meter-hour, Berth-  hour, Berth-day
Differentiation - Type of berth, GT**, GRT**, ship type**, traffic type**
Services tariff
Stevedoring
Stevedoring, Wharf-Handling, Receiving/Delivery:
Charging unit - Freight ton, metric ton, cubic meter, TEU, box
Differentiation - Form of cargo
General tariff
 Wharf handling      
Cargo Dues (Wharfage):
Charging unit - Freight or metric ton, cubic meter, TEU
Differentiation - Type of commodity
Facilities tariff
Cargo Processing, Storage
Transit Storage (short term/long term):
Charging Unit - hours/ Days
Differentiation - Open or closed storage, days in storage
Services tariff
Equipment, short-term rental
Equipment Hire:
Charging unit - Half-hour, hour, shift, half-day
Differentiation - Type of equipment
Processing to different form
(Consolidation/deconsolidation
)
Cargo Processing
Charging unit - Freight ton, metric ton, cubic meter 
Differentiation - Type of storage (open, closed, frozen)
Warehousing
Warehousing (long term)
Charging unit - Week, month
Differentiation - type of cargo 
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with specifically categorised tariffs for different port infrastructure, facilities and 
various services. Table 2.4 presents the nomenclature of port tariffs adopted from the 
tariff structures recommended by UNCTAD and ESCAP and the authors’ review of 
118 sea-ports.  
In practice, given the multitude of port tariffs, the fundamental problem facing port 
pricing research in the present context is the practical implementation of pricing 
principles to pricing in the port sector. Button (1979) stated that 'it is unlikely that a 
port authority will ever be able to devise the ideal marginal social opportunity cost 
pricing policy-fluctuating demands, inadequate information, problems of 
administration are all likely to contribute to their problems of accurately pricing the 
port services'. Moreover Haralambides (2002) stated that, in the presence of better 
compiled, accurate and transparent port statistics on costs, formulating pricing policy 
for cost recovery should be possible. Further, based on a case study of European ports, 
Haralambides et al (2001) claimed that no best-practice port pricing formula exists, 
even in those ports where the pricing objective is to recover the full cost of the port 
services provided the pricing decisions are at the discretion of the management. 
Therefore the task of testing the practicability of pricing principles remains. However 
there is scope to clarify the principles of port pricing empirically and to screen the 
factors that drive seaports to adopt their own pricing strategies. However limited 
empirical research has been conducted on the pricing strategies used by ports. One 
such attempt is the ATENCO project (Haralambides et al. 2001), whose conclusions 
have been discussed above. In the European context, the study recognised a substantial 
difference in the port infrastructure financing and pricing practices across Europe. The 
difference was mainly due to the way the port management was organised, the degree 
of port autonomy and the composition of legal and traditional practices.   
 Differentiating charges for different types of port services has become one of the 
key strategies used by ports to secure their market position while competing in a 
market driven environment (Wilmsmeier 2007). As a result the structure of port 
infrastructure charges varies greatly, even though the basis of the charges is more or 
less the same. For example port charges in European ports exhibit a high level of 
differentiation (Strandenes 2004). In ports with high private sector participation the 
bundling of port charges has also been applied.  
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2.4 COST-BASED PRICING 
The principle of cost-based pricing is that the revenue gained from port services needs 
to be sufficient to cover the cost of the port services, which can be classified into two 
categories: capital costs and operational costs (Heggie 1974). As Bennathan & Walters 
(1979) explained, there are two views on port infrastructure pricing, i.e. the European 
and Anglo-Saxon views. The European view is based on the macroeconomic objective 
of ensuring and facilitating economic growth in the port hinterland9. In contrast, the 
Anglo-Saxon view aims to ensure the financial sustainability of the port: port charges 
should allow the port to cover costs and where possible make some profit. As 
Bennathan & Walters (1979) pointed out, the efficient operation of ports requires ports 
to levy prices that are based on short-run marginal costs. This implies that, when 
demand for port services is sufficiently high to cause traffic congestion, the port can 
raise its tariffs by imposing a congestion charge. Alternatively when demand is low 
and the port has spare capacity available, it could use two-part tariffs to promote more 
traffic. Thus cost-based tariffs are only used by ports that aim to achieve financial 
sustainability and self-reliance.  
 According to the European Union's Green Paper (1997) port users should bear the 
real cost of providing port services. This would allow ports to cover new investments, 
operating costs, and the external cost of the production of port services. It is also 
expected that the cost imposed on port users (vessels and cargo owners) would be 
incorporated into the freight rate and would eventually be transferred to the price of 
cargo at destination. This ensures that new investments in the port sector are demand 
driven and will allow fair competition among ports.   
2.4.1 MARGINAL COST PRICING  
The marginal cost pricing strategy sets the price of port services (P) to equal marginal 
cost (MC): P = MC. Marginal cost is defined as the cost of producing an additional 
unit of output (Nichols 2000). In principle, companies apply marginal cost (MC) 
pricing where the market is competitive. MC pricing also aims at maximising social 
welfare i.e. social surplus, and allocates resources efficiently. For example, consider 
social welfare (    which is defined as:  
                                                 
9
 The hinterland is the word applied to the inland reg ion lying behind a port, claimed by the state that 
owns the coast. The area from which products are delivered to a port for shipping elsewhere is that 
port's hinterland. 
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where: TSC is the total (social) costs 
            TR is the total revenue (Port Throughput, Q x Price, P) 
            CS is the consumer surplus 
Maximize SW in equation (1): 
              
        
  
  
      
  
   
Where:  
      
  
 is the marginal cost. Since         is the area under the demand 
curve, D= P(Q), we can re-express it as: 
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Differentiation with respect to port throughput gives: 
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 = P(Q) 
The MC pricing strategy is justified when the port is considered to be a public asset 
and therefore port users are required to pay for the marginal social cost which includes 
not only the financial marginal cost but also the marginal external cost i.e. port traffic 
congestion. Button (1979) assessed the viability of a more economic based pricing 
system and argued that the users of a port should be charged the full marginal social 
opportunity cost of the port resources consumed at a given time and, in order to ease 
the excess port traffic, incorporated a congestion charge for port users in the event of 
the port capacity being over-stretched.  
 Note that the MC pricing strategy can apply to different types of marginal cost, i.e. 
short-run marginal costs (SRMC), long-run marginal costs (LRMC) or medium-run 
marginal costs. Button (1993) explained that the difference between SRMC and LRMC  
exists in the presence of returns to scale in the port industry. Further, SRMC equals 
LRMC if the industry experiences constant returns to scale and if it were less costly 
SRMC would be appropriate for the consideration of the tariff level.  
 Bennathan & Walters (1979) showed that, because of the economies of scale in the 
provision of port infrastructure and superstructure, the port operator will experience a 
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financial deficit if the price is set equal to the marginal cost. Goss & Stevens (2001) 
confirmed the same view noting that it is only under some conditions that the SRMC 
pricing system maximises the social welfare. These conditions include a definition of 
marginal costs adapted to the accounting system where all costs including the full 
external costs must be taken in to account when prices are set, and the hypothesis is 
used that all prices in the economy must be set equal to the marginal cost of their 
production.  
 However, the MC pricing theory is invalidated in practice due to the presence of 
series of unquantifiable spill-over effects, the existence of imperfect competition and 
the presence of taxes (Button 1979). In the case unquantifiable spill over effect include 
the complexities arise due to MC pricing in the port as an business organisation and 
following managerial and financial issues. Further, in the debate over MC pricing, 
there exists a proposition that LRMC is preferred over SRMC. Haralambides (2002) 
argued that port pricing based on LRMC ensures the economic viability of the port. He 
explained that, in the presence of economies of scale, if the throughput level is less 
than the minimum efficient, setting the price equal to SRMC would result in a 
financial deficit and setting prices at LRMC would reduce the financial deficit. 
Accordingly if the objective of a port is to recover the cost of providing port 
infrastructure and services, LRMC pricing is the most appropriate. However, 
Bennathan & Walters (1979) stressed that setting SRMC pricing at less than LRMC 
encourages the use of port infrastructure. Haralambides (2002) also noted that, if the 
output is beyond the optimal scale, pricing at SRMC may result in port congestion 
which in the long term can be relieved by to the capacity expansion of competing ports 
that aim to capture some of the economic profit earned by the adjacent port. Thus the 
price again settles at the long term equilibrium (at the LRMC). 
 Based on the above conclusions and the directives of the European Commission's 
White Paper on fair payment for transport infrastructure which emphasised that the 
entire infrastructure complex of the EU as a whole may not exhibit economies of scale, 
Haralambides (2002) concluded that, at an aggregate level, it is possible to recover the 
total cost of port services by employing a MC pricing strategy. This is however 
notwithstanding the fact that the success of MC pricing is clearly based on theoretical 
justifications and certain assumptions related to competitive markets. Thus MC pricing 
has been subjected to criticism and has paved the way to alternative pricing principles.  
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Advantages of MC pricing  
Marginal cost measures the additional resources utilised by supplying a unit of port 
services. Thus, in circumstances where port authorities have made inaccurate estimates 
in their development plans, MC pricing provides a basis for pricing port services. MC 
pricing enables the prices for different services of a port to be set so that the facilities 
are used efficiently and allows port authorities to testify that the variable cost of 
providing port facilities and services is covered.  
 The fact that port authorities are uncertain about the fixed cost and able to assess 
the variable cost of providing port services would bring about estimating marginal cost 
for port services. Thus the calculation of MC pricing requires less information than 
that for average cost pricing. In addition, the formulation of a MC pricing strategy 
based on the available information on variable cost is an approximation to the accurate 
marginal cost. Pricing just above the calculated marginal cost would recoup other 
unknown elements of the variable cost. 
Disadvantages of MC pricing 
As Vickrey (1955) pointed out, the producers of public services are hesitant to adopt 
marginal cost pricing to price their services because of its 'all ramifications as an 
absolute standard'. Efficient MC pricing only works in a perfectly competitive market. 
The main issue of MC pricing is the need for adequate revenues from operation as MC 
pricing will result in a financial deficit for decreasing cost industries. Thus, as seaports 
are a decreasing cost industry, the appropriateness of MC pricing is debatable unless 
the public port authority has the support of a perfectly costless source of revenues to 
finance the deficit. The straightforward consideration however is that the deficit is 
usually covered using tax income which follows the doctrine of subsidised ports, and 
is thus a burden on tax payers. 
 Another consideration with regards to MC pricing is competition. Unfair 
competition among ports in a particular port region may arise as MC pricing fixes 
prices below the actual costs, placing peripheral ports in a disadvantageous situation. 
Thus the case of adopting MC pricing in ports may be subject to competitive laws. 
 The lack of knowledge by port authorities of the costs of port operation is a 
constraint for pricing at marginal cost and makes the accurate compilation of port 
tariffs to account for infrastructure costs difficult. As a result making appropriate 
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decisions on port investments to meet new or growing demands for port services is 
impossible and often misleading. Further, the success of MC pricing depends on the 
assumption that there is always spare capacity in all port activities. It also assumes that 
the port planning and adaptation to traffic flow are perfect. These are only theoretical 
concepts and are considered to be less relevant for planning port charging systems in 
practice. 
 Beyond the theoretical perspective, there are several practical implementation 
issues and barriers for the MC pricing strategy. The first such issue is the significant 
market power possessed by shipping lines (e.g. shipping consortia) and hub ports, 
these can create political barriers that impede the application of MC pricing.  
 Second, as most of a port's prices are determined and formulated subject to the 
relevant ministerial level of government concerning the management, finance and 
operation of seaports, the implementation of MC pricing is likely to be a sensitive 
political issue and to be hotly debated. Moreover, governments in developing 
countries may be required to pass new acts to restructure port pricing decision making 
mechanisms. For example the port tariff of the Sri Lankan port authority is subject to 
the 1979 Act No 51, clause 37 (1) which states that 'the charges that may be levied by 
the port authority for the services provided by the authority shall be fixed, and may be 
revised from time to time, by the authority with the approval of the minister who shall, 
before giving his approval, consult the minister in charge of the subject of finance' 
(UN 1989a). Similar situations are found in most of the Chinese, Korean and 
Australian ports. For example, the Port of Melbourne (Australia) is subject to the Port 
of Melbourne Authority Act (1958) and the Port of Melbourne regulations (1965) 
which both define the pricing power of the port authority. The Port of Melbourne is 
also subject to the Subordinate Legislation Act (1984) which defines pricing power 
and places constraints on raising rates and charges (UN 1989b). BTE (1989) stated 
that the market power of Australian port authorities and the demarcation of port 
authority policies including the pricing of port services, were determined by the 
legislative and executive powers of the state governments.   
 Third, the port authorities especially in developing countries have shown that there 
is a lack of available information and data pertaining to cost, making the assessment 
and formulation of new tariff regimes difficult. Information management is not 
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sufficient to allow proper assessment of the factors pertaining to the new pricing 
design. For that reason, Haralambides (2002) claimed that a proper pricing policy 
required a better compilation of statistics, transparent port accounts and accurate 
accounting systems in every port.   
2.4.2 AVERAGE COST PRICING  
In adopting a suitable pricing principle, the central problem relates to a divergence 
between average and marginal costs (Coase 1946). This stems from two fundamental 
problems. First is the method by which costs that are common to consumers are 
allocated between consumers. Second is how the return of the fixed costs, which 
usually yield a rent, is determined given that the values of fixed costs are related to the 
factors of the production employed in the beginning of the production process.  
Average cost (AC) pricing addresses many of the issues facing MC pricing and is 
applied when there is a need for full cost recovery; the price is set equal to the average 
cost of the production of port infrastructure and services i.e. P = AC. This lead s to a 
break-even situation for the port operation which can operate further with normal 
profit generated by the pricing policy. Note that the early literature on public 
expenditure theories justified the provision of a particular public service at the cost of 
public capital and that the pricing of these services were exempt from the requirement 
of the full cost recovery from direct beneficiaries. The justification of this exemption 
was that the pricing promotes the use of the service which in turn produces multiple 
external benefits to the economy (Abouchar 1979).    
 With regard to seaports, tariffs imposed on vessels derived based on the average 
costs and the expected port traffic are advantageous as, provided the actual port traffic 
equals the expected port traffic, this strategy assures that the revenues collected offset 
the total costs. This approach is an appropriate pricing strategy to achieve budgetary 
objectives such as the aim to recover all the costs. Moreover the approach results in 
economies of scale if the port experiences an increasing throughput. Conversely this 
also implies that the outcome of AC pricing is inefficient in a situation where a port 
experiences less traffic. Thus there is a tendency to set prices higher when the demand 
for port services is less and lower when demand is strong. However, this approach 
discourages port callers with less ability to pay the price.  
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2.4.3 OPERATING COST PRICING  
The operating cost pricing (OCP) principle is based on the unit variable cost of 
providing port services. Average variable cost pricing is a form of predatory pricing 
and it is a possible pricing strategy between competitive pricing and the pure predatory 
pricing (Rosenbaum 1987). In port sector, OCP is obtained by taking the total variable 
cost divided by the expected demand for the port services and facilities (ESCAP 
2002). Since contemporary port handling is capital intensive in nature, variable cost 
tends to be less than fixed cost. However OCP is applicable to more labour intensive 
cargo handling operations i.e. break-bulk cargo handling operations. The pricing 
scheme is more rational in terms of covering the financial obligation involved in the 
provision of port services and ensures the maximum utilisation of port services 
provided at a given time. 
2.4.4 CONGESTION PRICING10 
Congestion pricing was first applied to road transport and in the form of a variable toll 
intended to reduce peak period traffic volumes to optimal levels (Litman 2011; 
Vickrey 1992). The congestion pricing method has been applied to ports where traffic 
exceeds the handling capacity of the port. Port congestion severely hinders the 
efficiency of a port and impacts on the selection of a port by port users (Tongzon 
2009). Port congestion causes vessels to wait until a berth space is available and 
waiting is an additional cost for vessels. In most instances the waiting time of ships at 
ports is one of the major characteristics considered by shipping lines in port selection. 
To bring demand to a sustainable level the price of the commodity in demand (i.e. 
berth space) needs to be raised. In essence this suggests that ports may need to add a 
premium onto the existing port charges to reflect the cost of the externa lity generated 
by vessels to incoming vessels. In practice however port tariffs are not raised in the 
belief that rises in port tariffs would cause imported commodity prices to rise and 
exporting commodity prices to fall (Bennathan & Walters 1979). However the 
presence of port congestion even in the absence of congestion pricing in seaports 
affects domestic shippers and consumers as, in most cases, competitive tramp ship 
operators and liner shipping operators usually charge to cover the additional expenses 
                                                 
10 This refers to pricing mechanisms designed to induce the economically -efficient use of congestible 
facilit ies. This method stems from welfare economics as a way of internalising the externality (the so -
called Pigouvian Solution, A.C Pigou 1920)  
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due to ships waiting in the queues. In practice most ports do not openly engage in 
congestion pricing.  
 The rationale for establishing a port congestion charge, as described by Noritake 
(1985), is to decrease or eliminate such external negative effects caused by congestion. 
The literature on MC pricing suggests that pricing at marginal cost incorporated with a 
charge on congestion, results in a better pricing scheme which reflects the societal cost 
of the use of the scarce resources of the port. Nevertheless, in practice, the application 
of MC pricing including a premium for externalities (congestion, environment 
hazards, risk of accidents) is not found in the present port sector (Vincent 1989). Thus 
congestion pricing can be regarded as sub-set of social optimal pricing.  
Advantages of Congestion Pricing  
- In a congested port, application of a congestion surcharge brings the port 
infrastructure and superstructure to a socially optimal level of utilisation 
(Noritake 1985).  
- Ports which are subjected to vicious shipping cycles are able to manage the 
port traffic and at the same time generate a flow of income which could be 
used to expand the existing port superstructures with more efficient 
technology, from which undesirable responses or effects from shipping lines 
can be mitigated.  
- Levying a congestion charges instigates the use of existing port facilities at a 
more efficient level. 
Disadvantages of Congestion Pricing  
- A major obstacle to the implementation of port congestion pricing schemes is 
their administrative complexity and the unavailability of a mechanism by 
which the level of the levy can be determined based on the incoming port 
traffic.  
- The attempt to internalise port congestion effects to port users will be 
substandard if port users pass the cost burden to shippers through increased 
freight charges (Strandenes & Marlow 2000) 
2.4.5 MULTI PART TARIFF 
The MC pricing discussed earlier tends to result in a financial deficit. The method also 
results in full utilisation of port capacity. Port operation is capital intensive and 
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marginal cost, hence the prices set based on the MC principle tend to be low and result 
in overutilisation (Bennathan & Walters 1979). The MC pricing method is also 
difficult to apply in practice because MC can be defined differently depending on the 
variable input. To overcome these issues, Button (1979) suggested three alternative 
options to deviate from MC pricing i.e. subsidising port operation, imposing 
discriminatory pricing for users and applying a two-part tariff. The first part of the 
two-part tariff consisted of the marginal social cost, and the second part was a fixed 
charge for the right to use the facility, which enabled a port authority to still adhere 
implicitly to the MC pricing principle. This pricing method is based on the Ramsay 
pricing principle11 which is designed in such a way that one party pays for the fixed 
asset cost recovery and the other party pays for variable cost recovery, or one party 
combines both cost components.  
One approach to multipart tariffs is to give a regular port caller i.e. a liner service, a 
lower port charge compared to a casual port caller, i.e. a tramp service. This provides 
the justification for the discounted port charges currently applied by ports. This pricing 
system produces cost advantages to ship owners who call regularly into a port 
compared to casual callers, and also allows the port to plan a quay occupancy schedule 
in advance, to avoid underutilisation of capacity and time wastage. This also suggests 
that the multipart tariff can be used to solve berth allocation problems. 
Types of multipart tariff systems 
Bennathan & Walters (1979) identify four main parts of the tariff: 
1. Lease a quay (LAQ) 
The port authority builds the facility and then rents this out to either a single user 
or to a shipping consortium on an annual or long term basis with tariff 
revisionary clauses. The rent is independent of the extent to which the facility is 
used. Other facilities required for the functioning of the quay will be charged by 
the port authority at the standard rate which is not stated in the lease agreement.  
 
                                                 
11 Ramsey pricing is  concerned with prices that maximise the sum of industry consumer surplus and 
profits. This version of price discrimination is sometimes called 'Second Best Pricing' since it deviates 
from 'First Best Pricing’ where P = MC (allocative efficient). The basis is that those with a high 
willingness to pay (inelastic demand) have to pay higher prices than those less willing to pay (elastic 
demand), (Button 1993). 
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2. Annual fee to enter (AFTE)  
The introduction of an annual fee to enter the port allows ships to enjoy a lower 
entry fee per call and, in the event of a overcapacity situation at a port, the entry 
fee for the call can be virtually zero. The rationale behind the AFTE is to recover 
the dredging cost of the channel, and therefore the fee is related to the draft of 
the vessel. The AFTE is usually set to reduce as the number of visits by the ship 
to the port increases. Two decisions have to be made before designing the 
AFTE, these are: 
 Whether the charge should be levied only on the shipping firm or should it be 
paid by a wider group such as a consortium. 
 What selection methodology will be adopted to calculate the standing charge.  
The AFTE charge should reduce as the number of ship visits increases. This 
suggests that modified forms of the AFTE can be devised that provide a discount 
for ships according to the number of visits to the port. Alternatively a port 
authority, with the aid of a port marketing strategy could offer packages based 
on the number of visits during a year.  
3. Container Charges 
Container charges result from the availability of an excess capacity of container 
terminals, the competition between ports for container traffic and the low and 
diminishing marginal cost of handling containers. Ports tend to charge a higher 
mark-up price over marginal cost to attract traffic and realise gains by providing 
faster ship turnaround times for container vessels (often owned by consortia). As 
the container traffic increases ports realise a fall in unit cost in container 
handling which, with investments in advanced container handling technology, 
allows them to keep charges low to realise economies of scale (Bennathan & 
Walters 1979). This way it is possible for a port authority to establish a charging 
system comprised of two prices: a low variable charge for handling and a fixed 
charge (rent) for the port facilities used by the liner shipping operators.  
4. Shippers' License to use port (LUP) 
The LUP for shippers, similar to the AFTE, is another strategy that can be used 
to charge for the use of port facilities and services. A shipper, in this context is 
an agent who represents the vessel and pays on behalf of the services used by the 
vessel. The shipper can be charged a price equal to the marginal cost of the use 
of the facility and the other port services. The irregularity of the port use gives 
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rise to a two part tariff, i.e. a regular charge and a special charge (which shippers 
use to base their decision on which port to choose). To attract shippers to the 
LUP system, the quantity discount method is used. 
5. Port charges as a percentage levy 
This is applied in order to overcome some of the complications of multipart 
tariffs such as favouring shipping consortia, the difficulty in determining a fixed 
charge and the administrative complexity. In this case all port charges are 
converted into a percentage levy on the freight charge, i.e. port charges are 
recorded as a constant fraction of the freight charge.  
However there is a difficulty in applying multipart tariffs to port services as the 
meaningful allocation of port costs between different types of port traffic is a very 
cumbersome exercise. In other words there is no single supplier of port services to a 
particular consumer or user in the port. 
The advantages and disadvantages of multipart tariffs are listed below. 
Advantages of Multipart tariffs 
- The multipart tariff pricing strategy encourages the establishment of a regular 
port caller list, this makes planning berth/quay occupancy schedules easier, thus 
minimising time waste and waiting cost. 
- The multipart tariff enables costs to be covered without restricting the use of the 
facility. 
- In the case of LAQ, shipping consortia who lease the terminal tend to adjust 
their use of the facilities to minimise the cost and avoid underutilisation of the 
facility. 
- The LAQ system encourages profit maximisation and increasing efficiency.  
- LAQ provides an opportunity to combine public ownership with private 
efficiency. 
- AFTE provides the basis for a charge to recover the dredging cost of a port. 
- The AFTE system can be easily modified and port marketing strategies can be 
incorporated into the pricing policy. 
- The LAQ system is particularly useful when there are commodity transits in 
mass quantities. Thus the leasing party would try to maximise the use of the 
facility. 
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- The opportunities for the LAQ system are boundless for terminals with larger 
containerised cargo and the method can be used as a bargaining tool for securing 
this traffic, while opportunities are limited for smaller containerised terminals 
and other unitised cargo markets.  
- Container charges will encourage liner consortia to bid for additional traffic 
thereby making the port to realise constant gains from container handling.  
- The container charging system is effective in extracting addition profit provided 
there is substantial competition among liner shipping for the container facilities  
and services provided by the port.   
The port charges as a percentage levy system could reduce the line shipping 
cost, thereby encouraging a lower freight rate.  
- In the case of transhipment cargo, where the elasticity of demand for 
transhipment cargo is greater than for domestic cargo, the port charges as a 
percentage levy system would raise the revenue of a port. Thus a port could 
place its position as a potential hub. 
- The port charges as a percentage levy system would encourage consortia vessels 
and other vessels to use the port more frequently with small loads of cargo. 
- The port charges as a percentage levy system is, in an economic sense, a logical 
system of pricing as it automatically encompasses the variations in the general 
price level. This is because freight rates are reflected with the changing cost of 
shipping due to the increase and decrease in the prices of ship operating services 
such as bunkering, labour and ship prices.    
- The port charges as a percentage levy system is the most simplistic charging 
method. It is not required to account for port costs in great detail.  
- The port charges as a percentage levy system is more suitable for liner services 
as their services are concentrated in connecting major ports.   
Disadvantages of Multipart tariffs  
- The irregularity of ship calls makes the implementation of multipart tariffs 
difficult. 
- Designing tariffs for regular port callers and casual port callers could be 
controversial.  
- Lower tariffs for regular port callers places regular callers at an advantage over 
casual callers. 
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- There is currently limited application of the LAQ system to ports in the 
developing world. 
- The LAQ system could lead to a creation of monopolised terminals owned by a 
shipping consortium.  
- AFTE is applicable and implementable only when the facility is not subjected to 
congestion.  
- The AFTE system confers greater advantages to a larger ship owner of liner 
ships or a consortium and is biased towards the large user.  
- The AFTE system is therefore discriminates against non-consortium or single 
ship owners and would add further monopoly powers to shipping consortium.  
- The AFTE system could hinder competition among non-consortium or single 
ship operators. The competition among non-conferencing ships provides the 
safeguard for trade in developing countries.  
- The AFTE system is very complex to administer.  
- The AFTE quantity discount system is effective when the port calls are 
dominated by few liner conferences.  
- The LUP system incorporated with a quantity discount would be biased towards 
larger ships to allow them to be concentrated heavily in the port.  
- The LUP system is difficult to administer particularly in the case of reselling it 
to other shippers.  
- In practice however LUP could be confined to shipping agents rather than 
shippers. 
- The proposition that port charges as a percentage levy would encourage 
consortia vessels and other vessels to use the port more frequently with small 
load of cargo is in practice unlikely to take place in the presence of liner 
shipping practices such as vessel pooling and vessel sharing.  
- The revenue generated from the port charges as a percentage levy system would 
be vulnerable to the oscillations of the freight rate. This charging system is 
functionally related to shipping cycles.  
- The port charges as a percentage levy system would be a move away from 
charging strategies that are based on cost. The port charges as a percentage levy 
system is no longer considering implicit costs such as the costs generated from 
the congestion of port facilities. Moreover the special charges such as storage 
charges, charges for extra labour use and quay use are not included in the levy.  
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- The port charges as a percentage levy system may be distorted in the hands of 
shippers and agents by quoting lower freight charges in order to claim benefits 
from paying less port charges. However this would not be possible in the case of 
liner shipping as freight charges are usually published.  
- It is difficult to apply the port charge as a percentage levy system to tramp 
shipping on charter, where no specific freight rate is charged for cargo.   
The multipart tariff strategy and its different forms demonstrate that there is no 
universal multipart tariff pricing strategy applicable to all port prices. Each system 
applied above would have its own advantages as well as inherent weaknesses. 
Multipart tariffs form the basis for strategic port pricing.    
2.5 ALTERNATIVE PRICING STRATEGIES 
Port planning and development, the port investment criteria and policies, and the port 
pricing policies and techniques are major aspects of port management. Port pricing 
policies and techniques based on the economic approach, as discussed under cost-
based pricing, primarily opt for marginal cost pricing, taking into consideration the 
effects on all parties involved in the production of port services and the benefits 
derived by others. The financial approach, as an alternative to the economic approach, 
argues that the prices set are based on accounting costs, so that both the fixed cost and 
the variable cost are covered while realising an adequate return. Nevertheless both 
approaches feature inherited weaknesses and practical implementation issues which 
remain for further investigation and discussion. It is agreed however that the efficient 
use of port services requires each port service to be priced according to its respective 
cost of production. In a situation where the costs of port services which are usually 
paid by the shippers are high, a decision by port management to raise revenues to 
cover increased costs by lifting port charges on vessels will hinder the efficiency of 
pricing and distort the relation between port charges and the costs across all port 
operation, which are mainly in common. Thus, the pricing in this context needs to be 
an integral element in the strategic plan of a port. 
 While ports can set their tariffs using cost-based strategies, which are essentially 
based on the economic principle that takes into account production cost, there are 
other pricing methods that are not based on this economic principle. UNCTAD 
(1995a) following its first publication on port pricing in 1975, presented a report on 
'strategic port pricing'. Research on port pricing undertaken since then has mainly 
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focused on providing practical suggestions and recommendations for port pricing, and 
is far from producing a practical pricing solution that can untangle inextricably mixed 
port pricing practices.  
2.5.1 STRATEGIC PORT PRICING  
According to UNCTAD (1995a), the 'strategic port pricing' strategy takes into account 
not only the port’s costs but also its performance and the value of its services. This 
approach is based on three elements: cost (C), performance (P) and value (V), the so 
called 'CPV approach'. It recognises the fact that improvements in both the financial 
and the operational performance of ports are necessary to deal with the emerging 
competitive environment within the maritime industry. Thus, strategic pricing is 
expected to help a port to achieve competitive advantages. The objective underlying 
the strategic pricing approach is threefold (UNCTAD 1995a, p.13): 
- 'The  cost-based  tariffs  are  used  to  achieve  the  marketing  objective  of 
maximizing the use of port services and the financial objective of covering the 
variable costs of these services.   
- Performance-based tariffs are used to achieve first, the operational objective of 
maximizing the throughput of port facilities while limiting the level of congestion 
experienced by users and secondly, the marketing objective of minimizing the 
loss of traffic owing to congestion.  
- The value-based tariffs are used to meet the financial objective of generating 
sufficient revenues to cover the ports' costs and the marketing objective of 
limiting the loss of traffic as a result of generating these revenues'.  
The CPV approach is however based on the following assumptions: that the port 
charges being compared between ports are for the same port services ; the ports being 
compared are competing for the same traffic; and the port costs alone should not 
determine the level of tariffs (which are seldom realistic). Given the increasing level of 
shipping market concentration, there is a need to expose shipping lines to more 
competition, and the strategic pricing of port services is needed (Bennathan & Walters 
1979). It is customary that, by their practical operation, shipping consortia would not 
reduce freight rates when they can achieve cost savings through improving shipping 
operation or port services (brought about by forming strategic alliances and consortia), 
(Bennathan & Walters 1979). Despite this, recent developments in the liner shipping 
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industry have diminished the ability of ports to apply strategic pricing. The formation 
of global strategic alliances among former liner shipping lines represents a new level 
of cooperation over major shipping route networks by optimising lines' assets through 
sharing vessels, ports, charters, terminals and joint scheduling of services (Slack, 
Comtois & Mccalla 2002). 
 Shipping consortia often practice price discrimination against shippers; by the 
origin, destination or value of the cargo. Strategic pricing by ports in this context can 
be applied directly as a counter discrimination method or indirectly as a method 
formulated to weaken the discriminatory price power of shipping consortia (Bennathan 
& Walters 1979). However this argument is invalidated in the presence of integrated 
global shipping alliances which can maintain stable freight rates over the same routes 
or in the same shipping regions. In addition the shipping alliances now have larger 
vessels and the sizes of vessels continue to grow. The survival of ports now depends 
on the ability of ports to satisfy the requirements of liner ships, such as deep channels 
and longer berth facilities, which can accommodate larger vessels with bigger drafts 
(Ryan 2002). 
 According to Bennathan & Walters (1979), one of the most visible areas of 
discriminatory pricing is ship due, as ports can impose charges based on the type of 
ship used by shipping line operators. Accordingly the monopoly power of liner 
consortia could be curbed by encouraging competition with a discriminatory pricing 
strategy favouring bulk carriers and tramp vessels, and charging relatively higher fees 
for liner consortia. This way the revenue loss from low port charges can be recovered 
while consortia are exposed to competition. Thus tramp shipping that enjoys lower 
port charges will be more competitive and in turn will be able to negotiate for lower 
freight rates than the conferences. 
 Despite the benefits that a port authority receives in terms of revenue, it is difficult 
for the port authorities to identify whether a vessel operates in a consortium or not. If 
this is the case, the ability of the port authority to impose counter discriminatory 
pricing strategies is weakened. Furthermore, the discrimination against liner consortia 
tends to exacerbate relationships between consortia and port authorities and sometimes 
even with governments. It is suggested that a port could realise a substantial position 
in a competitive shipping market rather than a monopoly market i.e. consortium. This 
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however requires a long term strategy when a varying degree of competitive mix of 
shipping services is found in the port. 
 The only evidence for strategic pricing is found in privatised ports. Ashar (2001) 
presented a methodology for port pricing by analysing the strategic environment 
within which privatised ports have to operate and set charges in line with their 
organisational structure and strategic environment. His study supported strategic port 
pricing as a new method that differed from others discussed in the pre-privatisation 
era, i.e. MC pricing, full cost recovery pricing and multipart tariffs. 
2.5.2 DISCRIMINATORY PRICING  
Discriminatory pricing is based on the expression 'charging what the traffic can bear', 
which implies that the port charges are differentiated for a given service according to 
the individual customer's ability to pay. This is regarded as the best pricing policy 
from a social point of view when a public utility or infrastructure services are subject 
to budget constraints. Discriminatory pricing tends to be set based on cargo units.  
There are some advantages involved in discriminatory pricing: 
- Discriminatory pricing differentiates port charges for a given port service 
according to the individual benefits as revealed by the individual's ability to pay. 
- Discriminatory pricing is the best pricing principle from the social point of view 
when a public port is operating under a budget constraint.  
- Discriminatory pricing is meaningful as the capital cost of ports (which the port 
dues are meant to recover), could not be allocated between traffics. Thus 
discriminatory pricing promotes capacity utilisation which in turn keeps down 
the capital cost per ton of throughput.  
A good example of discriminatory pricing is the Fully Distributed Cost Method 
(FDC). This method allocates common costs proportionally among the different 
services provided through a common infrastructure. As identified by Braeutigam 
(1980) for regulated industries in general, Bergantino (2002, p.361) re-stated the three 
general rules of the FDC method in the port context as;  
- 'The distribution of shared costs on the basis of the relative quota of port output 
of the specific service with respect to total output (relative output criterion);  
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- The distribution of common costs on the basis of the share of costs directly 
imputable to each service; 
- The distribution of common costs in relation to the gross revenues generated'.  
The discriminatory pricing strategy is implemented by using differential ship dues. 
The fees are levied according to the type of ship employed by liner operators, tramp 
service operators and bulk vessel owners. Ports can strategically set ship dues to 
control the monopoly power of liner consortia by encouraging competitors. Thus it is 
possible to discriminate in favour of bulk carriers or tramp services and charge higher 
fees for liner consortia. This way the port authorities may be able to recoup the losses 
from dues on under-priced tramp or bulk carriers. However this depends on the extent 
to which liner consortia react to the increased ship dues. It is important that liner ships 
do not pass the cost burden onto freight rates.  
2.5.3 COMMERCIAL PRICING  
The commercial pricing strategy is based on the notion that the price of a good or 
service should reflect its market value, e.g. its  quality, durability and brand. By the 
same token, port services should be priced based on their quality. The quality of the 
port services is embedded in the generalised cost of using the port for users; of which 
time of stay in the port, low damage to cargo, high safety standards and ship 
turnaround time are critical for port selection. Strandenes & Marlow (2000) proposed 
such a pricing system with a view to maximise port competitiveness, however as in the 
other private sector market players, the objective of commercial pricing in ports is also 
to maximise profit. However there are exceptional situations in commercial pricing 
practices such that some categories of port tariffs are reduced below the general tariff 
level for specific vessel traffic categories with the objective of attracting more traffic. 
For instance, in the Flemish port of Ghent (Belgium), the  removal of dock dues and 
lowering of mooring charges for container vessels operating short sea shipping is 
expected to bring about intermodal competition and more hinterland cargo to the port 
(Zachcial et al. 2006).  
 As noted by the Asian Development Bank, reforms in the port sector provide a 
strong justification for commercial pricing as they help to increase the operational 
efficiency, improve the chance of commercial success, promote timely port 
investments, reduce risk on return and provide access to capital (ADB 2000). In 
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addition, the private terminal operators within public ports have also engaged in direct 
marketing strategies with shipping lines, commercial pricing and the differentiation in 
the quality of the cargo services provided. It is also recognised that, in the process of 
private sector participation in port terminal operation, the pricing structure of public 
sector port monopolies has been replaced with a commercial pricing strategy based on 
the value to the user, rather than on the average cost to the port (ADB 2000). In this 
context commercial pricing is a rather appropriate complement to port privatisation 
schemes.  
2.6 PORT INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING: DIRECTION OF 
LITERATURE 
This section aims to evaluate the existing literature on port pricing especially in terms 
of the trends in research on infrastructure pricing. Port pricing has been covered in 
many studies and various perspectives have been discussed (Pallis et al. 2011; Woo, 
Pettit, Beresford & Kwak 2012). Port infrastructure pricing has been the main area of 
concentration in studies by Dowd & Fleming (1994), Haralambides (2002) and Talley 
(1994). However, with only a few exceptions, most studies on this topic concentrate 
mainly on the theoretical and policy perspectives (Acciaro 2013). Several approaches 
to port infrastructure pricing from the theoretical perspective have been covered in the 
literature. One of the most popular pricing approaches is the cost-based approach as 
mentioned earlier. This includes marginal cost pricing by Abbes (2007a), Button 
(1979), Goss & Stevens (2001), Haralambides (2002a), Meersman, Monteiro, 
Pauwels, Voorde & Vanelslander (2007b) and Swahn (2002); average cost pricing by 
Gardner, Marlow & Pettit (2006); and cost-axiomatic pricing by Talley (1994). Other 
pricing approaches include strategic pricing by Ashar (2001), congestion pricing, 
priority pricing and port slot auctions by Strandenes (2004). Dowd and Fleming (1994, 
p.31) noted: 
 'Clearly there is no single pricing approach that is accepted and applied uniformly 
by all ports. Nor can it be said that there is a "best approach", given the diversity in 
port characteristics, types of ownership, philosophies of management, specific goals, 
etc. These differences are reflected in the pricing approach or combination of  
approaches that they [the port] use, and, of course, there are always cases of 
mismanagement and misguided policies!' 
57 
 
 From the theoretical perspective, marginal cost pricing was favoured in the earlier 
research work of Button (1979) and Heggie (1974) as it helped to achieve a socially 
optimal outcome that made the most efficient use of resources. However, as discussed 
by Goss & Stevens (2001), Haralambides et al. (2001), Meersman, Monteiro, Pauwels, 
Voorde & Vanelslander (2007), and Meersman, Van De Voorde & Vanelslander 
(2002), while this method has many advantages, it is also subject to disadvantages, 
particularly the challenge of its application to port tariff design in practice. Together 
with the emphasis on achieving marginal cost pricing for port infrastructure, the 
relationship between the short-run and long-run marginal cost pricing has not been 
resolved adequately (Commission of the European Communities 1997). 
 Beyond the theoretical foundation and the practical implementation of marginal 
cost pricing for port infrastructure, a substantial number of extant literature focuses on 
the policy and practical aspects of port infrastructure pricing. These studies have 
attempted to unravel the issue of port pricing by approaching the subject from a 
multitude of perspectives. Overall, the methodologies and the research design of these 
studies do not provide sufficient scope for understanding the determinants of port 
infrastructure charges. The subject of these studies and their discussion has been 
centred only on the European port sector. This is mainly due to European transport 
policy prescriptions envisaging fair competition in the maritime sector, implying that 
port infrastructure pricing needs to be based on a commonly accepted pricing criterion. 
Accordingly studies commissioned by the EU attempted to explain how a fair port 
pricing policy could be achieved in the EU port context.  
 Concerning the policy perspective of port pricing, Gardner, Marlow & Pettit (2006) 
examined how the full cost recovery principle can be applied to EU ports. Their study 
focused mainly on the three ports of Felixstowe (UK), Dover (UK) and Dublin (the 
Republic of Ireland), and found evidence that the full cost recovery approach does not 
necessarily result in large increases in port charges. Their findings challenged the 
proposition made earlier by Baird (1999, p.1) that 'full cost recovery for private ports, 
privatised ports, as well as for public ports, remains an elusive ideal'. Perez-Labajos & 
Esteban Garcia (2000), Haralambides (2002) & Meersman, Van de Voorde & 
Vanelslander (2003) studied port tariff setting principles. Perez-Labajos & Esteban 
Garcia (2000) developed a methodology to evaluate efficient tariffs for commercial 
port services and proposed an objective function for all port services that could 
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estimate the deviation of port tariffs from their optimal level. However, the 
methodological frameworks employed in these studies do not cover port infrastructure 
prices and costs.  
 From the perspective of port pricing practice, some studies address various issues in 
pricing practices. Dowd & Fleming (1994) provide a guide on port tariff design and 
identify the key factors influential to port tariffs. According to the authors, port tariffs 
can be designed in several stages. The first stage involves internal examination of 
historical costs, imputed costs and sensitivity analysis; the second stage is external 
examination; the third stage is to seek approval on the new tariffs; and the last stage is 
to decide the actual tariffs, which can be different from those approved by the 
authority.  
 The aforementioned review showed that there is difficulty in assessing port costs, 
particularly marginal costs, and in identifying the costs associated with specific port 
operations (Haralambides 2002). Existing studies on port pricing mainly focus on 
theoretical and policy perspectives and have limited empirical research (the former 
being largely on pricing principles and the latter on tariff structure and charging 
practices). Thomas (1978) provided a general description of port charging practices 
and analysed stevedoring charging practices in terms of their advantages and 
disadvantages. The study identified that the nature of demand for cargo handling 
services and the degree of inter-dependence between stevedoring companies are major 
determinants of a pricing policy, but have no relation to port infrastructure charges.  
 Following the same tradition of Thomas (1978), Dowd & Fleming (1994) 
conducted an empirical investigation of port pricing in general that encompassed the 
processes of port price determination. They proposed a guide to effective port pricing, 
based on the US and Canadian port system, and developed a procedure for port price  
determination. The port pricing procedure involved several stages: an internal 
examination in which port prices were calculated based on historical costs, imputed 
costs and a sensitivity analysis; an external examination; a determination of a tariff 
rate. The study is based solely on information gathered by the authors from North 
American ports and has no support from the port pricing literature. Therefore the 
output of the study can be considered as the generalisation of the pricing process in the 
US/Canadian context and a mere policy guideline for determining port charges. As a 
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major weakness, the entire explanation is based on the explicit assumption of the 
availability of port cost data, which is rather unacceptable as this data is not 
transparent (Haralambides 2002; Psaraftis 2007), despite exceptional efforts from 
governments to make port costs and pricing structures transparent such as in the 
Flemish port sector (Zachcial et al. 2006).  
 Wilmsmeier (2007) advanced the literature on port tariff structure by analysing the 
tariff structure of European container ports in terms of the differentiation of charges 
from the port users’ perspective. More importantly port infrastructure charge 
differentiation is viewed as a mean of securing a port's market position in a market 
driven environment characterised with increased competition and differentiation of 
port services. The research also highlighted the fact that seaports are required to be 
financially independent, following the Anglo-Saxon view. The findings of the study 
shed light on port infrastructure charges and its determinants. It has also been shown 
that the degree of port competition and the type of port governance model have direct 
implications on the port infrastructure charge differentiation. However the research 
does not consider the relationship between the degree of competition and the type of 
port governance model, with the port infrastructure charge differentiation.  
 Gardner, Marlow & Pettit (2006) have developed a questionnaire to survey port 
pricing practices and related issues. The survey covers general port information on 
throughput statistics, competitors, container traffic and hinterland modal share, and 
port pricing policy information. The pricing policy information largely requests 
financial data in terms of port costs and revenues. The accuracy of this data is not 
certain as Haralambides (2002) asserted that accurately measured port costs and 
relaible and comparable port statistics are not in existance, and importantly the port 
accouting sytems from which cost and revenue data are generated are not always 
transparent. The information gathered by Gardner, Marlow & Pettit (2006) on the 
views of port authorities on the pricing principles adopted has provided a general 
understanding of the pricing objectives of port authories and the motivation for port 
pricing. To furnish the gap of unavailability of a common tariff structure ESCAP 
(2002) produced a comparative analysis of port tariffs including port infrastructure, 
but the study was limited to the ESCAP region. In fact, the study only considered a 
comparison of the port tariff structures of ESCAP ports and did not consider factors 
influential to different tariff structures and levels in general.  
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
As the port sector has evolved through different phrases of development, so have 
pricing practices. The review of the literature on seaport pricing principles has found 
that no single rule of thumb can be applied to all port charges and there is no common 
agreement on the way port pricing principles are categorised. However, the cost-based 
pricing approach that encompasses many pricing strategies provides a basic tool to 
determine port tariffs. The literature also indicates that port tariff formulation and 
practice can be complex and varies substantially worldwide. 
 Among the types of cost-based strategies, marginal cost (MC) pricing enables the 
maximisation of collective benefit and the most possible efficient use of resources, but 
does not cover the investment cost of the port. Essentially, this means that MC pricing 
is a price that maximises social welfare and in the current study the approach is 
referred as ‘social optimal pricing’. Alternatively, average cost pricing enables costs 
incurred by ports including capital investments to be recovered and consequently 
encourages investments and eases port congestion. It is understood that a significant 
constraint exists on average cost pricing, with the often opaque cost accounting 
systems seen in ports and the competitive pricing practices of ports acting as barriers. 
Multipart tariffs, often two parts pricing, enable ports to recover the cost of any 
investments and establishes a relationship with the marginal cost, whilst also allowing 
collective net benefits to be maximised. Ramsey prices have a specific nature that 
enable a minimisation of the 'loss of benefits' in relation to the marginal cost criterion 
or provide the basis for price discrimination. Compared to the other pricing practices 
the port charges as a percentage levy system is a straight forward pricing scheme.  
 The review of the literature has also identified different trends in the research into 
port pricing. The first is the debate concerning the principles of port infrastructure 
pricing from the theoretical and policy perspectives. This attempts to explain what an 
optimal port tariff should be, by drawing theoretical justifications and conducting 
empirical investigations, and also provides policy recommendations. The second is the 
port tariff structure and port tariff in practice, which is primarily concentrated on the 
analysis of port tariff structures, their determination and their application in the port 
sector. However empirical research on port infrastructure remains rather limited. 
Although typology of port pricing schemes are different and there are no accepted best 
practices in tariff designing, there is a need for a framework that could help to identify 
61 
 
the determinants of port infrastructure charges and analyse their relationships. This is 
because, although the nomenclature and typology is different, the purpose of tariff 
design and the basis of charge are similar. It is also essential to gain insight into the 
practices and processes of port tariff formulation across ports worldwide despite 
differences in their governance models, competition and social and economic 
characteristics. Thus this study contributes to the literature on port pricing by way of 
identifying a set of distinctive factors that influence the levels of port infrastructure 
tariffs, infrastructure tariff design and infrastructure tariff practices.    
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CHAPTER 3 : AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION ON PORT 
INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFFS12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Based on this chapter, a paper entitled 'Determinants of Port Infrastructure Pricing' was presented in 
the second International workshop on Port Economics 2012 in Singapore and has been published in The 
Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics , vol. 29, no. 2, pp.187-206.  
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajsl.2013.08.004 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
External factors behind the changes in port operations and management have put 
pressures on ports so that competition has increased to levels never previously seen. 
These factors include the globalisation of production, changing maritime technology, 
the shifting of bargaining power to port users,  particularly shipping lines and changing 
distribution patterns. Respectively, these factors have resulted in changes to port 
operations and management structures: ports have become value-adders; there is an 
increased need to improve port productivity; the bargaining power of a port has been 
influenced by the emergence of mega carriers and global port logistics service 
providers; and the arrival of hub ports has created more competition between ports 
(The World Bank 2007b). For ports to be efficient and competitive, port reforms have 
been undertaken worldwide with the private sector significantly involved in port  
operations, investments, development and management (e.g. ownership/partnership). 
Although most ports still have substantial market power, it is undeniable that ports are 
now under more pressure to become more competitive and responsive to changes in 
market conditions. Port competitiveness depends on a number factors, such as port and 
terminal charges, geographical location, water draft, feeder and multimodal 
connectivity, service reliability and stability, client relationship management and 
communication (Chang, Lee & Tongzon 2008a; Tongzon 2007). If a port wishes to 
stay competitive or improve its competitiveness strategies must be adopted that target 
these factors, such as: setting port tariff and terminal charges; improving operational 
efficiency; accommodating high shipping frequency; investing in infrastructure and 
cargo handling; and investing in information and communication technology.  
 This chapter presents an empirical investigation of seaport infrastructure tariffs with 
a primary focus on the determinants of seaport infrastructure tariffs as opposed to 
other non- infrastructure charges. The main difference is that infrastructure charges are 
often managed by the port authority, while non- infrastructure charges, e.g. cargo 
handling charges, are often managed by terminal operators. For most ports (landlord 
ports), infrastructure is owned by the state sector, and tends to be regarded as public 
goods and any charges therefore necessarily take into account the social welfare effect. 
Alternatively, if terminal operators are partially or fully owned by the private sector, 
then their charges would be subject to competition and be profit-oriented. While 
pricing strategies are often influenced by the cost of production, market structure, 
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demand and institutional factors (Tyndall 1951), they are more complex for ports for 
various reasons. First, most modern ports operate as providers of multiple services, 
whose operations are interdependent. Therefore splitting the production cost for 
pricing purposes can be very difficult, if not infeasible. In addition, since infrastructure 
investments in ports are largely 'irreversible' and are therefore 'sunk' costs, operational 
costs play an important role especially in short-term pricing. Second, as ports are 
regarded as both public assets and businesses entities, their pricing strategies can vary 
substantially depending on various external and internal factors. Third, port pricing is 
often subject to strong regulations, and therefore changes to port tariffs and charges 
require careful planning and justification. Fourth, as ports are logistics nodes, pricing 
should take into account both competition between ports and competition within the 
supply chain, which implies that the equilibrium price can be even as in an extreme 
case outside the competitive-monopoly price range (Nguyen (2011). This is 
particularly the case where port users are highly dependent on the ports within the total 
supply chain (Robinson 2002).  
 There have been numerous studies of port pricing, however most of these studies 
focus mainly on theoretical or policy aspects. For example, European port reforms13 
have shown a new direction towards maritime pricing especially in port infrastructure 
with much focus on the full cost recovery approach (Gardner, Marlow & Pettit 2006), 
but little empirical research has been conducted to identify the influential factors of 
port infrastructure tariffs and their relationships. As highlighted in the literature review 
(Chapter 2), the difficulty in assessing port costs particularly marginal costs, and the 
identification of the costs associated with specific port operations are among the 
challenges in port pricing (Haralambides (2002); identifying and evaluating port 
infrastructure pricing with respect to its costs and possible determinants remains a 
major research gap. There is a lack of research to quantify the effect of various factors 
on port charges. Therefore this chapter and subsequent ones attempts to address this 
gap through an econometric analysis of the relationship between port charges and 
other factors.   
 This current study examines the infrastructure tariffs of 159 seaports worldwide and 
empirically examines the relationship between port charges and other factors using the 
                                                 
13
 EU policy on port infrastructure pricing is reflected on its two main policy directives: The Green 
Paper on Marit ime and Port  Infrastructure and the White paper on Fair Payment for In frastructure Use.     
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simultaneous equation regression method. As many factors as possible are covered, 
depending on data availability, including those related to production, cost, market and 
institution. Because of the exploratory nature of the research the focus is on the main 
port infrastructure tariffs (i.e. marine charges) that are imposed on vessels, these are 
port channel dues (or channel charge) and the berth occupancy charge. Channel 
charge applies to the provision of navigation infrastructure including dredged channel 
and turning basins. For many ports this charge is also referred as port due. Berth 
occupancy charge is a charge for the use of a berth and is also referred to as berth hire 
in some countries. Data is publicly available data for both charges.  
 This chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 presents the analysis framework 
using the simultaneous equation regression method. Section 3.3 presents the results of 
the analysis, which is followed by a discussion of results in Section 3.4. The 
conclusion is presented in Section 3.5.  
3.2 PROPOSED ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK OF PORT 
INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFFS  
In this study, the simultaneous equation regression is applied to explore the 
relationship between port infrastructure tariffs as the dependent variables, and a 
number of factors as the independent variables (Appendix IV and V). Relevant 
diagnostic tests are also conducted to assist the data analysis. A test for simultaneity is 
conducted to determine whether the different types of infrastructure tariffs are subject 
to simultaneous relationships, and a test for normality is also conducted to confirm 
whether the conditions for Ordinary Least Square regression are met (Appendix VI 
and VII). The analysis covers the effect of not only of infrastructure-related costs but 
also other factors including port demand, administrative (legal) structures, governance 
models and geographical regions.   
 As explained in the previous chapter, port costs are among the most influential 
factor in port pricing. Therefore the econometric analysis will try to cover different 
cost related factors among other variables influential to port infrastructure pricing. 
Nevertheless, because of the unavailability of relevant data, mainly port costs and 
other factors like environmental costs, safety and security, port infrastructure 
specifications are used as proxies for port costs. Thus, the underlying assumption is 
that port infrastructure building and maintenance costs are strongly correlated with 
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port physical specifications such as the depth, length and width of the access channel 
and berths (Kent & Ashar 2001). In this case the study also assumed that the channel 
is naturally deeper thus less maintenance is required (dredging) and shallow channels 
and berths with less depth alongside need higher maintenance costs. In addition, the 
analysis also covers the effect of other factors including port service demand, 
governance model, administrative structure and the port location. These variables are 
explained in more detail below. 
a) Port infrastructure specifications 
Due to the unavailability of data on port infrastructure costs, the regression analysis 
uses channel length, width and depth, and berth length and depth as proxies for port 
infrastructure maintenance costs. The justification for the use of these variables as port 
cost proxies is that the level of maintenance costs such as dredging costs is closely 
related to the existing length, width and the depth of approach channel; the longer and 
narrower the approach channels with less depth are expected to incur more costs for 
maintenance and vice versa. The use of berth specifications as proxies for the costs of 
maintaining berths can also be justified on the same basis; all else being the same, 
ports with longer berths and less depth at the berthing place are expected to incur more 
cost and vice versa.   
b) Demand for port services  
The level of demand for port services as represented by variable port throughput is 
included in the model based on the inverse relationship between price and the quantity 
demanded as explained by the theory of price. However demand for port services is 
derived from economic activities within a country and the volume of trade between the 
country under the study and its trading partners (Tongzon 1995). Thus the trade flow 
of each port country is included in the model to represent the level of economic 
activity that affects port demand. International trade flow determines the level of port 
activities and thus can be influential in determining the level of port tariffs. 
International trade can be dependent on many factors including macroeconomic 
factors such as exchange rate, interest rate, trade agreements and trade barriers. In 
addition, the cost of exporting and importing hence trade  can be significantly affected 
by the infrastructure quality and standard, and transport costs including trade and port 
tariffs (De 2006).  
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c) Institutional factors 
Institutional settings and the regulatory framework of seaports have a significant 
impact on port management and the decision making process. With this regard the port 
governance model within which a port operates can have influence over the port tariff 
determination. The level of public sector participation in various port production 
activities is determined by the port governance model adopted by the seaport. The 
analysis also takes into account the effect of various governance models, namely the 
service port, tool port, landlord port and privatised port models that are widely 
believed to govern the way ports are managed. This is partly because the governance 
model reflects the level of port reform, particularly the involvement of the private 
sector in port ownership and management. Ports operating under the service port 
model function as public entity, while port operating under the landlord model set 
tariffs and provide port infrastructure for private operators to run. On the other hand, 
privatise ports have the sole authority over entire port management and operation. 
d) Port administrative model (legal structure).  
In this study, the effect of the legal structures used by ports is also allowed for. The 
administrative structure of a port reflects its specific view on and preference for its 
corporate responsibility as a legal entity. According to Morris, Schindehutte & Allen 
(2005) an administrative model can be defined using either an economic, operational 
or strategic approach, with each approach having unique decision variables. Of the 
three approaches, the economic model is concerned with profit generation and thus the 
revenue sources, a pricing strategy, a cost structure, margins and the expected turnover 
are the main decision variables. Thus, administrative models of ports are included in 
the regression analysis with the objective of identifying their influence on port tariffs. 
Four legal structures adopted by seaports are covered in the analysis, including a 
public port authority, a port corporation, a limited company, and local government.  
 Given that different port governance models exist, the administrative model 
adopted by each port tends to vary with the port. The majority of ports are overseen by 
a public port authority and take the form of landlord ports. In the absence of a port 
regulatory mechanism, the sole authority over port investment, planning and 
financing, and formulation and regulation of the tariff regime is a public port authority 
(Trujillo & Nombela 1999). Yet, many landlord or service model ports have the 
administrative structure of a public port corporation or limited company. Thus, given 
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the similarity existing in port governance, the level of corporatisation of port business can 
vary depending on the legal structure. 
e) Geographical region of the port 
The effect of the spatial distribution of seaport across world port regions is considered in 
the model to testify regional differences in port infrastructure tariffs. This is because ports 
located in the same region tend to have similar business practices, corporate cultures and 
levels of economic activities, which may affect their pricing regime. Regional-specific 
and country-specific factors may contribute to the determination of port tariffs. With 
this regard, the port regulatory mechanism of each port country and the port state 
control over pricing can significantly affect the level of port tariffs. For instance as 
shown by Dowd & Fleming (1994) if the tariffs of ports in a specific port region are 
set based on the public enterprise approach in which prices are set to promote local or 
regional economic activities and development, the level of tariffs in that region can be 
significantly lower compared to other port regions that follow different pricing 
approaches. To test this, the dummy variables for seven major port regions are 
included in the regression analysis as detailed below.  
 The estimated regression equation system based on log-transformed variables has 
the following specifications: 
                                                       
                                                                                                 
                                                
                                                                                                   
Where: 
             
                       
                     
                           
                       
                         
                           
                              
                              
                      
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 DPMs are dummy variables indicating whether the port is a port authority (DPM1DPMPA), 
port corporation (DPM2DPMPCR), port public/limited company (DPM3DPMLC) or local 
government as the bench marking business model 
 DPGs are dummy variab les indicating the port is a landlord (DPG1DPGLL), service 
(DPG2DPGS), service-landlord (DPG3DPGSL) or private port as the bench marking 
governance model 
 DPRs are dummy variables for geographical reg ion, indicat ing whether the port is in the 
African (DPR1DPRAF), Australian (DPR2DPRAU), East Asian (DPR3DPREA), North 
American (DPR4DPRNA), North West European (DPR5DPRNW E), South Asian 
(DPR6DPRSA), West-Middle East region (DPR7=DFRWME) and the rest of the word as the 
bench mark 
Cluster sampling was used in the data collection. In particular, ports were divided into 
eight (8) clusters on the basis of location: Africa, Australia, East Asia, South Asia, 
North America, North West Europe, West-Middle East, and the rest of the world. A 
total of 159 ports14 were included covering all the ports whose data are available from 
Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay’s data base (Lloyd's Register-Fairplay Ltd 2011). The list of 
ports included in the sample is presented in Appendix XIII. Data required for the study 
included port infrastructure tariffs of world ports, port infrastructure specification data, 
port throughput and total trade of the respective port country. Port tariffs are quoted on 
the basis of US$(Purchasing Power Parity Index) per 100 GT/GRT. Port infrastructure 
specifications are in meters (m). Data were collected from several sources. Port 
infrastructure tariffs, channel/port dues and berth occupancy charges, and port 
throughput in metric tons were mainly obtained from the official port authority 
websites and, where no tariffs were published, tariffs were obtained by direct 
communication with port authorities. Port infrastructure data which includes port 
channel and berth specifications were obtained from the Ports and Terminal Guide  
published by Lloyd's Register-Fairplay Ltd (2011) and the official websites of 
respective seaports. Data on external trade as the sum of export and import values of 
each port country were obtained from the official website of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Since many ports quote their charges in the ir local currency, 
their tariffs were converted to a universally comparable common currency using the 
Purchasing Power Parity Index (PPPI) published by The World Bank. Data on the type 
of port management organisation (by searching for information how the port authority 
is incorporated), the port governance model (by searching for information on 
governance model) and the port region were also collected mainly from port’s official 
                                                 
14
 Only seaports whose port infrastructure tariffs based on Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT), Gross 
Tonnage (GT), Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT), Net Tonnage (NT) were included in the analysis.   
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websites and the Port and Terminal Guide and analysed using dummy variables in the 
regression analysis. 
 Dummy variable for port governance were quantified using “1” and “0” for 
different governance models. For example the impact of landlord port on port charges 
was measured using “1” for landlord model ports and “0” for other governance 
models. The same was used interchangeably for other governance models. In the same 
manner the impact of port administrative model and the port location was also 
measured.   
 The regression model is estimated using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Two-
Stage Least Square (2SLS), and Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) estimation methods 
with different functional specifications. In addition to the OLS estimation, 2SLS and 
3SLS are used to test for the simultaneity relationship between channel dues and berth 
occupancy charge. Further, several diagnostics tests were also conducted to test the 
statistical properties of the data and its functional validity. The normality of data for 
each dependant variable, channel/port dues and berth occupancy charges were tested  
using the Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test. For the selection of simultaneous equation 
modelling for the regression model, the Hausman test of simultaneity is also 
conducted.   
3.3 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: ECONOMETRIC MODEL   
After removing the outliers from the sample the analysis includes 153 observations out 
of the original 159. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the descriptive statistics and a 
correlation matrix for the variables in natural log. As can be seen from Table 3.1, the 
standard deviations for all the variables are small relative to their means.  
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of econometric variables.  
 
 
VARIABLE   N    MEAN        ST. DEV    VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
lnTRFc 153 2.3 1.3 1.9 -3.9 4.5
lnTRFb 153 1.9 1.4 2.1 -4.6 4.9
lnBL 153 8.3 0.9 0.8 6.1 10.4
lnBD 153 2.3 0.2 0.05 1.5 2.9
lnCHL 153 8.5 1.5 2.4 3.2 12.3
lnCHW 153 5.5 0.7 0.5 3.8 8.2
lnCHD 153 2.6 0.3 0.09 1.6 3.5
lnPTP 153 16.2 1.4 2.1 10.4 19.5
lnTF 153 26.1 1.7 3 16.5 28.5
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix of the study variables.  
 
 
Table 3.2 shows that the two types of port infrastructure tariffs (channel/port due 
(lnTRFc) and berth occupancy charge (lnTRFb)) are positively correlated (0.39). Two 
main reasons are postulated for this positive correlation. First, ports are consistent in 
their tariff setting: ports that set higher channel dues tend to set higher berth 
occupancy charges. Second, these two charges are affected by the same factors, e.g.  
geographical region, the governance model and administrative (legal) structure. The 
positive correlation (0.29) between the channel due (lnTRFc) and length (lnCHL) 
could be due to the fact that the maintenance cost of a channel depends on its length. 
The negative correlation (-0.20) between the channel due (lnTRFc) and depth (lnCHD) 
is probably because deeper channels require less maintenance. Port throughput 
(lnPTP) is positively correlated with berth length ( lnBL), berth depth (lnBD) and 
channel depth (lnCHD) with the correlation coefficients of 0.55, 0.47 and 0.22, 
respectively. This implies that ports with deeper channels, and deeper and longer 
berths can accommodate larger ships and therefore have greater throughput.  
 Table 3.3 presents the results of the stepwise regression analysis using both the 
ordinary least square (OLS), two-stage least square (2SLS), and three-stage least square 
(3SLS) methods with different functional specifications. The number (in roman 
numerals) in the first column indicates the functional/model specification. The second 
column indicates the estimation method (OLS, 2SLS or 3SLS). For each model 
specification (from I to XI), there are two lines of regression results for equations (1) 
and (2) respectively. The third column shows the value of R-square.  
lnTRFc lnTRFb lnBL lnBD lnCHL lnCHW lnCHD lnPTP lnTF
lnTRFc 1.00
lnTRFb 0.39* 1.00
lnBL -0.14 -0.08 1.00
lnBD -0.08 -0.15 0.21* 1.00
lnCHL 0.29* 0.02 0.19 0.10 1.00
lnCHW -0.08 0.02 0.14 0.23* 0.02 1.00
lnCHD  -0.2 * -0.09 -0.05 0.39* -0.18 0.43* 1.00
lnPTP 0.01 -0.11 0.55* 0.47* 0.36* 0.03 0.22* 1.00
lnTF -0.07 0.19 0.37* 0.19 0.19 0.10 -0.03 0.28* 1.00
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 The Hausman test for the simultaneity problem was conducted 15. The Hausman test 
for the dependent variables suggests that          is determined simultaneously with 
         and they are endogenous. Thus a simultaneous equation system is 
appropriate. However, as shown below, the results obtained from a ll the 2SLS and 
3SLS methods are highly consistent with those provided by the OLS method. In 
support of the simultaneous equation analysis, the over identification restrictions of 
both regression equations was examined using the Hausman Specification test statistic.  
 The Hausman Specification test statistics for both simultaneous equations 
                           and                            are 
significant at the 1% significance level in which case the null hypothesis that some 
instruments used in both simultaneous equations (                      ) are not valid 
is rejected. Since the analysis used cross-sectional data, the heteroskedasticity 
corrected covariance matrix was used to address the heteroskedasticity problem.  
 As can be seen from Table 3.3 (p.69), the analysis identifies several factors that 
have a significant effect on port infrastructure charges. The following factors are 
highly significant: berth occupancy charge, channel length, channel depth and trade 
flow (of the country that the port is based in). Channel depth is however slightly 
significant in the model specifications except in MODELs III and VII with the 
coefficient of channel depth being -0.51 and -0.55 respectively, only significant at 
10%. The berth length and depth variables, representing the cost of berth maintenance, 
are not significant.  
 The values of the coefficients of several dummy variables show the effects of 
different qualitative variables on port infrastructure tariffs. The coefficients for the 
port administrative model are significant but only for the channel due showing that the 
port authority and port corporation models do not have the same pricing system as the 
limited company and local government administrative models.  The reason for this 
perhaps the berth occupancy charge is largely implemented along with the terminal 
handling charge. And since most ports are landlord ports, terminals are operated by 
private sector port operators and maintenance of terminals are also done by them. Thus 
                                                 
15
 The Hausman Specification procedure tests errors in variables and is useful to compare the 
differences in the estimates of OLS and IV estimat ion to detect the correlation between an independent 
variable with the estimated erro r term, which implies that there is simultaneity biasness in the dependent 
and independent variables.    
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berth occupancy charge of the landlord port has kept to a low level by the public port 
authority just to earn the long run economic rent of the infrastructure. 
 The regression results also indicate that the port governance model has significant 
impact on port pricing for some of the functional specifications under study. The 
results are however inconclusive. In addition, the port infrastructure pricing methods 
used in Australia and northwest European countries tend to be significantly different 
from each other, and from those used in the rest of the word.  
 As mentioned earlier, several diagnosis tests including the normality and 
simultaneity tests are included with the statistical analysis. The Jarque-Bera (JB) 
normality test statistic16 was calculated to test the normality of the distribution of 
channel/port dues and berth occupancy charges (Table 3.4, p.70). The JB normality 
statistic calculated for channel/port dues was 6.9 indicating that the null hypothesis of 
normality of the distribution of channel/port due data cannot be rejected at 1%. The 
normality test conducted for berth occupancy charge also suggests a similar 
distribution.  
                                                 
16 The null hypothesis of normality is rejected if the calculated test statistic exceeds the critical value , 
in this case 5.99, from the Chi-Square, χ2, d istribution with 2 degrees of freedom.  
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Table 3.3: Regression analysis results. 
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OLS - lnTRFc 0.28 0.38*** 0.26*** -0.07 -0.45 0.01  - 0.13**
OLS - lnTRFb 0.21 0.42*** -0.002 -0.6 -0.12 0.15**
OLS - lnTRFc (DPM) 0.32 0.35*** 0.27*** -0.14 -0.46 0.03  - 0.148***  - 1.06*  - 1.13* -0.4
OLS - lnTRFb (DPM) 0.21 0.40*** 0.009 -0.6 -0.12 0.15** 0.24 -0.06 0.5
OLS - lnTRFc (DPG) 0.34 0.39*** 0.28*** -0.07  - 0.51* 0.04  - 0.09*  - 1.06*** -0.33 -0.5
OLS - lnTRFb (DPG) 0.25 0.44*** -0.02 -0.7  - 0.15* 0.11 -0.05  - 0.83*** -0.3
OLS - lnTRFc (DPG,DPM) 0.38 0.37*** 0.28*** -0.14 -0.46 0.05  - 0.11**  - 0.98* -0.94 -0.4 -0.54 0.16 0.07
OLS - lnTRFb (DPG,DPM) 0.26 0.43*** -0.09 -0.6  - 0.16* 0.11 0.37 -0.04 0.5 -0.06  - 0.86** -0.3
OLS - lnTRFc (DPR) 0.36 0.36*** 0.24*** -0.06 -0.49 0.03  - 0.11** -0.3 0.82** -0.33 -0.37 0.05 0.66** 0.4
OLS - lnTRFb (DPR) 0.35 0.40*** -0.04 -0 -0.05 0.06 -0.2 -0.15 -0.39 0.04 0.94* -0.02  - 0.87*
OLS - lnTRFc (DPM,DPR) 0.39 0.35*** 0.25*** -0.11 -0.5 0.04  - 0.12***  - 1.06** - 1.14* -0.6 -0.3 0.71* -0.32 -0.28 -0.08 0.58* 0.41
OLS - lnTRFb (DPM,DPR) 0.35 0.40*** -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.37 0.53 0.4 -0.2 -0.19 -0.38 0.07 0.97* 0.01  - 0.87*
OLS - lnTRFc (DPG,DPR) 0.40 0.37*** 0.26*** -0.06  - 0.55* 0.06  - 0.09*  - 0.87*** -0.29 -0.4 -0.5 0.68* -0.37 -0.31 -0.08 0.39 0.23
OLS - lnTRFb (DPG,DPR) 0.37 0.41*** -0.06 -0.1 -0.06 0.04 0.13 -0.44 -0.1 -0.1 0.01 -0.32 0.03 0.97* 0.01 -0.68
OLS - lnTRFc (DPM,DPG,DPR) 0.42 0.37*** 0.26*** -0.12 -0.49 0.07  - 0.10**  - 1.05** - 1.06* -0.6 -0.39 0.18 0.14 -0.4 0.57 -0.35 -0.19 -0.14 0.38 0.24
OLS - lnTRFb (DPM,DPG,DPR) 0.37 0.41*** -0.05 -0.1 -0.08 0.04 0.43 0.45 0.4 0.01 -0.55 -0.2 -0.1 0.001 0.3 0.03 0.99* 0.02 -0.69
2SLS-lnTRFc 0.27 0.44*** 0.26*** -0.08 -0.43 0.02  - 0.13**
2SLS-lnTRFb 0.21 0.45*** 0.004 -0.6 -0.12 0.15***
2SLS-lnTRFc (DPM,DPG,DPR) 0.29 0.76 0.22** -0.18 -0.27 0.09 -0.1 -1.06 -1.09 -0.6 -0.29 0.43 0.25 -0.3 0.46 -0.11 -0.14 -0.56 0.28 0.54
2SLS-lnTRb(DPM,DPG,DPR) 0.36 0.35* -0.06 -0.1 -0.07 0.04 0.38 0.4 0.4 0.004 -0.54 -0.2 -0.1 0.05 -0.33 0 0.99 0.05 -0.68
0.11 0.97 0.19 -0.08 -0.37 0.12 -0.1 -1.08 -1.1 -0.8 -0.3 0.5 0.25 -0.2 0.38 -0.35 -0.17 -0.81 0.2 0.67
0.36 0.33* -0.05 -0.2 -0.06 0.04 0.36 0.38 0.4 -0.01 -0.55 -0.2 -0.1 0.07 -0.35 -0.01 0.98 0.07 -0.67
XI
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
I
II
III
IV
V
R
 S
Q
U
A
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E
VARIABLES
3SLS-lnTRFc/lnTRFb(Sy R sq= 0.77)
MODEL
( 153 Observations)
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Table 3.4: Jarque-Bera normality test results.  
 
 
3.4  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS  
The result of the regression analysis presented in the previous section shows that 
seaport pricing is significantly affected by a number factors, namely channel length, 
channel depth, trade flow, various business structure and governance models, 
geographical region, as well as the relationship between the port charges themselves. 
This section discusses and interprets the results obtained from regression analysis 
presented in Section 3.3.  
3.4.1 PORT INFRASTRUCTURE SPECIFICATIONS (PORT 
INFRASTRCTURE COSTS) 
First, the analysis determined that there was a significant two-way relationship 
between the two main infrastructure charges (the channel/port due and the berth 
occupancy charge). The results indicate that the average value of the coefficient for 
berth occupancy charge (in natural log) is about 0.38, which is the cross elasticity of 
channel due with respect to berth occupancy charge 17. This means that, if all else 
remains the same, a 1% increase in the berth occupancy charge is associated with a 
0.38% increase in the channel due. On the other hand, the average value of the 
coefficient for the channel due variable (in natural log) of 0.40 indicates that, if all 
else remains the same, a 1% increase in the channel due is associated with a 0.4% 
increase in the berth due. The values of the coefficients for the other variables can be 
interpreted in a similar fashion. The significance of the channel length variable with 
the average value of its coefficient of 0.26 indicates that, if all else remains the same, 
a 1% increase in channel length of 1% would see a 0.26% increase in the 
channel/port due.  
                                                 
17
 This is calculated as the average value of the coefficients for the variable that are significant at 1%, 
5% and 10%.  
JB STATISTIC P-VALUE α CRITICAL VALUES
lnTRFc 6.9 0.03
0.01
0.05
0.1
9.21
5.99
4.61
lnTRFb 1 0.6
0.01
0.05
0.1
9.21
5.99
4.61
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 Berth infrastructure specifications, berth lengths and depths are found to have 
insignificant effects on berth occupancy charge. This may be due to the fact that 
there are other factors affecting the berth occupancy charge which may need a 
separate investigation. Moreover, in some ports, this charge tends to be incorporated 
into wharfage which is associated with the terminal cargo handling service 18.  
 The result does not indicate a significant relationship between channel width 
(lnCHWi ) and channel due, while channel depth (lnCHDi) is found to have a significant  
negative relationship with channel due. Although this variable is only significant in two 
regression models, its coefficient is consistent with the value of about -0.53, suggesting 
that a 1% increase in channel depth would decrease channel due by 0.53%. As explained 
earlier, the negative relationship between channel depth (lnCHDi) and channel due 
(lnTRFc) could be due to the fact that channels with sufficient natura l depth require less 
maintenance and dredging costs. This interpretation is based on the assumption that the 
available data reflect the natural depth of the channel rather than the artificial depth 
achieved through dredging. The results provide evidence on the relevance of costs to 
port infrastructure charges. For example, longer and shallower channels require more 
maintenance costs, which in turn affect their respective charges. This also implies that 
deeper channels would require less dredging costs, which according to Ghosh, 
Prasad, Joshi & Kunte (2001) also depends on the geographic and hydrographic 
characteristics of the channel, and this data was not available for empirical study 
purposes.  
 The depth of port navigation channels is one of the major determinants of port 
competitiveness (Ha 2003; Tongzon & Heng 2005). For port approach channels with 
insufficient depths and widths the need for continuous dredging for easy navigation 
of vessels and the increase in vessel size, have led port authorities to undertake large 
scale investment in port infrastructure, superstructure and channel deepening (Woo, 
Pettit & Beresford 2011). Moreover port infrastructure standards and expansion 
efforts by port managing bodies have been featuring as elements in port competition 
(Ishi, Lee, Tezuka & Chang 2010). The provision of a dredge channel can be a 
source of economic rent for port authorities despite its social and economic 
development consideration as a public good (Baird 2004). The results of the 
regression analysis are also supported by the earlier findings of Wilmsmeier, 
                                                 
18
 As noted earlier, this variable could not be included in the current study due to the unavailability of 
its data for all ports included in the sample.  
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Hoffmann & Sanchez (2006), Wilmsmeier & Hoffmann (2008), and Oliveira (2010) 
that the improvements in the standard of port infrastructure such as berth length and 
maximum draft (deeper channels, turning basin and alongside depth) significantly 
reduce the impact of freight rate rise. This is primarily because, as explained earlier, 
ports with longer berths and deeper access channels charge shipping lines  relatively 
lower berth and port access charges, and as a result the impact on voyage cost and 
therefore on the freight rate can be low.  
 With regards to port pricing issues in world ports across major port regions, such 
as the lack of cost-relatedness of port tariffs as highlighted by Haralambides (2002), 
the results provide clear directives to port policy on the pricing and financing of port 
infrastructure. The dilemma in the EU context of port pricing, and also in all modes 
of transport, is related to the establishment of fair price for transport infras tructure 
charges. With regard to port pricing, the commonly accepted norm is to undertake 
cost-based pricing of port infrastructure with the objective of establishing a level 
playing field for maritime transport and eradicating unfair competition and business 
practices. For other port regions where there is no official engagement of establishing 
a framework for port pricing, individual ports frame their own port pricing strategies 
which are mainly governed by the port policies of individual countries, the port's 
administrative and governance model, and port industry and shipping market 
dynamics. As a whole therefore the basic question, as EU port directives have 
proposed is, what is the appropriate basis for port infrastructure charges that all ports 
can have allegiance to, given the differences in economic and financial objectives, 
governance models, business models and port trade volume that exists among world 
ports?            
 Experiences in port pricing in the EU context suggests that major EU ports follow 
the cost-based pricing approach. Full cost recovery pricing is evident among EU 
ports, who has not significantly raised the port tariffs although they are cost related 
(Gardner, Marlow & Pettit 2006). This implies that seaports formulate port tariffs by 
considering the costs of providing port infrastructure services and the results 
presented in section 3.2 further confirm this specifically in terms of port 
infrastructure charges. The results provide port management organisations with clear 
evidence on the cost-relatedness of port infrastructure charges and directives for the 
formulation of charges. In order to remain economical and to provide efficient 
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navigation services ports, especially self- financing ones with longer and shallower 
channels, are required to be cautious when setting channel dues, and to adjust their 
charges to take into account the level and cost of maintenance operations over time 
This is because longer and shallower channels require continuous maintenance, 
which over time results in a large capital outlay. Therefore the revision of channel 
dues against the periodic costs of maintenance is a pre-requisite for the efficient 
maintenance of port channels. The method of financing port infrastructure and its 
maintenance however can have impact on the level of the port infrastructure charge. 
Ports that operate with a regional and country economic development objective, 
which are mostly public ports operating under a port authority and which are often 
financed through public funding, set relatively lower port infrastructure charges 
compared to commercially operating ports with a corporate ownership.  
 Some countries have a common policy towards port infrastructure maintenance  
and port charges do not reflect cost-relatedness. For instance US public ports are not 
financially and operationally responsible for maintaining port channels. Instead a 
central government organisation, the US Corps of Engineers, is responsible for 
maintaining all the main US ports and their navigable waters (Fawcett 2007). 
Therefore, US public port authorities do not charge channel or port dues for vessels 
calling their ports. However, federal government financial constraints on the US 
Corp of Engineers have resulted in the restructuring of the role of the port authority 
in terms of port infrastructure provision and as a result, a port infrastructure 
maintenance charge (harbour maintenance tax on the volume of cargo passing 
through the port) has been introduced in some public ports to maintain port access 
infrastructure (Kumar 2002). Owing to the utilisation of US federal funds for 
maintaining channels, centrally introduced harbour maintenance imposed on shippers 
has been criticised on the basis that the user pay principle is not represented in the 
pricing policy (Ashar 2003). This scenario suggests that institutional set up of US 
public ports has given rise to some complexities in the US port infrastructure 
development, maintenance, finance and pricing endeavours. 
 The lack of the cost-relatedness of port tariffs has implications for port 
competition and efficiency. Inter-port competition promotes port efficiency. Barriers 
to inter-port competition constrain the enhancement of port efficiency. Port reform in 
the Spanish port system provides a good example of this. Although port reforms 
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undertaken during the 1990’s to enhance the autonomy of port authorities resulted in 
the growth of port traffic (Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta & Pérez 2008), the 
overall efficiency of the port system including the efficiency of the port 
infrastructure has not significantly improved (González & Trujillo 2008). This is 
particularly due to the fact that inter-port competition was limited in the enacted laws 
of the port reforms, as port tariffs were uniformly set for all ports (Castillo-Manzano, 
López-Valpuesta & Pérez 2008). Further cost-based design of channel dues will 
result in reducing port development anomalies.  
 If channel dues are not cost-based, channel maintenance requires public funding 
support, which is mostly found in some EU ports and most US ports. EU initiatives 
on achieving cost-based pricing are mainly backed by the discrepancy in objectives 
and pricing practices adopted by subsidised ports and private ports. Subsidised ports 
are able to charge lower port dues than competing privatised ports whose objective is 
to recover investment costs (Ubbels 2005). These pricing practices affect the 
competition balance among ports as public funding for channel dredging in some 
ports places those ports which do not receive public funding in a less competitive 
position (Ircha 2001a). For the efficient operation of the port, it is critically important 
for the port managing body to have the full authority over the management of the 
port access channel. The disintegration of full authority or the separation of the port 
access channel management from the port managing body and its transfer to a 
separate management entity will hinder port efficiency as timely investment in 
channel deepening is not guaranteed. For instance, in the Australian port industry, the 
transfer of the Port of Melbourne access channel maintenance to the Victorian 
Channel Authority has impacted on the efficiency of the port (Everett & Robinson 
2006). A similar situation can be found in the waterways between Brussels port and 
Antwerp port in Belgium where a high fee for the use of the channel has been the 
result of separate channel management bodies (Balen, Dooms & Haezendonck 
2012). These examples suggest that cost-based pricing of port infrastructure 
maintenance results in a level playing field for ports and that channel management 
needs to be a sole responsibility of the port in order to have an efficiently functioning 
port operation. Thus, in order for ports to increase their competitive position and the 
efficiency of the port infrastructure, the autonomy of the port managing body to set 
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and increase port tariffs is required. Once autonomous the port managing authority 
can set up cost-based port tariffs. 
3.4.2 PORT DEMAND  
The analysis results show that trade flow has a statistically significant, negative 
relationship on channel due, but no significant relationship with berth due. The 
negative relationship between trade flow and channel due could be because trade 
flow is strongly correlated with port output, which often exhibits economies of scale 
in port operation. This could also be because of the demand effect, whereby the lower 
the channel due, the higher the demand for port services. The value of the coefficient 
for the trade flow variable indicates that, if all else remains the same, an increase in 
total trade value of 1% is associated with a average decrease in channel due of 
0.11%. The low value of the coefficient implies that demand for port services is 
inelastic. In addition, this could be due to the fact that port charges are a small 
fraction of total transportation costs and therefore port users base the port choice 
decision not on the port charge alone but on the total cost of transportation (OECD 
2011).  
3.4.3 PORT ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL  
The legal and statutory framework of a port is an important enabler that balances the 
power between the port and the government, and addresses important questions 
regarding the commercial, managerial and financial autonomy of ports (Verhoeven 
2010b). Thus, the effects of various administrative (legal) structures and governance 
models of ports can be evaluated through the coefficients of the dummy variables. 
The dummy variable for the port authority legal structure is significant (average 
value of the coefficient is -1.0375). This indicates that, if all else remains the same, 
channel dues charged by ports with the port authority legal structure are only 35% 
(=e-1.0375 x100%) of those charged by ports with the local government legal 
structure19. Similarly, the value of the coefficient for the port corporation dummy (-
1.11) indicates that the channel dues for ports operating under the port corporation 
business structure are only 33% (=e-1.11 x100%) of those charged by ports operating 
under the local government legal structure. While the values of the coefficients 
appear to be large and therefore maybe questionable, the negative relationship 
                                                 
19 
This way of interpreting the numeral results follows the log linear form of the regression equation 
(1) used in the study. 
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indicates that ports operating under the port corporation legal structure charge less 
than those under the local government legal structure. This result may not necessarily 
reflect the true characteristics of the seaport population, the result might be due to the 
fact that the local government legal structure is typically preferred by small ports, 
such as found in New Zealand, that face demand constraints and diseconomies of 
scale and which therefore have to rely on higher tariffs to stay in business (Heaver 
1995). Higher tariffs at some ports could be due to high local input costs, trade 
unions and labour/employment policies. Alternatively, lower channel dues are due to 
the public good nature of port infrastructure where tariffs are formulated to achieve 
optimal social welfare.  
 Market-driven business organisations possess the capability of effective pricing to 
overcome cost disadvantage (Vorhies, Harker & Rao 1999). Private port companies 
such as those in the New Zealand port industry, are given no financial support from 
central or local government, and operate as more market responsive corporatised 
business entities. This would suggest that their port pricing strategies are market- 
driven. Conversely, the tariffs of ports managed by a port authority administrative 
model might be formulated subject to the approval of the relevant ministries thus 
hindering the ability of the port authority to set tariff structures and restricting the 
level of corporatisation of tariff structures. The extent of this issue is reduced for 
commercialised ports operating under the port corporation business structure where 
the management is given more autonomy in financing and pricing. Thus the 
corporatisation of a port means an increase in financial autonomy and the ability to 
generate higher cash flows from port tariffs.   
 The dynamics of the port industry in Far Eastern countries such as Japan, South 
Korea, China and Singapore confirms the above disparity of port charges based on 
different port business structures. South Korean ports are operated under port 
authority business structures and charge relatively lower port charges compared to 
ports in other port regions.  For instance the comparatively lower port charges of 
Pusan port (Korea) have attracted transhipment cargo originating from China and 
West Japan (Zan 1999), while in terms of the level of port charges, Osaka and Kobe 
ports (Japan) have relatively higher port charges (Ha 2003). This suggests that ports 
in Japan, largely managed by bureaus or local government port authorities (Morisugi 
2000), and which operate under local government business structures charge 
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relatively higher port charges. This also suggests that the pricing policies of South 
Korean ports are perhaps based on the public enterprise approach of pricing, while 
Japanese port pricing policy is cost-based. Port management bodies in Japan assess 
port dues and fees for the use of port facilities on a cost accounting basis with the 
objective of recouping the cost incurred for providing them (Ports and Harbour 
Bureau 2006). There is also a requirement, as stipulated in Article 6 of the Japanese 
Local Public Finance Act, for Japanese ports to be regulated to self- finance their 
operating costs (Terada 2002).  
 The business structure under which ports operate has direct implications on the 
way port charges are formulated which in turn affects the commercial business level 
of ports. Port management bodies are required to revisit their port pricing framework 
along with their business and market structure, and restructure their port business 
model to mitigate unforeseen adverse impacts on the port industry. The results also 
provide policy directives for regional port policy formulation in terms of inter-port 
competition. For example, a level playing field for port operation and competition for 
the Far Eastern region can be established provided that South Korean ports adopt 
cost-based pricing approaches for port tariff formulation. Unless this happens, the 
port industry in the adjoining countries in the region will shrink and these ports will 
only operate as gateways to and from hinterland markets.  
3.4.4 PORT GOVERNANCE MODEL 
The dummy variables for the governance model can also be interpreted in the same 
fashion as those for port business structures. The average value of the coefficient for 
the landlord model dummy variable (DPGLL) is -0.965 indicating that, if all else 
remains the same, the average channel due of landlord ports is only 38% (=e-0.965 
x100%) that of private ports. The average value of the coefficient for the service port 
model of -0.84 shows that, if all else remains the same, the average berth occupancy 
charge of service ports is only 43% (=e-0.84 x100%) that of private ports, while the 
infrastructure charges of service- landlord (mixed model) ports are not significantly 
different from those of private ports. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
private ports are profit-driven rather than socially-welfare driven and tend to charge 
higher than landlord and service ports. The results also confirm the underlying 
pricing objective of ports, such that landlord ports are generally publicly owned and 
are not required to recover costs, while private ports are required to recover all costs 
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including the investment costs in order to operate efficiently (Haralambides 2002). 
Privatised ports often restructure port tariffs to recover the cost of port infrastructure 
development and rehabilitation. For instance, in the port of Fe lixstowe (UK), the 
Harwich Haven Authority tariff has been raised with larger ships paying more in 
conservancy fees to cover the higher dredging costs as, including all other port 
services, the ultimate financial risk of port operation is borne by the private port  
(Baird 1999). As a result, owing to the fact that the payback period of port 
investment is longer and the nature of the investment is capital intensive (Baird 
2000), private ports and ports with highly corporatised administrative models tend to 
levy relatively higher port infrastructure charges.  
3.4.5 PORT REGION (LOCATION) 
Differences in the level of port infrastructure charges can be related to the market 
structure, port pricing policies and the regulatory framework under which ports 
operate. Such differences could also due to the fact that the autonomy of port 
authorities in setting port charges differs with geographical region. For example port 
authorities in Anglo Saxon regions possess relatively higher autonomy over ports 
than those in the Continental port regions (Verhoeven 2011). Thus, port regions with 
ports operating under the continental model would not confer the total costs of port 
operation onto port users, any deficits are partially covered through the taxation of 
the wider group of beneficiaries of the port (Bergantino 2002). This suggests that 
different port regions follow different port polices on the distribution of port costs 
among participants in the industry. The results of the dummy variables in the 
regression analysis also confirm this proposition.   
 The significance of the dummy variables for the Australian ports (average value 
0.73) means that, if all else remains the same, Australian channel dues tend to be 
about two times higher than those of ports in other regions. The average value of the 
coefficient for the northwest European region dummy variable (0.9675) indicates 
that, under the same conditions, berth occupancy charges of ports in this region are 
2.63 times higher than those of the bench marking region (the rest of the world). This 
ratio is 1.59 for the channel dues of ports in South Asia and 0.41 for the berth 
occupancy charges of ports in the West-Middle East region.  
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 There are two main reasons that Australian ports have relatively higher port 
charges. First, following the government’s public enterprise policies, Australian ports 
are under pressure to be profitable or at least to ensure cost recovery (Everett 2009; 
Everett & Robinson 1998). Together with relatively high input costs, this tends to 
result in comparatively higher port infrastructure tariffs. Second, because of country-
specific factors, most Australian ports have some market power and are allowed to price 
their services independently (Menezes, Pracz & Tyers 2007; Pettitt 2007). In order to 
achieve this, Australian ports adopt the Fully Distributed Costs Method which 
enables ports to have full coverage of total costs (Bergantino 2002). Australian ports 
possess some monopoly power and can price independently as the ports are the only 
gateways to the hinterland of each Australian state. Despite this most ports are 
overseen by an independent regulator. In the same region, the restructuring and 
corporatisation of New Zealand ports has seen these ports become more independent 
and operate as self- financing private port companies of which a substantial corporate 
share is owned by regional councils (Heaver 1995; Ircha 1999). Thus, port 
infrastructure tariffs in the Australian region ports are cost-based and profit-driven 
which results in comparatively higher port infrastructure tariffs20.   
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines port infrastructure charges using data from 159 seaports. The 
result of a simultaneous equation regression, with channel due and berth occupancy 
charge as the two dependent variables representing port infrastructure charges, 
indicates a two-way relationship between the channel due and the berth occupancy 
charge. Channel due is positively correlated to channel length, while channel depth 
appears to be negatively correlated. Trade flow appears to have a negative effect on 
channel due but no significant effect on berth occupancy charges. Overall, three 
propositions can be made with regard to the results on the cost-relatedness of port 
infrastructure tariffs using the simultaneous equation analysis.  
a) The level of channel dues and berth occupancy charges are jointly or 
simultaneously determined and an increase in the level of one charge leads to 
an increase in the other. 
                                                 
20
 An in-depth evaluation of infrastructure pricing in Australian port sector was carried out and a paper 
titled  'Port Infrastructure Pricing Policy and Practice: A Case Study of Australia and New Zealand 
Seaports' was presented at the annual International Association of Maritime Economists Conference 
2014 held in Norfolk, USA. (A rev ised version of the paper is under review in Australian Journal of 
Maritime and Ocean Affairs).  
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b) The positive coefficient of the channel length is significant and indicates that 
longer channels require more dredging, resulting in higher costs, which are 
reflected in the channel dues. This suggests that channel maintenance costs 
increase with the length of the channel.  
c) The coefficient of the channel depth is significant. Its minus value implies 
that channel maintenance cost is lower for deeper channels. Thus port 
authorities can charge lower tariffs for port dues and channel dues with 
naturally higher depth.  
d) The coefficients for berth length and depth are not significant, suggesting that 
berth length and depth and their maintenance costs are not reflected in berth 
hire charges. Some other exogenous factors appear to be responsible for the 
determination of the berth hire charge. Possibly many service ports can cover 
their berth facility charges using the cargo handling charges imposed on 
vessels. Nevertheless the coefficient is negative, which implies that as the 
berth length increases, the berth hire charge may reduce. Ports with many 
berths and longer berths can accommodate more ships and bigger ships, 
allowing the port to realise a higher output which in turn realises economies 
of scale. Thus, the costs of maintaining longer berths can be spread over 
many vessels calling into the port at a given time. In this sense, ports with 
many berths and longer berths charge lower berth charges than ports with 
fewer and shorter berths. 
It is interesting to note that the channel dues charged by ports operating under the 
port authority and port corporation legal structures are lower than those operating 
under local government entity legal structures. Furthermore, landlord ports and 
service ports tend to charge less than private ports, implying that the former are 
supposed to play a dual role, while the latter are more profit driven. In addition, 
infrastructure charges of Australian and northwest European ports are significantly 
higher than the rest of the world.  
 The finding of the research has some implications for port policy, pricing 
committees, port authorities, operators and managers. Efficient pricing is a 
prerequisite to making efficient infrastructure investments (Winston 1991). While 
public ports should aim to maximise user welfare, given the growth in demand for 
port services, they may need to evaluate their pricing approach in order to reduce the 
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financial burden and consider the competition by privately operated ports. Port 
managing bodies may be required to consider suitable mechanisms to establish cost-
based infrastructure tariffs, especially those of self- financing port managing bodies. 
The result of the analysis strongly indicates that the cost-based approach plays a key 
role in port pricing, but that actual charges remain substantially different across port 
business structures, governance models and geographical regions in the word. In 
addition, very high charges by private ports may also mean their charges need to be 
monitored. 
 The study is subject to limitations that could be considered for future research. 
First, because of the unavailability of relevant data, port infrastructure dimensions 
were used as proxies for infrastructure costs. The inclusion of data on dredging cost 
if available in future research would help to reduce complexities related to the 
difference between the natural depth and the artificial depth of the channel. Second, 
due to its exploratory nature, the study only considered channel due and berth 
occupancy charges, other charges especially terminal charges were not considered. 
Thus, future research can extend the empirical framework proposed by current study 
and includes additional charges, especially terminal charges to cargo owners/shippers 
and charges for other services such as pilotage. In addition, future research can also 
incorporate the role of competition, vertical relationships along the supply chain and 
port-regional development. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The research methodology is a vital and an essential component of the research 
process as the research outcome heavily depends upon the methodology adopted. For 
management studies, the research impact strongly depends on the appropriateness 
and the rigor of the research method used in the investigation (Scandura & Williams 
2000). Thus the development and justification of the methodological framework are 
needed to achieve the research objectives. This and subsequent chapters aim to gain 
further insight into the port infrastructure tariff setting process and related issues. In 
particular a primary data collection instrument (a survey of international sea port 
managers) is conducted to assist in the analysis of the current knowledge and practice 
of pricing principles by seaport managers, the infrastructure tariff setting process, 
tariff setting and the factors that influence tariff setting. Thus the research conducted 
in this and subsequent chapters will complement the research presented in Chapter 3, 
which used secondary data to study the determinants of port infrastructure tariffs.  
 To achieve the research objective, a conceptual framework concerning port 
infrastructure tariffs in terms of port pricing theory, pricing objectives, factors 
affecting port infrastructure tariff design and current conditions and issues in port 
infrastructure tariffs in practice is presented. The research design including data 
collection, a questionnaire design and data analysis methods is also explained. In 
particular, the analysis will make use of primary data collected from a survey of 
international seaports. The questionnaire covers the current knowledge of port 
pricing held by seaport organisations, port pricing objectives, the factors influencing 
the design of port infrastructure tariffs and any existing port infrastructure pricing 
practices. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
will be applied to identify and analyse the underlying factors in the infrastructure 
tariff design and setting process.  
 The current chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides explains the 
conceptual framework and the development of the survey questionnaire; section 4.3 
presents the research design; section 4.4 explains the data analysis method; and 
section 4.5 provides a synopsis of the chapter and its conclusions.  
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4.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND QUESTIONNAIRE  DESIGN 
4.2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As outlined in the previous section, the objectives of the primary data analysis are to 
test the level of knowledge held by port organisations about port pricing principles, 
their applicability and the various factors influentia l to port infrastructure tariff 
design and practices. The latter can be internal and external to the port organisations 
and are illustrated using the conceptual framework presented in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: The conceptual framework for port infrastructure pricing.  
 
The conceptual framework shown in Figure 4.1 identifies the theoretical and 
practical aspects of port pricing and recognises the following pricing approaches that 
have been explained in detail in Chapter 2 (the literature review) including: 
 Cost-based pricing. 
 Market based pricing. 
 Socially optimal pricing. 
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 Discriminatory pricing. 
 Strategic pricing. 
Figure 4.1 also shows that port infrastructure pricing can be influenced by various 
factors such as:  
 Port costs, especially infrastructure costs and maintenance costs.  
 Policy and regulation, which in many cases dictates the method and process 
of port tariff setting.  
 The tariff objectives set by the port authority.  
 Competition, including the number of rival ports offering similar services.  
 Demand, as governed by international trade and other relevant 
macroeconomic variables. 
 The shipping market, especially the bargaining power that shipping lines have 
to negotiate port tariffs and charges with ports.  
The conceptual framework above demonstrates how pricing knowledge, port 
pricing practice and port pricing theory are interrelated.  The top section of the 
framework demonstrates that port infrastructure tariff design and practices are 
influenced by many factors including port policy, port competition, port 
ownership, port demand and port costs. Lower part of the framework 
demonstrates how port’s knowledge on port pricing theory and ability to apply 
those theories affect the designing of port infrastructure tariffs.  
4.2.2 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN  
The study relies on a survey of international seaports as the key data collection 
instrument. The survey questionnaire was developed based on the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 2. The main part of the questionnaire includes questions concerning the 
existing knowledge that seaport managers have of port pricing principles and their 
application to the port infrastructure tariffs of their ports (Notteboom & Winkelmans 
2001); the tariff objectives of the port (Meersman, Van De Voorde & Vanelslander 
2003; Strandenes & Marlow 2000; Suykens & Van De Voorde 1998); the factors to 
consider when designing port infrastructure tariffs such as cost consideration, 
competition, stakeholder participation, and transparency; and the revision of port 
infrastructure tariffs (Haralambides et al. 2001; Meersman, Van De Voorde & 
Vanelslander 2003; Tongzon 2009). The following aspects influential to the port 
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infrastructure tariff design are proposed for further investigation at the data analysis 
stage and are therefore included in the survey questionnaire:  
a) Ownership.  
b) Governance model. 
c) Administrative structure. 
d) Competition in the sector. 
e) Knowledge of pricing principles and their applicability.  
f) Objectives of tariff setting.  
g) Costs, especially capital investment and maintenance.  
h) Financial position. 
i) The port users’ perception of tariff levels.  
j) Demand and the characteristics of the port user. 
k) Government policies and regulation.  
In addition, the following aspects of port infrastructure tariff practices are also 
proposed for further analysis: 
l) Stakeholder participation in port infrastructure tariffs.  
m) Transparency of port infrastructure tariffs. 
n) The revision of port infrastructure tariffs.  
o) Institutional arrangement for the design and revision of port 
infrastructure tariffs.  
A copy of the survey questionnaire is provided in Appendix I. The survey 
questionnaire comprises of six (6) sections: A to F. 
Section A: Seaport profile 
This section seeks administrative information of the survey participants which 
includes the port’s ownership and governance model, the port’s administrative 
structure, the level of competition experienced by the port and its location. The main 
objective of this section is to identify and classify ports based on their location, 
ownership, governance and administrative structures, and level of competition.  
 Ownership structures tend to vary across ports (Commission of the European 
Communities 1997). Thus, this section aims to take into account the differences 
between the ownership structures of ports that may affect their infrastructure pricing 
policies. According to ILO (1996), government ownership of the navigational 
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infrastructure is around 76%  and berth related infrastructure around 63%. Given 
their stake in the port sector, governments can have significant control over the way 
infrastructure tariffs are set. Question A1 seeks information on the port ownership 
which includes the different types of ownership (such as central government, state-
provincial government authority, municipal government, public private foreign 
partnership and private foreign/domestic companies).  
 Questions A2 and A3 seek information on the port governance and administrative 
structure of ports included in the sample from which the influence of different port 
governance and administrative structures on port infrastructure objectives and design 
can be drawn. Differences in the governance and administrative structure are also 
likely to impact on port tariff design. For example, according to Turnbull & Wass 
(1995), the landlord port model is the most successful port governance model to 
improve economic efficiency. Under this model, port authorities and government 
agencies play an important role in port governance in terms of the design of the 
concession agreement, its regulatory regime, the tariff regime and the mechanism by 
which the concessions are awarded (Notteboom 2007). However, the interference of 
the public sector in port tariff design has resulted in weaker financial performance 
and as a result new port governance models have been adopted. For example, Greek 
ports adopted a new port governance model by converting the traditionally state-
controlled port organisations into publicly-owned corporations and, in order to make 
them financially viable, handing the administration of these ports over to 
commercially driven, autonomous port authorities (Pallis & Syriopoulos 2007). 
Furthermore the port governance model can also have direct implications on the 
tariff structure of ports. For example, as a result of Mexican port reforms, port tariﬀs 
charged by the port administration (Administraciones Portuarias Integrales-APIs) to 
ships for the use of common infrastructure are subject to price caps which are set at 
levels close to the long term marginal cost of each port (Estache, Gonzalez & Trujillo 
2002).  
 Ports that are close to others, especially those that share overlapping hinterlands 
and/or forelands, tend to compete to attract cargo and vessels (Van Niekerk 2005; 
Veldman & Buckmann 2003; Yap & Lam 2006; Yap, Lam & Notteboom 2006). The 
level of inter-port competition can impact on port infrastructure tariffs. Competition 
strengthens given that ports with more traffic lower their port charges. Ports with 
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high traffic levels can lower port charges mainly in the provision of berths, dredged 
channels and break waters (Tongzon 1995). Therefore port infrastructure tariffs can 
be used as a tool for inter-port competition. Questions A4 and A5 identify the 
location and the level of competition experienced by the survey port. Information 
collected from these questions will be used to analyse the impact of competition on 
the port tariff objective and port infrastructure tariff design.  
Section B: Port infrastructure pricing knowledge 
Port authorities tend to follow an existing tariff structure developed historically with 
subsequent periodic revisions. Port tariff structure and the related complexity of 
nomenclature in pricing terminology have led to the introduction of a model tariff 
structure (ESCAP 2002). As Abbes (2007) noted, port authorities need to have at 
least a minimal knowledge of the short term and long term costs of port 
infrastructure in order to make informed decisions on efficient port operation, to 
adopt the best financial and administrative strategies, and to make appropriate 
investment decisions. For example, when formulating port tariffs, accurate 
information on port costs and their accurate compilation are prerequisites for the 
implementation of marginal cost pricing (Haralambides 2002; Swahn 2002). In order 
for a port authority to compile cost statistics a theoretical and empirical knowledge of 
port costs is necessary. In this context, various pricing principles were suggested, 
namely: marginal cost pricing (Bennathan & Walters 1979; Goss & Stevens 2001 
and Haralambides 2002); average cost pricing-full cost recovery (Hall & Hitch 
(1939); average variable cost pricing-operating cost recovery (Baumol 1996; Burns 
1986); Ramsey pricing (Ramsey (1927) and two-part and multi-part tariffs and 
commercial pricing i.e. mark-up pricing (Strandenes & Marlow (2000). The White 
Paper of the European Commission (1998) recommends that all EU ports need to 
follow marginal cost pricing; there are many examples of the difficulty in evaluating 
the marginal costs of seaport operation and its application to the real world (Abbes 
2007).  
 Nevertheless the application of the pricing principles in the seaport industry has 
not been fully examined, and the extent to which port authorities are aware of and 
understand these pricing principles is not clearly understood. As Goss (1990a, p.268) 
noted, 'most port authorities interviewed have been quite unable to justify their 
structure of port charges'. Section B of the questionnaire is designed to cover this 
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issue of the level of knowledge that port authorities have on port pricing. Questions 
in section B1 concern the knowledge of port mangers of various pricing strategies 
such as cost based pricing, market based pricing, social optimal pricing, 
discriminatory pricing and strategic pricing.  
 Question B2 asks about the level of applicability of the pricing strategies. This 
question is intended to gain an understanding of port infrastructure tariffs in terms of 
their cost relatedness, their ability to promote efficiency, their simplicity and their 
discriminatory nature; 'A clearly articulated pricing strategy is a prerequisite to the 
success of a public port authority' (Dowd & Fleming 1994, p.30). Haralambides 
(2002, p.334) recommends that a marginal cost pricing strategy can 'rationalise 
demand and allocate scarce port capacity according to carriers’ willingness to pay'. 
Alternatively, Bergantino (2002) asserts that, under natural monopoly conditions 
which experience economies of scale, marginal cost pricing does not allow for fixed 
cost recovery, and therefore only generates losses. Well-developed ports are yet to 
consider full cost recovery pricing. For instance, as estimated by Veldman & 
Buckmann (2003), container ports in the Antwerp-Hamburg port range needed to 
increase their port access charge (which covers dredging costs) in order to meet the 
targets of a policy of full port-cost recovery. Policy directives initiated by the EU 
have resulted in ports in the EU region having to at least revisit their pricing 
strategies.    
Section C: Port infrastructure pricing objectives 
The aim of Section C of the survey is to obtain information on the main objectives of 
the port infrastructure tariffs. As discussed by Haralambides (2002), the main 
consideration in the port sector is to establish an efficient port pricing system leading 
to a cost recovery taking into account a range of other objectives. These objectives 
can be varied based on the expected outcome. Ports might use port infrastructure 
tariffs as a tool for managing inter-port competition because, as Tongzon & Sawant 
(2007) noted, shipping lines consider port charges and connectivity to be the second 
most important factor when selecting a port. Some ports aim at competing for niche 
markets in the shipping industry and design their tariffs for this purpose. For 
example, vessels with higher transhipment cargo volumes calling at South Korean 
and Taiwanese ports have received substantial price discounts (Lirn, Thanopoulou, 
Beynon & Beresford 2004).     
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 Alternatively, some ports design tariffs in order to promote regional development. 
Thus port infrastructure services are considered to be public goods (Baird 2004; Goss 
1990a). For instance, most US ports are considered to be drivers of local economic 
development, local trade and job promotion, while achieving their internal 
commercial objective of maximising port throughput (Goss 1990c; Randall 1988). 
Although ports occupy a position partly as a public utility and partly as a private 
enterprise and offer port services, including port infrastructure, from a socio-
economic approach (maximising social welfare); the capital intensive and 
technologically evolutionary nature of the shipping industry has forced the port 
industry to become highly capital intensive with higher level of investment in port 
infrastructure (Suykens & Van De Voorde 1998). To clarify the dual role of ports as 
public assets and businesses, Section C of the questionnaire focuses on the 
uncovering the objectives of port infrastructure tariff design.    
Section D: Factors influencing port infrastructure tariff design 
This section of the questionnaire is designed to obtain the perspective of port 
managers on the influence of some pre-determined factors on port infrastructure 
tariff design. These factors include: the port’s capital and the operating costs of the 
port infrastructure; the financial position of the port; the service quality; total port 
costs to users; inflation rate and change in input costs; trade flow through the port; 
the number of ship calls; the vessel size variability; the tariffs of competitors ports; 
and government policies and regulation.    
Port infrastructure and maintenance costs: The financial, economic and operational 
objectives of a port; the market share of the port; and the port traffic growth 
situation, need to be accounted for when formulating port tariffs (Frankel 1987). 
These factors can be highly influential on port infrastructure pricing in world ports as 
the governance and administrative structure, and the conditions under which ports 
operate and are managed, tend to differ significantly.  
 Port infrastructure costs (mainly capital costs in the provision of port channels, 
turning basins and berths) are significant components of port total finance. Thus port 
infrastructure construction projects are subject to r igorous economic evaluation in 
which the return on the investment and its sensitivity are assessed with respect to 
various plausible scenarios that involve financial risk. This is because possible cost 
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escalations in the construction and maintenance of port infrastructure, the volatility 
in port demand measured in traffic flow, and the behaviour of competitors could 
result in stochastic financial returns on the investment in port infrastructure 
(Kakimoto & Seneviratne 2000). Thus, despite rather accurate port investment 
appraisals having been made, the financial outcome of port infrastructure has an 
element of risk. This leads to the conclusion that those decisions on port tariffs and 
their levels, especially those tariffs for infrastructure, are crucial in ensuring an 
adequate return on investment over the life of the port infrastructure. In turn the 
outcome of the financial risk assessment of port infrastructure construction and 
maintenance is highly influenced by port tariff levels.            
 In the context of a growing trend towards port privatisation, determining the 
individual cost share for port users of common port facilities in a port is vital to 
allow the fair and efficient allocation of common infrastructure costs (Bergantino & 
Coppejans 2000). This is particularly important where port infrastructure funding in 
developing countries is supported by international organisations such as the World 
Bank. In order to meet the conditions for borrowing, ports and their governing 
authorities are required to generate adequate incomes to maintain port facilities, 
replace port assets and finance a reasonable portion of total capital costs (Grosdidier 
De Matons 1986). Such circumstances have implications on the port infrastructure 
tariff design.         
Inflation rate: Ports offer infrastructure and services in return for a cash flow that 
helps the port organisation provide sustained port infrastructure and other services. 
Port assets such as dredged channels and berth facilities incur depreciation and loss 
of value due to market distortions, Heggie (1974, p.19) states, 'avoiding these 
distortions such as overutilization of port infrastructure, a lack of finance for 
maintenance is to base the port dues on real costs and correcting dues for the changes 
in the time value of money'. The change in the value of money is reflected in the rate 
of inflation and the prices charged for particular uses of port services need to 
incorporate an inflation premium. Thus, accounting for the real value of providing 
port infrastructure guarantees the rate of return on the capital spent on providing that 
port infrastructure.  
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Financial position of the port: A clear and transparent link between port costs and 
pricing is viewed as an important and necessary requirement for ports, as ports 
should set their tariffs so as to generate sufficient revenue to cover their costs and to 
meet their financial objectives (ESCAP 2002). However, ports in a strong financial 
position can use their pricing policy to foster their competitive advantage; those ports 
which are financially strong are able to offer lower port charges, and so stay 
competitive in the market. US port authorities are the best example: the ability of US 
ports to issue long term bonds that yield tax free interest has attracted larger 
investments into these ports and raised their capital position. In effect, public port 
authorities have been able to offer lower port charges (Goss 1990b).    
 The differences in port infrastructure financing can also influence the port 
infrastructure tariff design. This section of the questionnaire is designed to obtain 
information on the impact of different port infrastructure financing practices and 
private sector participation on the pricing practices. The question of the economic 
and financial viability of port infrastructure development raised by the European 
Commission (1997) needs to be justified in a broader context by examining whether 
private sector participation in the port sector leads to a more commercial attitude 
towards pricing and infrastructure funding. Further, the information gathered from 
this section provides the opportunity to understand the extent to which public sector 
ports and other undertakings deal with each other concerning port infrastructure 
financing, pricing and the level of involvement in port infrastructure investment in 
the world context.   
Port user costs: Port users makes their decisions based on their perception of the 
service quality and port charges. Some port users establish relationships with port 
authorities and arrive at longer-term agreements for the use of port infrastructure 
facilities (Heaver, Meersman & Van De Voorde 2001). Where there is inter-port 
competition and port users can negotiate with ports about the level of port charges, 
port charges tend to be more competitive (BTE 1989). On the supply side, in a 
competitive environment port authorities need to negotiate with the users and use 
different strategies (e.g. long-term agreements) to maintain their customer loyalty 
(Heaver, Meersman & Van De Voorde 2001). However, such long term agreements 
tend to remove the flexibility and ability of users to negotiate tariffs and change port 
(Pallis & De Langen 2010). Alternatively, ports may rely on other means to deal with 
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users in a competitive environment such as tariff negotiations, rebates and volume 
discounts.  Some ports offer discounts on port tariffs depending on the volume of 
business negotiated with port users; for example Ningbo (China) provides a 10 to 
30% discount depending on the volume of business negotiated (Cullinane, Teng & 
Wang 2005).   
Port demand and service quality: Ports under one authority can levy uniform 
charges. For instance, port authorities in Israel, Papua New Guinea, Canada (under 
the former National Harbour Board) and some port authorities in Australia (under the 
former Maritime Board in New South Wales) apply uniform port charges to all ports 
regardless of port cost levels or port demand conditions (Goss 1990a; Goss 1990b). 
However port reforms and the need for a cost recovery pricing approach have led to 
more rational port tariff structures. Port terminal charges are influenced by trade 
volume and service quality (Tang et al. 2011), factors which are covered by question 
D7.      
The tariff level of competing ports: The environment of competition within which a 
port operates influences the way the port sets its tariffs. High volumes of domestic 
traffic, good  hinterland connections, adequate feeder networks, good infrastructure 
and more importantly competitive port pricing are among the most important factors 
in the formation of a hub port (Aversa, Botter, Haralambides & Yoshizaki 2005). 
Competitive pricing tends to make total port tariffs competitive and lead to a regional 
tariff structure (Frankel 1987). For instance, financing or port charging practices in 
the European port sector may not only be affected by the ownership and/or the 
operation of a port, but also by the competitive position of the port (European 
Commission 2001). For example, the intra-port monopolists in highly competitive 
port ranges such as Le Havre-Hamburg are forced to set port charges competitively 
(Notteboom 2002). Furthermore, the degree of inter-port competition places a ceiling 
on individual port charges which in turn restrains port organisa tions from setting  
port charges to generate full cost recovery (Gardner, Marlow & Pettit 2006). The 
argument being that, if a port does set its charges to generate full cost recovery it will 
lose its customers to its competitors. However some ports (for example some EU 
ports) have state funded port infrastructure, and their tariffs can be priced at lower 
levels relative to self- funded ports. This has resulted in unfair competition among 
ports as port users are more attracted towards the ports with lower prices. In addition, 
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increased inter-port competition has resulted in the substitution of cost based prices 
for those prices based on monopolistic port behaviour featuring discriminatory 
pricing practices (Goss & Stevens 2001). Thus, the only solution to circumvent 
different port pricing practices and the resulting unfair competition is to introduce 
market based pricing principles for port infrastructure (Commission of the European 
Communities 1997). This discussion suggests that ports should consider their 
competitive environment when setting port tariffs.  
Government policy – government policy on port financing and regulation: The 
strategic role of transport infrastructure is considered to be a critical success factor 
for a competitive advantage and the internationalisation of supply within the context 
of ever increasing demand for the mobility of goods and people (Nijkamp & Rienstra 
1995). Thus, most governments place a high priority on transport infrastructure in 
their investment policies. Owing to government budget-tightening and an ideological 
dislike of the public financing of transport infrastructure most countries in the world 
look closely at options for Private Public Partnerships (PPP) (Kurek 2010). A wide 
variety of port financing approaches has ensued as a result of the diffe rences in port 
governance models (European Commision 2007). Among these private sector 
funding has increased due to increasing demand for port capacity following 
burgeoning world trade, containerisation and container traffic, and the extension of 
ship capacity (Boeuf 2003). These private investments are mainly concentrated on 
superstructure while the public sector mainly contributes to port infrastructure 
investments (Debrie 2010). Nevertheless many European countries plan to replace 
such tax-based public financing of infrastructure with a system based on user charges 
(Knockaert, Evangelinos, Rietveld & Wieland 2009).  
 The questions in Section D concern related factors that influence the design of 
port infrastructure tariffs. This section covers the effect of the key factors such as 
capital cost and operating costs, a port’s financial position, shipping market 
dynamics, port competition and government policy and regulation towards ports 
which are captured in the questionnaire survey of port managers.  
Section E: Port infrastructure pricing practice (people involved, the level of 
transparency and tariff revision) 
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This section of the questionnaire looks at the infrastructure pricing framework of a 
port in terms of port infrastructure pricing practices such as tariff negotiations, the 
tariff setting and revision approval process, the parties involved, the level of 
transparency and the reasons for tariff revision. The survey seeks to capture the port 
infrastructure tariff in practice with the intent to develop a framework that identifies 
the factors contributing to various tariff designs.  
Stakeholders’ involvement in tariff design   
Dowd and Fleming (1994) state that the external examination of port tariffs with the 
participation of port users allows ports to negotiate port tariffs and establish a 
negotiated price for every port service. These port users basically comprises with 
shipping lines and cargo owners. Obtaining their feedback on designed tariffs is 
beneficial in terms of establishing port customer relationships and a port price that 
can be imposed for a certain period of time for the use of the port. Nevertheless, 
there can be consequences for the financial position of the port as the negotiated 
price may be substantially lower than the internally determined port price. In 
addition, a government’s involvement in the port tariff decision making process will 
further impede the ability of the port organisation to be financially viable, to 
establish and to exercise cost based port tariffs. In most instances the freedom of 
seaport authorities to charge for port services on a cost basis is curtailed by the 
decisions of governments concerning the design and the level of port charges (Juhel 
2001).  
Transparency: policy directions for designing tariffs, public tariffs, negotiated port 
charges, lump sum port fees, and the regulation of port infrastructure pricing 
The European Commission's ((1997) study is mainly concerned with the issues and 
suggestions for pricing principles such as user pay and transparency in port pricing. 
The questions in Section E2 mainly examine the level of transparency in port 
infrastructure tariffs. They include policy directives for port pricing practices such as 
the legal and policy framework, the nature of the tariff design process, new tariff 
imposition, tariff regulation and negotiation.  
 (a) Policy direction for tariffs: Policy direction and the process for port tariff 
setting are important elements to understand as the practice of port infrastructure 
pricing is primarily influenced by the institutional set up under which the directives 
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for port operation originate. Government policy directives on the pricing of port 
infrastructure have influenced the tariff design and setting process, and as a result, 
various tariff structures have been established. Examples include the member states' 
support for infrastructure charging in the EU (Commission of the European 
Communities 1997) and the Greek government’s involvement in financing and tariff 
setting for infrastructure (Zachcial et al. 2006). Some public port authorities (for 
example those in Bulgaria, South Korea, Taiwan, Italy and Argentina) structure port 
infrastructure charges in such a way that they can be applied uniformly to all ports in 
the country. This makes the imposition and the collection of port charges s imple and 
convenient.  
 (b) Public tariffs: It is generally accepted that a port that is a common user 
facility and a provider of public port infrastructure to any ship requires a transparent 
pricing structure (Eriksson, Gullne, Lindvall, Karvonen, Saurama, Göthe-Lundgren, 
Mellin & Lindberg 2009). Thus most port tariffs are made publicly available by port 
authorities and the decision to publish may possibly depend on the organisational set 
up of the port. In some ports publishing port charges is a legal responsibility of the 
port authority. For example, in Japanese ports, the design and publication of up to 
date port tariffs covering port infrastructure, the facilities necessary for the use of the 
port and the port services, are a legal responsibility of port authorities under Article 
12 of The Port and Harbour Law of 1950 (Olukoju 1997). Nevertheless, there are 
criticisms about the transparency of tariff setting and there are no common 
regulations for the compilation, publication and revision of port tariffs. In the EU, 
short-sea shipping is characterised by a lack of transparency of port tariffs (Paixao 
Casaca & Marlow 2007).  
 (c) Negotiated port charges and the lump sum port fee: Economic regulation in 
the port sector, especially in the regulation of port access, enables a port 
infrastructure owner (usually a port authority) to negotiate access terms and 
conditions with port access seekers (usually shipping lines). For example, in 
Australia, economic regulation encompasses the rights of access to infrastructure and 
the terms of access, including the ability to set prices for the good or the service 
(Allen Consulting Group 2008 ). This allows port authorities to negotiate port 
charges with the port users independently of the government’s involvement (Industry 
Commission 1993). Alternatively, where shipping operators have the right to 
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negotiate with port authorities as in the UK, port tariffs tend to be lower (Goss 1998). 
As a result, for example as in the South Australian port sector, any price increase in 
port tariffs may not reflect the actual market price that needs to be paid by the port 
users (ESCOSA 2009). In the case of landlord ports, private port terminal operators 
are most likely to negotiate a lump sum fee for all services offered to ships at the 
berth (ISL 2006). Shipping conferences can also negotiate charges with port 
operators based on specific contracts (Reynaerts 2010). This reinforces the fact that 
the willingness of port authorities and port users to negotiate port charges has a direct 
implication on the port infrastructure tariff practices. Moreover, the increased market 
power of liner shipping resulting from the dynamism of the shipping industry 
(mergers and acquisitions) has placed shipping companies in a better bargaining 
position with seaports. Shipping lines visiting a port on a regular basis negotiate long 
term contracts with the port, which reduce the ability of the port to charge the cost of 
the service provided to the user (Strandenes 2004). Thus, it is more likely that the 
influence of port users is embedded in port tariff practices. Furthermore, as a result 
of competition, commercialisation, mergers and acquisitions ports need to pay more 
attention to their efficiency and productivity enhancement strategies (Wilmsmeier 
2007). In this regard, providing quality port infrastructure is important in establishing 
efficient port operation and is also a significant factor along with port tariff levels for 
shipping lines when selecting a port.   
 Private sector participation in ports under concessionary agreements has impacted 
on the design of the port infrastructure tariffs in terms of the level of charge. Port 
infrastructure tariffs are offered to port users as a composite fee directly received b y 
the port or included in the terminal fee charged by the terminal operator. In the latter 
case, the port operator also pays a rental to the port infrastructure owner for the use 
of the infrastructure. Evidence from the Peruvian port sector suggests that the port 
infrastructure tariffs paid by port users in ports with a single concessionary operator 
are 22% lower compared to those paid by port users in ports with multi-port 
concessionaires (Defilippi 2004).       
 (d) Regulation of port infrastructure tariffs: The regulation of port operation in 
general aims to foster greater competition. Tariff regulation is given more attention 
following private sector participation in the port sector in order to establish fair 
competition. There are different pricing practices in the port sector as a result of 
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market regulation, terms of contracts and the establishment of an independent 
regulatory agency with a pricing formula for cost recovery (ADB 2000). For 
instance, ports on the Iberian peninsula are subject to a strict regulatory regime 
(Castillo-Manzano & Asencio-Flores 2012). This can negatively affect the autonomy 
of the port authority when tariff setting, In comparison, ports in the UK are self-
governing independent seaport organisations with significant freedom to set tariffs 
(Baird 1999). The autonomy of the port authority in tariff affairs is of prime 
importance when setting up a market responsive cost based tariff structure for 
seaport infrastructure and services. Although, as observed by UNCTAD (1975), the 
degree of autonomy of port authorities has increased only by a limited extent so that, 
in the EU context, the managerial autonomy over decisions on financial resourcing, 
investments, and tariff setting in response to changing market requirements remains 
relatively strict or limited (European Commission 2001). Centralised control of a 
port and the port authority and the resulting lack of autonomy result in a ports that is 
unresponsive to competition and cause port authorities to retain their traditional port 
pricing structures (BTE 1989). In addition, as Tongzon & Sawant (2007) found, 
among the factors affecting the preferences of the port users when selecting a port, 
the influence of port charges relative to other factors in the port choice need to be 
incorporated in the formulation of seaport policy, as port users generally have a 
maximum  price that they are willing to pay for the use of port infrastructure and 
services. The consultation and/or the influence of port users on port tariff setting is a 
customary practice found in North American seaports (Dowd & Fleming 1994; 
Wilder & Pender 1979). This section of the questionnaire examines these factors and 
circumstances in ports worldwide. Section E2 also covers issues related to port tariff 
regulation, the autonomy of the port authority in tariff setting and the influence of 
port users on tariff implementation. 
e)Tariff revision: Port tariffs may need to be revised after new port investment 
(Heggie 1974) and in response to specific factors such as the changing financial 
position of the port, port facilities and increasing competition from rival ports 
(UNCTAD 1995a). In such circumstances, the existence of a simple procedure for 
revising port tariffs results in a more predictable tariff structure (Vincent 1989). 
However the reasons for port tariff revision are not clearly understood. In many ports 
tariffs are revised annually and the practice of tariff revision is used as a marketing 
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tool to attract port users  (ESCAP 2002; Psaraftis 2005). The process of tariff 
revision requires interaction by the port authority with external parties such as the 
government and port users to ensure the welfare of the latter (UNCTAD 1996). 
However this occurs in various ways as ports follow different practices as observed 
by OECD (2011). Many ports in West and Central Africa tend to decide tariff leve ls 
without considering the traffic volume so as to cover port costs (Harding, Pálsson & 
Raballand 2007). However the frequency of such revisions and the underlying 
reasons are not apparent. A further investigation on the factors affecting such 
practices in world seaports provides a much broader context. The formulation and 
revision of port tariff structures have evolved traditionally and, in the process, have 
involved various stakeholders including the governments of ports. As Dowd & 
Fleming (1994) noted, tariff revision involves internal and external processes that 
consider the views, opinions and approval of all the stakeholders participating in the 
port business. However the official tariff formulation, revision and approval process 
has been over looked and needs further insights in order to understand the presence 
of any obstacles and their impact on the establishment of efficiency-promoting cost 
based port infrastructure tariffs. Questions E3.1 to E3.6 of the questionnaire aim to 
obtain information about existing institutional arrangements for port tariff revision, 
the processes and decisions made when revising port infrastructure tariffs. Questions 
in section E3 gather the views of port mangers on the factors concerning the decision 
of ports to revise their port infrastructure tariffs. Further, to complement the port 
tariff setting process, based on the views expressed by Frankel (1987) on the 
contribution and the roles of port managers in each department of the port 
organisation and, later by Dowd & Fleming (1994) on internal examination, the 
factors considered for port infrastructure tariff design, formulation and revision are 
identified by the questions in Section E. Question E4 relates to the level of 
involvement of the different departments within a port in tariff revision.   
 The questionnaire also includes two open ended questions (E5.2 and E5.3) to 
obtain information about infrastructure tariff formulation, revision and approval 
procedures, and the expectation of the port management concerning the req uirement 
for port tariff-related training and support. The open ended questions were included 
with the objective of discussing the implications of the research findings on the 
existing port infrastructure tariff formulation and implementation practices.  
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Section F: Profile of the respondent    
This section obtained details on the profile of the participating respondents. The 
information requested included the job title, administrative department, experience in 
the current position and experience of port tariff affairs. This information helps to 
confirm the validity and accuracy of the information gathered in the questionnaire.   
4.3  RESEARCH DESIGN  
This study on port pricing comprises three main parts that support the three-part 
research cycle as well as the “triangulation” of the research results as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. Part 1 is a comprehensive literature survey, conducted to examine port 
pricing research and its direction, mainly focusing on port infrastructure pricing. Part 
2 is an econometric analysis of port infrastructure tariffs (chapter 3) to analyse the 
extent to which port infrastructure costs explain the level of port infrastructure tariffs 
while controlling for the effect of other factors such as geographical location, 
governance model and demand.  
 
Figure 4.2: Research Design and Methods. 
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practices, examine the knowledge of port authorities on conventional port pricing 
theory, and identify the factors that influence port infrastructure tariff design and 
practices. The questionnaire asks port managers to provide their views about port 
infrastructure tariffs and related information concerning their formulation, 
management, institutional and policy frameworks, and the competitive environment 
that their port works in. The data are analysed using exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) at first in contrast to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).    
4.3.1 SAMPLING FRAMEWORK 
Cluster sampling was adopted to select the world ports for the questionnaire survey. 
Cluster sampling was adopted primarily because it takes into account the 
geographical distribution of seaports across port regions in the world and allows for 
the analysis of seaport pricing practices across different regions.  
For each port region, North American, South American, African, West European, 
Mediterranean, South and West Asian, East Asian and Australasian, the contact 
details of port managers from 450 seaport authorities were chosen from the official 
web sites of the regional port associations and the Port and Terminal Guide (Lloyd's 
Register-Fairplay Ltd 2011). The contact details of the port, the name of the port, the 
port authority and its location were also checked against the names of the top 450 
ports published by Lloyd's Register-Fairplay and World Port Source website (World 
Port Source 2013). It was assumed that the management of those ports with the 
higher throughput (i.e. those in the top 450) would have a greater interest in the 
organisational set up, the management of the port and the port finances, including 
port tariffs. Accordingly 450 seaports were included in the sample for the world port 
survey.  
4.3.2 PRETESTING, RECRUITMENT AND RESPONSE RATE 
The use of an online (HTML) based questionnaire survey method was preferred as 
recommended by Yun & Trumbo (2000). Participants for the port survey were 
invited to participate by email to the head of each seaport authority. A consent form 
for participation was attached together with the access link to the web-based 
questionnaire developed using the 'Google document' tool.  
 A pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted in order to assess its reliability and 
to check for errors and confusion. The pre-test was conducted on 15 participants 
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from academia, research colleagues and colleagues known from the port industry. A 
mixed method was adopted for the pre-testing of the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was also approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of 
Tasmania (Appendix III).       
 The survey invitations were sent out from the 1st of November to the 31st of 
December 2013. Of the 450 emails sent inviting participation in the survey, 111 were 
rejected due to incorrect email addresses or rejection from the email server. Of the 
remaining 339 emails successfully sent, four port authorities declined to participate 
and there were 67 complete responses and returns of the questionnaire (a response 
rate of 20%). During the survey, in order to reduce the non-response bias, suggested 
by Armstrong and Overton (1977) as the most common type of extrapolation, a 
successive waves of the questionnaire were generated along with a stimulus, that is a 
statement that a research report of the survey is provided to the respondent.  
4.4  DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
The study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods. Both exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were applied in the 
analysis of factors influential to the practice and design of infrastructure charges  in 
complementary to the regression analysis. The econometric analysis was 
complemented with EFA and CFA primarily because econometric analysis was 
unable to capture certain aspect of factors that contribute to the determination of port 
infrastructure tariffs such as knowledge & its applicability, competition and tariff 
objective and also triangulate upon port demand, cost recovery factors identified in 
the regression analysis. Further they could identify factors influential to tariff 
practice such as tariff policy availability, regulation, transparency concern and 
stakeholder influence.  
The two methods were preferred as two research analysis tools for two main reasons. 
Firstly, as Cudeck (2000) highlighted, EFA is capable of determining the number of 
underlying factors important to the research topic, it is able to quantify the extent that 
each variable is associated with the underlying factors, and is helpful in obtaining 
information about the nature of the variables from observing which factors contribute 
to the performance of which variable. Secondly, although EFA has not been 
extensively applied in port pricing research it has been applied extensively in a broad 
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range of research fields (Winkelmans 1977) and other areas of port research such as: 
identifying the determinants of port competitiveness and the selection of ports (Yeo, 
Roe & Dinwoodie 2008); the port selection factors used by shipping lines (Chang, 
Lee & Tongzon 2008a); the factors affecting port service quality (Kolanović, 
Skenderović & Zenzerović 2008 ; Pantouvakis 2006); and the impact of port 
integration and cooperation on port competitiveness (Chiang & Hwang 2013). 
Thirdly, CFA is applied not only as an alternative to EFA but also to confirm the 
results of the EFA, and produce a modal fit for the latent factors. 
 To derive an appropriate number of factors that best fit the data set Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) was applied as preferred over other methods such as: 
unweighted least squares, generalised least squares, maximum likelihood, princ ipal 
axis factoring, alpha factoring, and image factoring.  Two criteria are used in EFA to 
determine the suitability of factors:  
a. Factors were extracted based on the total variance determined by an 
eigenvalue greater than 1 (Kaiser Criterion).  
b. The numbers of factors above the point of line break in scree plot were  
considered. 
As part of the factor analysis process, the Varimax rotation method was applied in 
factor extraction, given the fact that there is no widely preferred method of factor 
rotation and all tend to produce similar results (Abdi 2003; Fabrigar, Wegener, 
Maccallum & Strahan 1999).    
 Several statistical tests were conducted before undertaking the EFA:  
a. KMO test (Ferguson & Cox 1993). 
b. Bartlett’s test of Sphericity (Bartlett 1950; Dziuban & Shirkey 1974; 
Grossman, Nickerson & Freeman 1991; Tobias & Carlson 1969). 
c. Correlation coefficient (Dziuban & Shirkey 1974; Grossman, Nickerson & 
Freeman 1991). 
The main objective of these tests was to check whether data is suitable for factor 
analysis. They showed that the proposed model based on EFA was a best fit to the 
observed data. 
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4.5  CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this and the subsequent chapters is twofold. Firstly, primary data 
collected from the survey of international seaports is used to complement and 
triangulate the secondary data study of port infrastructure tariffs. Secondly, insights 
are sought into the infrastructure tariff setting process and practices used by 
international ports, the knowledge and awareness of port authorities of the principles 
of port infrastructure tariffs and their applications to port tariffs are assessed, and the 
factors that affect and issues that are involved in port infrastructure tariff design and 
setting practices are identified.  
 This chapter presents the methodological framework adopted in the study to 
answer the research questions and test the research hypotheses. The methodological 
framework presented in the chapter is based on data and information gathered from a 
HTML based online questionnaire completed by 67 seaport authorities (equating to a 
20% response rate) from different port regions worldwide. The questionnaire was 
pretested in order to assure its internal validity.     
 The study employed two methods to understand the factors influencing port 
infrastructure tariff design and practices. The results of the EFA and CFA conducted 
on the data gathered by the structured questionnaire of world ports to determine 
factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design and practices are presented in 
the next chapter.   
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As explained in the research methodology (chapter 4) the main focus of this chapter 
is to examine the current level of knowledge held by port authorities concerning port 
pricing and its applicability to current infrastructure pricing, and to explore the 
factors affecting port infrastructure tariff design and setting practices. The chapter is 
organised as follows: section 5.2 provides essential information on the data set, the 
profiles of the respondents and the descriptive statistics of the data; section 5.3 
presents the results of the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) of port infrastructure tariff design; section 5.4 presents the EFA and 
CFA results for the port infrastructure tariff setting practices; section 5.5 presents the 
survey results concerning the current port tariff formulation, revision and approval 
processes used by worldwide ports; section 5.6 presents the survey results on the 
perceived need for tariff design training and specific support requirements; and 
section 5.7 concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.2.1 DATA SET  
 Sixty seven (67) port managers from 67 international seaports in different port 
regions, all with various ownership types, governance models and administrative 
structures, responded to the survey, and provided the data presented in this chapter.  
 Figure 5.1 shows the geographical coverage of the data set (survey respondents 
came from the countries coloured green in figure 5.1). The geographical coverage of 
the data includes port authorities from the USA, Canada, Colombia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Brazil, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Germany, Scotland, France, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Croatia, Finland, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
China, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Australia 
and New Zealand. 
112 
 
 Table 5.1 summarises information on the ownership, governance model, 
administrative structure and the port region of the ports surveyed.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: The geographical distribution of the seaport authorities surveyed. 
 
  
 
Table 5.1: Ownership, governance, administrative structure and port region of the 
participating ports. 
 
Ownership Count Percentage Administrative Structure Count Percentage
Central Government 24 36% Statutory Public Port Authority 22 33%
State/Provincial Governemnt 16 24% Commercialized Port Authority 12 18%
Municipal Governemnt 11 16% Government Department 6 9%
Local Government 6 9% Statutory Corporation 2 3%
Public-Private/Foreign Partnership 1 1% Government Owned Limited Corporation 7 10%
Private/Foreign Company 2 3% Public Limited Company 5 7%
Private/Domestic Company 6 9% Private Limited Company 9 13%
Private-Public/Community Trust 1 1% Non Profit Public Enterprise 1 1%
Other 0 0% Municipal Enterprise 2 3%
Government Trading Enterprise 1 1%
Governance Modal Count Percentage Port Region Count Percentage
Service Port 18 27% European 28 42%
Tool Port 4 6% North American 13 19%
Landlord Port 36 54% South American 3 4%
Privatised Port 6 9% East Asian 6 9%
Other 1 1% South East Asian 4 6%
Australasian 13 19%
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Source: Author’s calculation based on survey data. 
 
Of the total 67 participating ports, 85% are publicly owned (36% by central 
government, 24% by state or provincial government, 16% by municipal government 
and 9% by local government). With regard to the port governance model, 54% 
conform to the Landlord model, 27% the service model and 9% are privatised. 
Among the total ports 33% are administered by a statutory public port authority,  
while 18% are commercial port authorities, 13% are private limited companies and 
port corporations account for 13%. Interestingly more than 50% of ports in the 
sample exhibit some level of corporatisation. 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of the administrative model across the port governance 
model. 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the distribution of administrative models across governance 
models. The Statutory Public Port Authority is the predominant administrative model 
for the ports with Service and Landlord governance models (44% and 35% 
respectively). The Commercialised Port Authority is the predominant administrative 
model for ports with the Tool governance model (50%), and the second most 
common administrative model for Privatised ports (29%). The predominant 
administrative model for Privatised ports is (unsurprisingly) Private Limited 
Companies (42%). Statutory and Commercialised Port Authorities therefore 
represent the dominant administrative structures of the participating ports, while the 
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other administrative models have a fair representation. The majority (42%) of the 
ports sampled came from the European port region which includes Western Europe, 
Southern Europe and Northern Europe (the Baltic). The North American and 
Australasian regions accounted for 19% each, Asia 15% (included East and South 
East Asia) and there was a very limited response (only 4% of the total) from the 
South American region.   
5.2.2  PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS 
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2 present the position and department of the survey 
participants respectively. 
Figure 5.3: Designation of respondents. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Distribution of the position and port department of the respondents.  
Position 
Port Department 
General 
Administration 
Commercial 
and 
Planning 
Port 
Operations 
Accounting 
and 
Finance 
Marketing 
and 
Publication 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
90% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
Managing Director 43% 14% 14% 0% 29% 
Port Executive-
Department Head 
15% 35% 15% 30% 5% 
Port Executive 14% 57% 14% 14% 0% 
Other 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 30% 39% 12% 15% 4% 
42% 
30% 
15% 
10% 3% 
Port Executive Port Executive-Department Head 
Chief Executive Officer Managing Director 
Other 
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42% of respondents are port executives while 30% are departmental heads. More 
importantly 15% are chief executive officers and 10% are managing directors. The 
respondents are mainly attached to their port’s general administration or commercial 
and planning departments, both department accounting for about 69% of the total.  
 Figure 5.4 shows the number of years of experience related to port tariffs held by 
the respondents. The data revealed that most of the respondents have a substantial 
experience in tariff related work with 67% of respondents having 6 years or more 
experience with regard to port tariffs. More importantly 39% of respondents have 11 
years or more experience in port tariff related affairs. This suggests that the 
responses to the questionnaire came from a sample of port managers holding 
positions of authority in the ports, and who had many years of experience in port 
tariff formulation and implementation. Thus the data used in the analysis is valid and 
reliable and representative of the current port infrastructure tariff dynamics.  
Figure 5.4: Experience related to port tariffs.  
  
5.2.3 FACTORS AFFECTING PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF 
DESIGN 
Table 5.3 reports the feedback by the respondents to the 9-point Likert scale 
questions on the factors influential to infrastructure tariff design. There are two parts 
to section B of the questionnaire concerning the knowledge of pricing approaches: 
questions B1.1 to B1.5 have a scale from 1, 'not at all aware', to 9, 'fully aware' and 
questions B2.1 to B2.5 have a scale from 1, 'not at all applicable', to 9, 'highly 
applicable'. For section C, concerning port tariff objectives (C1 to C8) there is a scale 
33% 
28% 
27% 
12% 
1-5 years 6-10 years 16 years and above 11-15 years 
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from 1, 'not at all agree', to 9 'strongly agree'. Section D regarding the factors 
affecting port infrastructure tariff design (D1 to D11) has a scale from 1, 'not at all 
important', to 9, 'highly important'. All the mean values of the responses are 
significantly higher than the respective midpoint of the Likert scale (5), suggesting 
that respondents are aware of port pricing models, their applicability and the factors 
that influence port infrastructure tariff design. The 'Average' (Table 5.3) refers to the 
average of each respondent’s feedback to all questions. The mean value 6.5 implies 
that the respondents have an overall positive view on port pricing approaches, their 
applicability and factors affecting port infrastructure design.   
Table 5.3: Factors affecting port infrastructure tariff design.  
 
Variable - Tariff Design Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
B1.1 Awareness of cost based pricing 7.9 1.4 -1.2 1.2
B1.2 Awareness of market based pricing 7.8 1.5 -1.3 0.9
B1.3 Awareness of social optimal pricing 4.9 2.6 -0.2 -1.1
B1.4 Awareness of discriminatory pricing 5.5 2.7 -0.4 -1.1
B1.5 Awareness of strategic pricing 6.8 2.2 -1.3 1.4
B2.1. Use of cost based pricing 6.9 2.3 -1.3 1.1
B2.2. Use of market based pricing 6.9 2.4 -1.3 0.9
B2.3. Use of social optimal pricing 3.7 2.3 0.4 -0.9
B2.4. Use of discriminatory pricing 3.4 2.5 0.6 -0.8
B2.5. Use of strategic pricing 5.7 2.6 -0.7 -0.8
C1 Recovering investment costs 7.4 2.1 -1.5 1.5
C2 Competition with rivals 7.1 2.0 -1.3 1.7
C3 Attracting specific cargo and port users 6.6 2.1 -0.8 -0.1
C4 Increasing port capacity utilisation 6.8 2.2 -1.1 0.6
C5 Covering operation costs 7.1 2.3 -1.2 0.4
C6 Promoting regional economic development 6.5 2.4 -0.7 -0.4
C7 Achieving return on investment 6.0 2.7 -0.7 -0.7
D1 Infrastructure investment cost 7.6 1.7 -1.5 2.8
D2 Infrastrucutre maintenance costs 7.2 2.0 -1.4 1.8
D3 Inflation 6.4 2.2 -0.6 -0.2
D4 Port's financial position 6.6 2.1 -0.9 0.2
D5 Percieved service quality 6.8 2.1 -1.3 1.1
D6 Total financial costs to port users 6.6 2.1 -0.9 0.4
D7 Trade flow 6.7 2.0 -1.2 1.4
D8 Number of ship calls 6.8 2.0 -1.3 1.5
D9 Variability in ship size 6.0 2.3 -0.7 -0.5
D10 Competing port's tariffs 6.8 1.9 -1.3 2.3
D11 Government policy and regulation 6.6 2.3 -1.1 0.4
Average 6.5 2.2 -0.9 0.5
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5.2.4 FACTORS AFFECTING PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFFS 
PRACTICE 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the response to the survey questions 
using the 9-point Likert scale (from 1 being 'strongly disagree' to 9 being 'strongly 
agree').  
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of factors affecting port infrastructure tariff setting 
practices. 
 
Questions (E1.1 to E4.7) concern the view of the port managers on port infrastructure 
pricing practices in terms of stakeholder participation in port infrastructure tariffs, 
the level of transparency, and factors considered during tariff revision. Overall the 
average of the views of the factors related to port infrastructure tariffs setting 
practices (5.4) suggests some intermediate level of awareness among respondents to 
Variable - Tariff Practice Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
E1.1 Having a committee for tariff formulation 5.8 3.1 -0.5 -1.4
E1.2 Departmental involvement in tariff design 6.2 2.6 -0.7 -0.6
E1.3 Needing government approval for revised tariffs 5.5 3.4 -0.3 -1.7
E1.4 Obtaining feedback from port users 5.9 2.5 -0.6 -0.6
E1.5 Obtaining feedback from port operators 5.5 2.8 -0.4 -1.2
E2.1 Having a policy guideline for tariff design and revision 5.9 2.8 -0.5 -1.1
E2.2 Having a policy on rebates and discounts 6.2 2.9 -0.8 -0.9
E2.3 Publishing tariffs to public 8.3 1.6 -3.4 12.1
E2.4 Having a tariffs regulatory control 5.5 3.3 -0.3 -1.6
E2.5 Offering composite tariff 4.4 2.9 0.2 -1.5
E2.6 Making tariff design and revision public 5.1 3.1 -0.3 -1.5
E2.7 Offering negotiable tariffs 4.8 2.9 0.0 -1.5
E2.8 Adhering to published tariffs 7.3 2.4 -1.6 1.7
E2.9 Offering a lump sum port fee 2.7 2.2 1.3 0.6
E3.1 Revising tariffs after new investment 3.5 2.5 0.6 -0.9
E3.2 Adjusting tariffs with inflation and input cost 6.0 2.9 -0.6 -1.0
E3.3 Revising tariffs as per port demand 4.5 2.4 -0.1 -1.3
E3.4 Revising tariffs as per port’s strategic plan 5.5 2.4 -0.6 -0.6
E3.5 Revising tariffs as per port’s competitive position 5.7 2.3 -0.6 -0.4
E3.6 Revising tariffs as per port's financial position 5.6 2.3 -0.6 -0.4
E4.1 Obtaining inputs from navigation and signalling department 3.9 3.1 0.4 -1.4
E4.2 Obtaining inputs from operation department 6.3 2.5 -1.0 0.0
E4.3 Obtaining inputs from commercial and planning department 7.0 2.4 -1.2 0.6
E4.4 Obtaining inputs from accounting and finance department 6.9 2.2 -1.0 0.6
E4.5 Obtaining inputs from marketing department 5.0 3.0 -0.1 -1.4
E4.6 Obtaining inputs from Engineering department 4.8 2.7 0.0 -1.3
E4.7 Obtaining inputs from human resource department 3.2 2.6 0.8 -0.7
Average 5.4 2.7 -0.4 -0.3
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the questions asked by this section of the survey. Most of the mean values of the 
responses are slightly higher than the respective midpoint (5) of the Likert scale, 
suggesting that respondents are aware of those factors that affect the port 
infrastructure tariffs setting practices. However, most mean values are only less than 
6, except for a few cases. This indicates that participants seem to be less concerned 
about the factors that determine port infrastructure pricing setting practices. 
However, questions E1.2, E2.2, E2.3, E2.8 and E3.2 are the exception, all of which 
have a mean above six. Table 5.4 shows that the involvement of different 
departments in tariff design (mean 6.2) is a major way of involving stakeholders in 
port infrastructure tariff design, followed by obtaining feedback from port users (5.9) 
and having a committee for tariff formulation (5.8). This suggests that the strongest 
factors that affect port infrastructure tariff setting practices are the departmental level 
that is involved in tariff design and revision, the availability of a clear tariff policy 
for rebates and discounts, making port tariffs publicly available, the requirement for 
adhering to public port tariffs, and the need to adjust port infrastructure tariffs in 
accordance to price level and change in input costs. 
5.3 FACTOR ANALYSIS: PORT INFRASTRCUTRE DESIGN 
This section presents the result of the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and the 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to examine the factors influential to port 
infrastructure tariff design. The EFA presented in section 5.3.1 is used to identify the 
key underlying factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design. A CFA is then 
applied to further test the statistical relationships between those variables; this is 
presented in section 5.3.2.   
5.3.1 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF DESIGN 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 (research design and methodology), the EFA is applied 
using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and the varimax criterion (Appendix 
VIII). Before undertaking the EFA, tests of sampling adequacy and sphericity were 
also conducted. The sampling adequacy test included the test statistic of the Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy which is 0.674, significant at the 1% 
significance level. Similarly Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Chi-Square test statistic for 
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the sample is 976.17, which is significant at the 1% significant level. Thus the null 
hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix is rejected.  
 Table 5.5 presents the total variance explained by the all the factors associated 
with the feedback obtained from the survey questions concerning the factors that are 
important to the design of port infrastructure tariffs. Factors one to five (representing 
factors influential to port infrastructure design) have the eigenvalues of 5.615, 2.296, 
1.822, 1.786 and 1.533 respectively, which are greater than one and explain 72.54% 
of the total variance. Thus, only these five factors can be retained for further analysis,  
according to the Kaiser criterion.  
Table 5.5: PCA factor analysis of factors influential to port infrastructure tariffs 
design: Total variance explained (5 Factor Model).  
Factors 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.615 31.193 31.193 
2 2.296 12.757 43.950 
3 1.822 10.124 54.073 
4 1.786 9.923 63.997 
5 1.533 8.517 72.514 
6 0.811 4.507 77.020 
7 0.727 4.040 81.060 
8 0.658 3.653 84.714 
9 0.584 3.245 87.958 
: : : : 
18 0.084 0.466 100.000 
              Extraction method: Principle Component  
Table 5.6 reports the rotated, rescaled component matrix for the five factors 
identified in Table 5.5. The last row of the table shows the Cronbach's Alpha 
coefficients, used for the reliability test as recommended by Meyers, Gamst & 
Guarino (2013). The values of the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient for each of 5 factors 
concerning port infrastructure design are 0.848, 0.803, 0.730, 0.784 and 0.762 
respectively. These indicate a relatively high level of reliability (as they are above 
0.721) such that the variables identified are more likely measuring a same construct.  
 As indicated by the loading values (table 5.6), the first factor, ‘port demand’, is 
covered in the survey questions D4, D5, D6 and D7 and is associated with the port’s 
financial position (0.792),the total financial cost to the port user (0.787), the 
                                                 
21
 According to Nunnally (1978), a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.7 or higher is an acceptable reliability 
coefficient. 
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perceived service quality for users (0.762) and the trade flow of the port (0.696). The 
higher loadings of the variables suggest that port infrastructure tariff design is 
influenced by the financial position of the port, the level of total costs to port users, 
the perceived service quality by port users and the trade flow of the port.  
Table 5.6: The rotated, rescaled component matrixa. 
                                             Factors 
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D4     Port’s financial position 0.792 0.068 -0.041 0.086 -0.051 
D6    Total financial costs to port users 0.787 0.217 0.150 0.106 0.273 
D5     Perceived service quality 0.762 0.061 0.123 0.372 0.103 
D7    Trade flow 0.696 0.038 0.306 0.368 -0.185 
B1.4 Awareness of discriminatory pricing 0.104 0.580 -0.035 0.165 0.117 
B1.2 Awareness of market based pricing -0.017 0.912 0.008 0.026 0.073 
B1.1 Awareness of cost based pricing 0.081 0.839 0.007 0.085 0.077 
B2.2 Use of market based pricing 0.391 0.671 0.288 -0.118 0.061 
B2.1 Use of cost based pricing 0.510 0.644 0.009 -0.036 0.281 
D10  Tariffs of competing ports  0.289 0.072 0.853 0.082 -0.011 
C2    Competition with rivals  -0.178 0.068 0.852 0.117 0.031 
D9    Variability in ship size  0.366 -0.137 0.622 -0.097 0.211 
C4    Increasing port capacity utilisation 0.240 0.012 0.062 0.871 0.121 
C6    Promoting regional economic development 0.162 0.068 -0.059 0.783 0.185 
C3    Attracting specific cargo and port users 0.042 0.247 0.520 0.669 0.045 
C1    Recovering investment costs -0.014 0.076 0.019 0.112 0.902 
C5    Covering operation costs  0.007 0.182 0.093 0.255 0.739 
D1    Infrastructure investment cost 0.500 0.144 0.072 -0.038 0.685 
Cronbach's Alpha (Reliability) 0.848 0.803 0.730 0.784 0.762 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.  
a
 Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.674 
 
 The second factor referred to as port pricing 'knowledge and applicability' is 
covered by questions B1.2, B1.1, B2.2 and B2.1 and is associated with the awareness 
of market based pricing (0.912), the awareness of cost based pricing (0.839), the use 
of market based pricing (0.671) and the use of cost based pricing (0.644). 
Interestingly the awareness of discriminatory pricing (0.580) covered by question 
B1.4 fails to load above 0.6. These results suggest that the port managers surveyed 
possess considerable knowledge of cost based, market based and discriminatory 
pricing approaches and that pricing knowledge is useful when designing port 
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infrastructure tariffs. More importantly cost based and market based pricing 
approaches are being currently applied in the design of port infrastructure tariffs.  
 The third factor, ‘industry dynamics’, includes shipping market and port 
competition and is covered by questions C2, D10 and D9 of the questionnaire and is 
associated with the level of competition with rival ports (0.852), the level of tariffs 
set by rival ports (0.853) and the variability in vessel size (0.622). This suggests that 
the ports surveyed consider the port’s competitive position against its rivals and the 
characteristics of the port users when designing the infrastructure tariffs. The 
variability in vessel size is an important consideration when offering discriminatory 
port infrastructure tariffs as, intuitively, the vessel size is positively correlated with 
the gross tonnage or the length of the vessel.    
 The fourth factor, referred to as ‘tariff objective’, is covered by questions C4, C6 
and C3 and is associated with increasing port capacity utilisation (0.871), promoting 
regional economic development (0.783 ) and attracting specific types of cargo and 
port users (0.669). This suggests that the main objective of infrastructure tariff design 
is primarily to attract vessels with specific types of cargo that can be best handled by 
the port, so that the port is not only able to increase the utilisation of port capacity 
but is also able to promote regional economic development.  
 The fifth factor, 'cost recovery', is covered in questions C1, C5 and D1 and is 
associated with the recovery of  infrastructure investment costs (0.902), covering 
operational costs (0.739) and the infrastructure investment cost (0.685). This 
indicates that contemporary ports are very much concerned about the infrastructure 
investment cost when designing their tariffs. This is consistent with the fact that ports 
are highly capital intensive and as such, recovering capital investment costs should 
be a priority of infrastructure pricing.    
5.3.2 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF DESIGN  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is conducted to further analyse and confirm the 
relationships between the five factors identified in the EFA shown in Table 5.6 
(Appendix IX). Figure 5.5 shows all the possible relationships between the underlying 
factors of port infrastructure tariff design with the standard estimates of the 
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regression coefficients respectively. The relationship between variables is indicated 
by covariance estimates. The results indicate a relationship between port demand and 
other factors including pricing knowledge and applicability, industry dynamics, tariff 
objective and cost recovery.  
Figure 5.5: Path diagram with standardised estimates for the all relationships.  
 
 Further, cost recovery is related to the knowledge and applicability of port pricing 
and tariff objective. The regression weights reported in Table 5.7 (p.123) strongly 
indicate that all variables are significant at 1% except variable D10Comp_port_ 
tariffs (D10: the tariffs of competing ports) which has a negative variance.  
 The large value of the Chi-square statistic, which is CMIN/DF = 2.428 and the 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of 0.147 (Table 5.8) and the 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) of 0.67 and the Adjusted GFI of 0.56 indicate that 
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modification of the model is necessary. The variables with low loadings are first 
excluded, and based on the values of standardised residual covariance variables those 
with higher residual covariances (above 0.4) are excluded in repeated trials.  
Table 5.7: CFA analysis results for the model shown in Figure 5.5. 
Variable  
 
Factors 
  
Estimate  
S.E. C.R. P 
D4     Port’s financial position  Port Demand  1 
  
*** 
D6    Total financial costs to port users  Port Demand  1.184 0.222 5.331 *** 
D5     Perceived service quality  Port Demand  1.315 0.230 5.706 *** 
D7    Trade flow  Port Demand  1.096 0.210 5.212 *** 
B1.1 Awareness of cost based pricing   Pricing Knowledge & Applicability  1 
  
*** 
B2.1 Use of market based pricing  Pricing Knowledge & Applicability  1.326 0.245 5.408 *** 
B1.2 Use of cost based pricing  Pricing Knowledge & Applicability  1.209 0.241 5.006 *** 
B2.4 Awareness of discriminatory pricing  Pricing Knowledge & Applicability  1.125 0.300 3.748 *** 
B1.4 Awareness of market based pricing  Pricing Knowledge & Applicability  1.144 0.155 7.385 *** 
D10  Competing ports’ tariffs   Industry Dynamics 1 
  
*** 
C2     Competit ion with rivals   Industry Dynamics 0.937 0.145 5.107 *** 
D9    Variab ility in ship size   Industry Dynamics 0.837 0.165 5.067 *** 
C4     Port capacity utilization   Tariff Object ive 1 
  
*** 
C6     Regional economic development  Tariff Object ive 0.742 0.141 5.254 *** 
C3     Attracting cargo and port users  Tariff Object ive 0.676 0.128 5.282 *** 
C1     Covering investment costs  Cost Recovery 1 
  
*** 
C5     Covering operation costs  Cost Recovery 0.919 0.193 4.757 *** 
D1     In frastructure investment cost  Cost Recovery 0.664 0.140 4.739 *** 
    *** 0.00 = significant at 1% significance level 
 
Table 5.8: Model Fit-Factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design.  
Chi-square statistic (CMIN) 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 45 305.961 126 0.314 2.428 
Saturated model 171 0.000 0 
  
Independence model 18 748.345 153 0.000 4.891 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model 0.142 0.126 0.168 0.000 
Independence model 0.243 0.226 0.260 0.000 
 
 Figure 5.6 shows that the CFA results strongly indicate a significant relationship 
between port demand and the tariff objective and some degree of relationship 
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between port pricing knowledge and cost recovery, and between the tariff objective 
and cost recovery. 
Figure 5.6: Path Diagram with Standardised Estimates for the Significant 
Relationships. 
 
 
As indicated in Table 5.9, all the variables in this model are significant. Furthermore, 
although their values remain just outside the desirable ranges as shown in Table 5.10, 
both the Chi-square statistic (CMIN/DF) and the root mean square error of 
approximation RMSEA have improved significantly with their values being 1.114 
and 0.042 respectively. PCLOSE related to RMSEA is 0.526. Given that the RMSEA 
point estimate < 0.05 and the probability associated with the test of close is > 0.50, it 
can be concluded that the resultant model fits the data well. Further the Goodness of 
Fit Index and Adjusted GFI have significantly improved being their values 0.920 and 
0.856 respectively indicating an acceptable model fit (Appendix XI, Model fit 
summary).  
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Table 5.9: CFA analysis results for the Figure 5.6 model. 
Variables 
 
Factors 
E
st
im
a
te
 
S.E. C.R. P 
B1.1 Cost based pricing knowledge  Pricing Knowledge  1 
   B1.2 Market based pricing knowledge  Pricing Knowledge  1.04 0.41 2.49 0.01 
C4 Port capacity utilisation  Tariff Object ive 1 
   C6 Regional economic development  Tariff Object ive 0.76 0.14 5.43 *** 
C3 Attracting cargo and port users  Tariff Object ive 0.69 0.12 5.48 *** 
C1 Recovering investment cost  Cost Recovery 0.90 0.10 4.72 *** 
C5 Covering operational cost   Cost Recovery 1 
   D7 Trade flow   Port Demand 0.90 0.20 4.36 *** 
D5 Perceived service quality    Port Demand 1       
*** = significance  
Table 5.10: Model Fit Summary for Figure 5.6: CFA on factors influential to port 
infrastructure tariff design. 
 Chi-square statistic (CMIN) 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 20 27.857 20 0.314 1.114 
Saturated model 45 .000 0 
  
Independence model 9 246.445 36 0.000 6.846 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model 0.042 0.000 0.110 0.526 
Independence model 0.298 0.263 0.333 0.000 
 
 This result suggests that, in contrast to the EFA output of five factors, the CFA 
produces a model of four factors that are influential in port infrastructure tariff 
design: port demand, port pricing knowledge, the tariff objective and the cost 
recovery consideration. The dynamics of the port and shipping industry, such as port 
competition and variability in ship size, do not influence port infrastructure tariff 
design. Although ports possess substantial knowledge on cost based and market 
based pricing approaches, their applicability is rather limited. 
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5.4 FACTOR ANALYSIS: PORT INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING 
PRACTICES      
5.4.1 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF 
SETTING PRACTICES  
Similar to the previous section, a EFA is conducted to analyse the factors influencing 
port infrastructure tariff setting practices based on data collected from the 
questionnaire sections E1 to E4 (Appendix X). Again, before undertaking the EFA, a 
test for sampling adequacy and sphericity was conducted. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy for items E1 to E4 was 0.683, which is above the 
suggested minimum. Similarly Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Chi-Square test statistics 
for items was 877.45, which is significant at the 1% significant level. Thus the null 
hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix is rejected. Table 5.11 and 
Table 5.12 show the results of the EFA concerning the factors affecting the port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices. 
Table 5.11: Factors influential to port infrastructure tariff setting practices.  
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.878 27.698 27.698 
2 2.384 17.027 44.725 
3 1.592 11.373 56.098 
4 1.235 8.824 64.922 
5 0.921 6.578 71.500 
6 0.753 5.377 76.877 
7 0.699 4.990 81.867 
: : : : 
13 0.192 1.372 99.060 
14 0.132 0.940 100.000 
  
Factors one to four (Table 5.11), representing port infrastructure tariff policy, tariff 
regulation, transparency and stakeholder participation in port infrastructure tariffs 
respectively, have the initial eigenvalues of 3.878, 2.384 1.592 and 1.235, which are 
larger than 1 (Table 5.11). These factors explain 64.922% of the total variance of the 
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variables. Thus, according to the Kaiser criterion, these factors can be retained for 
further analysis. 
 Table 5.12 reports the rotated, rescaled component matrix for these factors. The 
values of the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient for the variables in each of the four 
factors identified as influencing port infrastructure tariff setting practices are 0.807, 
0.670, 0.678 and 0.873 respectively. 
Table 5.12: Rotated, rescaled factor matrix.  
 Factors  
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E3.5 Revising tariffs as per port’s competitive position  0.772 -0.052 0.213 0.051 
E2.1 Having a policy guideline for tariff design and revision 0.723 0.454 0.000 -0.147 
E2.2 Having a policy on rebates and discounts 0.707 -0.033 0.219 0.008 
E3.4 Revising tariffs as per port’s strategic plan  0.706 0.207 -0.065 0.029 
E4.3 Obtaining inputs from commercial and planning dept . 0.684 0.128 0.134 -0.015 
E3.2 Adjusting tariffs with inflation and input cost 0.635 -0.222 0.063 0.144 
E2.4 Having a tariff regulatory control 0.067 0.806 0.190 0.139 
E1.3 Needing government approval for revised tariffs  -0.042 0.793 0.113 0.123 
E2.8 Adhering to published tariffs  0.242 0.556 -0.267 0.339 
E2.5 Offering a composite tariff 0.223 -0.015 0.785 -0.093 
E2.7 Offering negotiable tariffs  0.277 -0.013 0.719 0.213 
E2.9 Offering a lump sum port fee  -0.039 0.341 0.704 0.184 
E1.4 Obtaining feedback from port users 0.032 0.159 0.014 0.926 
E1.5 Obtaining feedback from port operators 0.007 0.199 0.236 0.870 
Reliab ility - Cronbach's Alpha  0.807 0.670 0.678 0.873 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterat ions 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.683 
 
 
 The first factor, ‘port infrastructure tariff policy’, is associated with six variables: 
tariff revision as per the port’s competitive position (loading value 0.772), 
availability of a policy guideline for tariff design and revision (0.723), availability of 
a clear policy on tariff rebates and discounts (0.707), tariff revision as per port’s 
strategic plan (0.706), obtaining inputs from commercial and planning department 
participation in port tariff design (0.684) and adjusting tariffs with inflation and input 
cost (0.635).  
 The second factor, ‘tariff regulation’, is associated with two variables: having 
regulatory control of the port tariff (0.806) and the need for government approval for 
tariff revision (0.793). However the question on tariff transparency (adhering to 
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published tariffs) has the loading of 0.556 and cannot be included in the tariff 
regulation factor. 
  The third factor, ‘transparency’ is associated with three variables: tariff bundling 
(0.785), tariff negotiation (0.719) and the lump sum payment option (0.704). The 
fourth factor, ‘stakeholder participation’, is associated with two variables concerned 
with obtaining feedback from port users of revised tariffs (0.926) and feedback from 
terminal operators of proposed tariff revision (0.870).  
 The results of the EFA suggest that ports follow specific tariff policies when they 
revise their tariffs. A number of factors may influence their tariffs and hence the need 
to revise their tariffs. These include the port’s competitive position, strategic plans, 
rebate policy, inflation and input costs. The tariff setting and revision process 
involves the commercial and planning departments of the port as well as stakeholders 
including port users, competition regulatory authorities and governments.  
 
5.4.2 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF 
SETTING PRACTICES  
 A CFA was conducted in order to further evaluate the four underlying factors 
identified by the EFA and their relationships (Appendix XI). Figure 5.7 (page 129) 
shows all the possible relationships between the underlying factors  of port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices and their associated variables with the standard 
estimates of the regression coefficients respectively.  
 The relationships between the variables as indicated by the covariance estimates 
indicate a relationship between tariff policy and other two factors including tariff 
regulation and transparency. Further, tariff regulation is related to transparency and 
stakeholder participation, and transparency is related to stakeholder participation.  
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Figure 5.7: Path diagram with standardised estimates for the all relationships      
(model fit). 
 
The regression results shown in Table 5.13 (p.130) strongly indicate that all 
relationships are significant at 1%. However, the Chi-square statistic CMIN/DF is 
1.696, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.103 and PCLOSE 
is 0.011 (Table 5.14, p.129), and a modification of the model is necessary. Variables 
with low loadings are excluded first and, based on the values of standardised residual 
covariances; variables with higher residual covariances (above 0.4) are excluded 
subsequently.  
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Table 5.13: CFA analysis results for the Figure 7 Model. 
Variable                  Factors Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
E4.3 Obtaining inputs from commercial and planning dept.   Tariff Policy 1   
E3.4 Revising tariffs as per port’s strategic plan  Tariff Policy 0.920 0.235 3.906 *** 
E2.2 Having a policy on rebates and discounts  Tariff Policy 1.291 0.297 4.346 *** 
E2.1 Having a policy guideline for tariff design and revision  Tariff Policy 1.303 0.294 4.436 *** 
E3.5 Revising tariffs as per port’s competitive position  Tariff Policy 1.194 0.252 4.737 *** 
E2.8 Adhering to published tariffs  Tariff Regulation 1    
E1.3 Needing government approval for revised tariffs   Tariff Regulation 1.864 0.587 3.177 *** 
E2.4 Having a tariff regulatory control  Tariff Regulation 2.157 0.676 3.193 *** 
E2.9 Offering a lump sum port fee  Transparency 1    
E2.7 Offering negotiable tariffs  Transparency 1.438 0.408 3.529 *** 
E2.5 Offering a composite tariff  Transparency 1.244 0.365 3.404 *** 
E1.5 Obtaining feedback from port operators  Stakeholders 1    
E1.4 Obtaining feedback from port users  Stakeholders 1.344 0.565 3.804 *** 
    *** = significant at 1% significance level 
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Table 5.14: Model Fit Summary for Figure 5.7: CFA on factors influential to port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices.  
 Chi-square statistic (CMIN) 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 31 101.736 60 0.001 1.696 
Saturated model 91 0.000 0 
  
Independence model 13 348.924 78 0.000 4.473 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model 0.103 0.067 0.136 0.011 
Independence model 0.229 0.205 0.254 0.000 
 
Figure 5.8: Path Diagram with Standardised Estimates for the Significant 
Relationships (model fit).  
 
The CFA results (Figure 5.8) indicate significant relationships between transparency 
and tariff policy, and transparency and stakeholder participation, and some degree of 
relationship between tariff policy and stakeholder participation. The tariff regulation 
factor is not significant as all of its variables that were significant under the EFA are 
excluded by the CFA. 
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 The result of the CFA reveals that the underlying factors influential to port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices are port tariff policy, stakeholder participation 
and transparency. Table 5.15 shows that all the variables included in this model are 
significant. 
Table 5.15: CFA analysis results for the Figure 5.8 model. 
Variables   Factors Estimate  S.E. C.R. P 
E2.2 Having a policy on rebates and  
discounts 
 Tariff Policy  1 
   
E3.5 Revising tariffs as per port’s 
competitive position 
 Tariff Policy  1.004 0.219 4.576 *** 
E2.1 Having a policy guideline for 
tariff design and revision 
 Tariff Policy  0.783 0.186 4.219 *** 
E1.5 Obtaining feedback from port 
operators 
 Stakeholders 1 
   
E1.4 Obtaining feedback from port 
users 
 Stakeholders  1.244  0.365 3.894 *** 
E2.7 Offering negotiable tariffs   Transparency 1.675 0.727 2.304 0.02 
E2.9 Offering a lump sum port fee   Transparency 1 
   
 *** = significant at 1% significance level 
Table 5.16 indicates that the CMIN/DF value has improved significantly to 0.834. 
The RMSEA value for the 3 factor model is 0.000, with the 90% confidence interval 
ranging from 0.000 to 0.108 and the p value (PCLOSE) related to RMSEA indicates 
a closeness of fit equal to 0.740. The 90% confidence interval indicates that the true 
RMSEA value in the population falls between the lower (0.000) and upper bounds 
(0.108).   
Table 5.16: Model Fit Summary for figure 5.8: CFA on factors influential to port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices.  
Chi-square statistic (CMIN) 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 16 10.010 12 0.615 0.834 
Saturated model 28 0.000 0 
  
Independence model 7 151.899 21 0.000 7.233 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.740 
Independence model 0.307 0.262 0.354 0.000 
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Given a RMSEA point estimate less than 0.05 and the probability associated with the 
test of close greater than 0.50, and also the Goodness of Fit Index and Adjusted GFI 
being their values .961 .909 respectively, it can be concluded that the resulting 
model has a good fit. Therefore, it can be confirmed that the tariff policy factor is 
related to the port’s guideline for tariff design and revision, the revision of tariffs as 
per the port’s competitive position, and the presence of a policy on rebates and 
discounts. The stakeholder participation factor is related to practices such as 
obtaining feedback from port operators and users, while the transparency factor is 
related to tariff setting practices such as offering ships negotiable tariffs and lump 
sum payment options.  
 This result suggests that, in contrast to the EFA output, the CFA produces a model 
of three factors that are influential on port infrastructure tariff setting practices: port 
tariff policy, stakeholder participation and transparency. The tariff regulatory 
requirements including government approval and adhering to published tariffs do not 
have much influence on infrastructure tariff setting practices. More importantly 
although ports have specific departments such as commercial and port planning 
departments that are responsible for tariff setting, obtaining input solely from these 
departments is not sufficient for tariff revision. In addition, tariff revision as per the 
port’s strategic plan should not be the only basis for tariff revision.  
5.5 THE PORT TARIFF FORMULATION, REVISION AND 
APPROVAL PROCESS22  
As mentioned in section 1.3, third objective of the study is to assess the determinants 
of port infrastructure tariff design and practices in world seaports and discuss the 
implications for port management and policy makers. Thus open-ended question 
section is to investigate whether port follow a structured procedure to design, revise 
and implement tariffs. This section presents the results of the two open-ended 
questions included as part of the questionnaire to international seaport managers 
(Appendix II). The first open-ended question concerned the survey port's tariff 
formulation, revision and the tariff approval process, and the second one concerned 
the training needs for port managers in port tariff design. The tariff setting practices 
that are influenced by port tariff policy include: having a policy guideline for tariff 
                                                 
22
 An extract of responses to the open ended questions E5.2 and E5.3 on tariff formulat ion, revision 
and approval process of the respondent’s port and the training needs for p ort managers in port tariff 
designing is provided in Appendix II.  
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design and revision; revising tariffs based on the port’s competitive position and 
strategic plan; obtaining input from the port's commercial and planning departments; 
and having a policy on rebates and discounts. A content analysis of the responses to 
the open-ended question on port tariff formulation and the revision procedure reveals 
the role of a port committee or a board of directors and the existence of several 
different approaches to tariff formulation, revision and approval (summarised in 
Table 5.17).   
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Table 5.17: Port tariff revision and approval: participants and the process.  
Port Administrative 
Model 
Internal 
body 
Reviewers  
Government 
Rep 
Government 
Approval  
Feedback  Process 
Municipal port enterprise  
Port 
committee/
board 
Commercial 
section 
Council 
representative 
- - 
Internal departmental rev iew → internal committee→ 
implement 
Statutory port authority 
Board of 
directors 
Internal 
staff/CEO/  
Ministry 
representative 
Ministry/ 
Regulatory 
approval  
Port users 
Internal rev iew → Board of d irectors → ministry 
recommendation → regulatory approval → implement  
Commercialised port 
authority 
Board of 
directors 
Port 
management 
- 
Ministry 
approval 
Port users Internal rev iew → Ministry approval→ implement  
Port department  
Internal 
committee 
Port 
financial 
section/CEO 
- 
Ministry 
approval 
 Internal rev iew → Ministry approval → implement 
Port corporation 
Board of 
directors 
Each port 
department 
- 
Ministry 
approval 
Port users 
Internal rev iew → Board of d irectors → customer   
feedback → implement 
Private limited company  
Board of 
directors 
Internal 
review/  
external 
consultants/
CEO 
- - - 
Consultant → CEO → Board o f directors  
→implement 
Source: compiled by author based on survey data 
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In ports owned by municipal councils port tariffs are subject to approval by a port 
committee, usually the council of administration of the port authority. The council is 
made of representatives of the public administrators and of the port operators. The 
analysis of responses from port managers revealed that 60% of port authorities have 
a committee responsible for tariff formulation, review and revision. They also stated 
that the technical aspects of port tariffs are handled by their port’s commercial 
division. 
 The following summarises the different procedures for tariff formulation and 
revision used by the municipal ports surveyed:  
i. The existing tariff structure, including both tariff items and rates, is used for 
tariff revision. The revision is proposed by the Business & Operations 
Department based on the market and certain other conditions for 
consideration and approval by a committee of selected members chaired by 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the port. Revision is usually on an 
annual basis but sometimes is on-demand (when required). 
ii. Tariff change initiatives are first suggested internally by the department that 
owns the tariff then, after consultation with port users, the proposed 
fees/changes are internally approved by the Executive Committee or the 
Board, upon which a notice of the fee/change is published before the fee 
comes into effect. 
A port tariff committee works with port operators to review tariffs based on the 
Consumer Price Index and in the event of a new port investment, identifies new port 
users and proposes incentives for port users.  
 Statutory public port authorities established under the service and landlord models 
represent 33% of the ports sampled.  The procedures for tariff formulation and 
revision used by the statutory public port authorities surveyed are summarised below:  
i. Port tariffs are annually reviewed by senior staff responsible for tariffs with 
the CEO and with the endorsement of the CEO of the port. The revised tariffs 
are then forwarded to the Board of Directors for final approval. 
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ii. The port tariffs are agreed by a Port Committee that is the administrative 
council of the port authority. The council is made of representatives of the 
public administrators and the port operators. 
iii. Port tariffs are revised annually to adjust for the inflation rate.  After 
discussions between the Executive Board and the port community 
association, revised tariffs are submitted to the government (at the ministerial 
level) for approval.  
iv. Basic tariffs are approved by the government and the port has a limited 
authority to change, depending to its strategy and financial situation. 
v. The tariff revision process is based on the strategic plan and objectives, and is 
reviewed by a state board responsible for public sector administration.  
vi. Tariff revision considers the regional trends in tariffs, the tariffs of competing 
ports and the infrastructure costs. Tariffs must be approved by a board of 
directors and/or a commissioner and a supervisory board of the port. 
The data collected also revealed the different steps that ports under the statutory port 
authority administrative model take when revising and formulating port tariffs. These 
are:  
i. Conduct a review of the prevailing rates (domestic and regional) for similar 
services offered at competing ports. This includes a review of the port's 
competitive position and the behaviour of competing ports. 
ii. Review the financial conditions of the port, and any wages and salary increases 
that are a result of negotiations with employees, which increase the operational 
costs. 
iii. Strive to engage in the settlement of labour contracts with labour unions in 
order to reduce operational costs through higher efficiency, which will impact 
on shipping lines costs.  
iv. Account for the maintenance of and acquisition of new equipment and 
infrastructure. 
v. Ensure that the port remains competitive by using a conservative increase in 
tariffs. 
vi. Forward revised tariffs for approval. The approval process would include board 
approval from the port and ministerial approval on behalf of the government.   
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The information provided by commercialised port authorities on the tariff 
formulation revision and approval procedure indicates a procedure similar to that 
adopted by statutory port authorities. The involvement of the Board of Directors of 
the port and the relevant ministry for tariff approval is common to both 
administrative models. While tariffs are reviewed and revised annually by port 
management, it involves a process of engagement with all port stakeholders. Port 
users are informed of the revised tariff rates prior to implementation for comment 
and suggestions. Interestingly, tariffs are revised annually with regards to the rate of 
return objective and cost increases including finance costs, wages and other supplies  
of the port. The changes to pricing are usually formulated and documented in the 
port’s strategic plan.  
 Survey information provided by Government Department port authorities 
indicates the tariff formulation revision and approval procedure involves a public 
policy prescription adopted by a public department or a bureau. Since port 
infrastructure tariffs, port, berth and light dues, are charged for the use of public 
marine infrastructure and facilities, fees levied are based on the schedules contained 
in legal provisions and thus, revision to those schedules is a legislative procedure. 
While tariff revision is carried out annually based on cost, the process involves 
approvals by the CEO of the port and the minister. Port tariffs are internally reviewed 
and adjusted by the financial department of the port with technical inputs given by 
respective departments such as the Marine Department and Port Works Division of 
the Civil Engineering and Development Department.  
 For Port Corporations including both statutory and limited corporations, port 
tariffs are reviewed regularly to ensure currency using financial reports, market 
information and strategic planning. Once reviews are completed, tariffs are set. After 
the approval of the Board of directors, tariffs are published to port customers. Unlike 
a port under a port authority or government department, there is no or much less 
government or regulatory involvement in the tariff approval process. The tariff 
revision process is carried out internally. The existing tariff structure is revised by 
each department of the port based on the market and certain other conditions for 
consideration and approval by a committee chaired by the CEO. In order to increase 
the transparency, revised port charges are notified to port users with information 
concerning the reasons for revision.   
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 The tariff revision process of the more corporatised port administrative models 
such as private limited company ports involves the annual revision of tariffs to allow 
for growth in infrastructure, customer requirements and the need for a return to 
shareholders. In the revision process, port management often employs external 
consultants in the absence of internal expertise. As commonly seen in other port 
administrative models, the pricing of tariffs is led by the CEO or Financial Officer. 
The results are submitted to the Board of Directors of the port for approval. More 
importantly tariff adjustment takes into account the Consumer Price Index and other 
input cost changes.  
5.6 TRAINING AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENT FOR TARIFF 
FORMULATION 
Port pricing has been viewed as an archaic issue by many researchers due to its 
historical evolution and the heterogeneity of non-standardised business practices 
across ports. There is limited research on the need for technical training and support 
to port staff in tariff setting. The capability of seaport authorities in port tariff design 
and revision is variable. There is no clear evidence whether seaport authorities 
possess substantial knowledge on port pricing theory and principles and seaport 
authorities apply them in port infrastructure tariff design. The survey provides the 
views of port mangers on the training needs of port authorities in tariff design. Figure 
5.9 summarises the responses of port managers concerning the knowledge and 
applicability of port pricing approaches.  
Figure 5.9: The knowledge and applicability of port pricing approaches: The view of 
port managers. 
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The survey data of ports revealed several aspects of technical training and support 
that ports think they might require in designing port infrastructure tariffs. This 
section briefly presents views of port mangers on the training requirement for port 
tariffs designing 
 As shown in Figure 5.9, 96% and 90 % of port managers agree that they are aware 
of the cost based and market pricing approaches respectively which is also confirmed 
by the EFA and CFA results. However only 78% of them agree that cost based 
pricing has been applied to tariff design while only 81% agree that market based 
pricing is used. 78% are aware of the strategic pricing approach while only 64 % 
agree that this has been applied in practice. 50% of port managers are aware of the 
discriminatory and social optimal pricing approaches while only 20% agree that this 
approach has actually been applied in practice. The survey also revealed several 
aspects of technical training and support that port managers thought that they might 
require concerning the design of port infrastructure tariffs. The following aspects of 
training and support were highlighted by respondents: 
i. Any training needs to establish a clear documented policy for the formulation 
of tariffs and the implementation of a pricing policy to achieve other objectives 
including investment recovery and maintenance. 
ii. Training related to developing a ‘Pricing Estimator’ would be useful. 
iii. Training is required to establish a more accurate approach to cost based prices 
for port services. 
iv. Training and support through international seminars with best-practice in port 
pricing and the theory behind this best-practice. 
v. Support requested for some management levels in the general formulation, 
strategy and good practices for high port competitiveness in port tariff design 
and revision. 
vi. Support to conduct a market survey of the infrastructure tariffs of competitive 
ports. 
vii. Support to develop a good data base, analytical tools, an experienced 
workforce, knowledge about other ports and the environment is required  
viii. Support in policy advice related to port tariff setting to meet the needs of the 
shareholder (government). 
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5.7 CONCLUSION  
 This chapter presents the results of a survey of international seaports on various 
aspects related to their infrastructure tariff design process and setting practices. Data 
collected from the survey were applied using both EFA and CFA to identify the 
underlying factors influencing port infrastructure tariff design and setting practices 
and to evaluate their relationship. 
 The survey received the responses of 67 seaports from various regions in the 
world including North America, Europe, Asia and Australasia. The result of the EFA 
indicates that the factors affecting port infrastructure design are port demand, pricing 
knowledge and applicability, competition and vessel size, the tariff setting objective 
and costs. The study has also found the underlying factors influential to port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices: government policy, stakeholder participation in 
tariff revision and the level of transparency.  
 The analysis of open-ended questions on the procedure of infrastructure tariff 
design, revision and approval, and the need for specific training requirements for 
tariff design shows that port authorities follow different processes in tariff design, 
revision and approval. In addition, various parties are involved in the approval 
process depending on the administrative structure of the port. Further training and 
support requirement that ports need in tariff designing and revision shows that the 
existing knowledge on port pricing and what is required. Further it is also another 
evidence to suggest ports, although they have some knowledge in port pricing, there 
is lack of application of it.  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter23 discusses the results of the analysis presented in chapter 5 and 
provides implications for port management, policy makers and stakeholders. 
Importantly this chapter also reviews the research project’s findings and whether the 
project has addressed the research questions and hypotheses that were presented in 
chapter 4.  
 The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the analysis results 
concerning the factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design. Section 6.3 
discusses the analysis results concerning port infrastructure tariff setting practices, 
the tariff revision and approval process, and the knowledge by port authorities of port 
pricing approaches and their applicability. Section 6.4 compares the results of the 
regression estimation of infrastructure tariff determinants  (chapter 3) and the results 
of the EFA and CFA on the factors influential to port infrastructure tariff design with 
the view of triangulating the research findings. Section 6.5 addresses the research 
questions and hypotheses presented in chapter 4 and section 6.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
6.2 FACTORS INFLUENTIAL TO PORT INFRASTRCUTRE TARIFF 
DESIGN 
An analysis of the results presented in chapter 5 reveals various underlying (latent) 
factors influential to port infrastructure design. The EFA identified five factors 
influential to infrastructure tariff design, four of which have been analysed and 
confirmed by the CFA. These factors are presented in Table 6.1 (overleaf).  
 Table 6.1 shows that five factors have been identified by the EFA to affect port 
infrastructure tariff design. The first factor, ‘port demand’, consists of four variables 
as identified by the EFA: the financial position of the port, costs to port users, service 
quality and trade flow. However, only service quality and trade flow have been 
confirmed by CFA to have influence on port infrastructure tariff design.  
  
                                                 
23
 Based on this section of the chapter and analysis results presented in the previous chapter, a paper 
entitled ‘Port Infrastructure Pricing: Findings from a Survey of International Seaports ' was presented 
at the annual International Association of Marit ime Economists Conference 2014 held in Norfolk, 
USA. 
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Table 6.1: Factors determining port infrastructure tariff design. 
Factors Variables 
 
EFA CFA  
Port Demand  
D4    Port’s financial position   
D6    Total financial costs to port users   
D5    Perceived service quality    
D7    Trade flow   
Pricing Knowledge 
& Applicability 
B1.1 Awareness of cost based pricing    
B1.2 Awareness of market based pricing   
B2.4 Awareness of discriminatory pricing   
B2.1 Use of cost based pricing    
B2.2 Use of market based pricing   
Industry Dynamics 
D10  Tariffs of competing ports    
C2     Competit ion with rivals    
D9     Variability in ship size    
Pricing Objective  
C3     Attracting cargo and port users    
C6     Regional economic development   
C4     Port capacity utilisation   
Cost Recovery 
C1     Covering investment costs   
C5     Covering operation costs   
D1     In frastructure investment cost   
 = significant   = not significant 
Source: prepared by the author based on EFA and CFA results 
The second factor, ‘port pricing knowledge’ consists of five variables as identified 
by the EFA: knowledge of cost based pricing, market based pricing and 
discriminatory pricing methods, and the use of cost based and market based pricing 
methods. However, only the knowledge of the cost based and market based pricing 
methods have been confirmed by the CFA to have an influence on port infrastructure 
tariff design. 
The third factor, ‘industry dynamics’, consists of three variables as identified by 
the EFA: the effects of the tariffs of competing ports, competition between ports, and 
ship size. However, all of these effects could not be confirmed by the CFA.  
The fourth factor refers to the objectives of port infrastructure pricing and 
consists of three variables as identified by the EFA: attracting cargo and port users, 
promoting regional economic development, and improving port capacity utilisation. 
However, the CFA only confirms the effect of the first two variables.  
The fifth factor, ‘cost recovery’ consists of three variables as identified by the 
EFA: covering (total) investment costs, covering operational costs and the  
infrastructure capital cost. Since total investment cost includes infrastructure capital 
cost, only the first two variables have been confirmed by CFA. The following 
sections discuss the role and implications of these factors.  
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6.2.1  PORT DEMAND 
The first factor influential to port infrastructure tariff design is the demand for port 
services. The result of the EFA and the CFA has confirmed the importance of trade 
flow in infrastructure tariff design. Trade flow is important because demand for port 
services is derived from trade (Seabrooke, Hui, Lam & Wong 2003; Suykens & Van 
De Voorde 1998) and therefore seaborne trade is considered to be a proxy for 
transport demand (Tinbergen 1959). Therefore, for given tariffs, the revenue from 
port charges for all port activities which include port infrastructure, port services for 
vessels, cargo handling and cargo storage, depends on the demand for the port 
services.  
 Jiang, Kronbak & Lopez (2013) found that a 1% increase in the cost of transport 
results in a 2.13% reduction in import volumes. Thus one way to promote trade 
would be to lower total transport costs. This can be achieved by having relevant 
polices in place. Furthermore trade flow needs to be considered in the design of the 
port infrastructure system and its improvements (Taneja, Ligteringen & Van 
Schuylenburg 2010). Thus trade flow is an important consideration when deciding 
the price of infrastructure services.  
 The results identify service quality as the second variable that is influential to port 
infrastructure tariff design. This reflects the fact that for a given port tariff, the 
decision by a user to use a port’s service depends on the quality of the services 
offered. In order to raise port demand, i.e. to attract more vessel traffic, an 
understanding of the sensitivity of port users to changes in the service quality and 
port charges is required (ADB 2000). This implies that the perceived service quality 
for port infrastructure and services is a port choice variable and can be considered as 
a port demand determinant. Given that port charges represent a relatively small 
portion of total shipping costs (Malchow & Kanafani 2004), the service quality 
offered by ports and the price they offer are very important to the port choice 
decisions made by carriers, shippers and freight forwarders (Chang, Lee & Tongzon 
2008b; Lirn, Thanopoulou & Beresford 2003; Ng 2006; Slack 1985; Tongzon 2009). 
For instance, port sectors in South Africa indicated that port users were dissatisfied 
with the costs and service quality of South African ports (Trade and Industry 
Chamber 2007). According to Joy (1988) and Strandenes (2004), carriers with strong 
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market power independently decide their ports of call and the ir decision is based on a 
number of factors such as service quality, port charges and regulation.   
 The perceived service quality by port users is vital for the purpose of improving 
economic and technical efficiency in those ports where the use of the existing port 
infrastructure is already at maximum capacity. Such efficiency improvements 
enhance both the actual and perceived service quality, which may help reduce costs 
for port users and shorten vessel time in port (Wang & Cullinane 2006).  
 In the presence of inter-port competition, setting appropriate port price and 
keeping up with higher service quality is a constraint to a port authority (OECD 
2011). However ports with higher levels of services can benefit from higher port 
charges. As explained by De Borger & Van Dender (2006), in a duopoly 
environment there can be a large facility with higher levels of service quality at a 
higher price and a small facility with a smaller share of the market with lower service 
quality at a lower price. Competitive port markets are no exception; ports with higher 
levels of service quality are in a competitive position to charge relatively higher port 
charges compared to those with a lower level of service quality. Furthermore, among 
the challenges faced by port authorities in improving the long term competitive 
position of their port, understanding their customers' changing expectations regarding 
the quality and price of their services is a relatively important matter (Paixão Casaca 
2008). The complementary nature of the use of port infrastructure and services 
implies that having a low perceived service quality in port services has an impact on 
port choice, and therefore on port infrastructure use. Thus the quality of port services 
needs to be considered in the tariff design for port infrastructure, mainly when setting 
the level of port charge. 
 The financial position of a port also needs to be considered when deciding port 
infrastructure charges. There is a link between a port’s financial condition and 
predatory pricing; a port in a healthy financial position can rely on this position to set 
lower port charges in order to force its competitors out of the market..  
 Total port costs to port users is one of the major determinants of port selection by 
carriers (Tongzon & Sawant 2007). The longer a ship stays in port, the higher the 
cost for its carrier will be. Since most port authorities calculate port dues and berth 
hire charges based on gross tonnage of the vessel and port stay time, the total port 
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cost for larger vessels increases with the time spent in port. In the contemporary 
shipping industry cooperative agreements in the shipping industry, such as strategic 
alliances between major container lines, have resulted in increased pressure on port 
authorities to reduce the port costs incurred by vessels by lowering the port charges 
(Baird 1999). Thus, the consideration of the total port costs of different port users in 
the design of port infrastructure tariffs is a rather rational approach.   
6.2.2  PRICING KNOWLEDGE & APPLICABILITY 
The second factor influencing port infrastructure tariff design is the knowledge held 
by the port about port pricing and its applicability in tariff design. Applicability refers 
to the application and use of any existing knowledge about port pricing to tariff 
design. The knowledge and awareness of port authorities of different costs and 
pricing approaches are a prerequisite for developing cost based tariffs. Knowledge of 
port costs, and the short-term and long-term run costs of port infrastructure is needed 
for efficient port operation and investment decision making (Abbes 2007). The tariff 
determination process presented by Dowd and Fleming (1994) includes an internal 
examination of tariffs in which charges are calculated based on cost elements such as 
historic costs, imputed costs and a return on investment. This brings out a dichotomy 
in port pricing with regard to port authorities: one being the knowledge that port 
authorities have of various types of port costs and their consideration in port pricing, 
the other being returns on port investment for a given set of port tariffs.  
 From the perspective of total supply chain costs, the cost based pricing approach 
would improve the balance between overall costs and the benefits of port and supply 
chain activities (OECD 2009). The design of port tariffs should take into account the 
response of different port users to a new tariff level (ESCAP 2002). The results of 
the survey showed that 96% of the respondent ports agreed that they understood the 
cost based pricing approach while 90% of respondents stated that they implemented 
market based pricing techniques when designing port infrastructure tariffs. 
 One of the key objectives of cost-based tariff setting is to maximise the port 
infrastructure and service utilisation (Eriksson et al. 2009). However the cost-based 
tariff approach has its own weaknesses in that it provides less incentive for port 
authorities to reduce costs (Grosdidier De Matons 1986). Thus, the cost based pricing 
method, especially when used by government owned ports under no pressure for cost 
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management, can lead to inefficiency in the provision of port infrastructure and 
facilities (Cullinane, Yim Yap & Lam 2006; Ircha 2001b; Song & Lee 2006; Vining 
& Boardman 2008). The public subsidy for port infrastructure provision and its 
continuation, as often found in the EU (Asteris & Collins 2009), is perhaps an 
example of the outcome of such inefficiency. In the U.S. port tariffs are held below 
the cost of providing the port’s infrastructure and services in order to maximise the 
port’s usage. This has led to a deficit which is financed through government 
subsidies (Winston 1999). Cost-based pricing would result in a complex tariff 
structure for ports that handle a wide range of cargos with a wide range of port 
facilities and that have many different users as a result (Gardner, Marlow & Pettit 
2006).  
 The results indicated low levels of application of the social optimal pricing model 
when designing port infrastructure tariffs (only 21% agreed that it is applied) despite 
the relatively higher level of theoretical knowledge (46% of managers were aware of 
this) of port authorities on the same. This is perhaps due to, as confirmed by Núñez-
Sánchez (2013) using Spanish port infrastructure fees, the presence of heterogeneity 
among port authorities in terms of the pricing objective, the different port demand 
conditions and elasticity, the different cost structures and port user characteristics. 
Thus, the 'public-good' nature of port infrastructure as described by Baird (2004) is 
not reflected in the pricing design of the port infrastructure tariffs of contemporary 
ports.  
6.2.3 TARIFF OBJECTIVES 
The objective of port authorities is important for tariff design. Port capacity 
utilisation, regional economic development and attracting cargo and port users are 
major objectives considered by ports when setting their charges. Where the main 
objective of a port is to foster sustainable development, tariffs are set to recover the 
costs incurred in the provision of port infrastructure and services, to promote the 
economically efficient utilisation of port infrastructure and to ensure a fair share of 
benefits for port users (Asian Institute of Transport Development 2001). Given the 
port user's willingness to pay, the provision of adequate capacity for incoming port 
traffic is vital for a carrier's port choice. Thus, increasing the utilisation rate of the 
port infrastructure is an important strategic driver for tariff design, which would 
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generate higher revenues resulting in infrastructure cost recovery and a stronger 
competitive position for the port (Magala 2005).  
 Seaports are the major contributors to the development of port cities around the 
world. They contribute to the social, economic and environmental renown of the port 
location, and promote the regional and local economy (Brirsel & Cerit 2010). The 
economic development surrounding and associated with port cities can reach a 
situation of irreversibility even if the port is no longer relevant to the economic 
development (Fujita & Mori 1996). This follows the European doctrine that ports are 
a part of social infrastructure and their value can be assessed in terms of their 
contribution to regional development without much focus on raising profitability 
(Lee & Lee 2012). Thus the regional economic development objective has direct 
implications for port tariff design: if a high priority is placed on promoting regional 
economic development then revenue promotion will be hindered through the tariff 
design.       
 Interestingly only a few ports state their tariff objectives. For example, the Port of 
Melbourne Corporation clearly outlines its port pricing objectives which include:  
encouraging the efficient use of port facilities, promoting trade, and achieving cost 
recovery for all port activities including the provision of port channel and berthing 
facilities (Industry Commission 1993). Another tariff objective is to attract specific 
cargo and port users. Port managers plan and implement port marketing strategies in 
order to increase both port users and cargoes so that a higher level of profit can be 
achieved. Additionally, consideration is also given to different types of cargo and 
port users when designing port tariffs (Graillot 1986).     
6.2.4 COST RECOVERY 
The emphasis on cost recovery in port pricing is partly a result of the intention to 
ease the budgetary pressure of governments and allow ports to be financially 
independent from state subsidy (BTE 1989). This has led, as Notteboom (2008) 
noted, to most landlord port authorities operating as commercial undertakings aiming 
at full cost recovery. Port infrastructure development, particularly in developing 
countries, is often financed through international finance agencies. The funding 
agencies require that the tariff policies of ports are designed in such a way that 
investment costs are recouped (Grosdidier De Matons 1986). Furthermore designing 
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tariffs based on the cost recovery approach is a key factor in promoting private sector 
interest and participation in port investment and operation (Kurek 2010).  
 Cost recovery is the main objective of port infrastructure pricing in many of the 
port authorities in the EU at recent times (Eriksson et al. 2009). Achieving cost 
recovery is influenced by political belief and can be a challenge for ports 
(Haralambides & Veenstra 2010). Failure to recover the costs of providing port 
infrastructure results in dependence on government subsidy and pressure on financial 
resources (Gardner, Marlow & Pettit 2006; Haralambides 2002). The challenge of 
financial pressure for new port investments can be overcome by strategic responses 
such as establishing a tariff policy regarding port dues and concession fees with a 
cost recovery basis (Verhoeven 2010a). 
 Current trends in concession agreements suggest that a greater consideration is 
being given to the cost recovery of port infrastructure investments (Rodrigue, 
Notteboom & Pallis 2010). More importantly the financial performances of East 
Asian port authorities demonstrate that port charges are set to achieve more than cost 
recovery and that the revenues from tariffs have fully compensated the increase in 
capital costs of port infrastructure construction (Abe & Wilson 2009). However 
establishing full cost recovery pricing for port infrastructure tends to change the 
market share of ports (Veldman & Buckmann 2003). In addition, there is also a 
suggestion that applying cost recovery pricing to port approach channels can hinder 
complementary transport modes, such as inland waterway traffic in some regions of 
the EU (Suykens & Van De Voorde 1998). Baird (1999) argued that even private 
ports in the UK and ports in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Japan do not 
exercise full cost recovery pricing for port infrastructure, instead a free market rate 
for port use is exercised. Heaver (1995) suggested that policies designed for port cost 
recovery pricing need an international standard. A more extended approach of cost 
recovery can be the consideration of internalising the external costs of port operation.  
 Nevertheless, many ports have tried to achieve full cost recovery through their 
pricing policy. For instance the port tariffs of Victorian ports in Australia, especially 
the Port of Melbourne Corporation, have increased with the aim of recovering the 
cost of channel deepening projects (Essential Services Commission 2009) while 
ports in New South Wales (NSW) streamlined the Port Management Act with the 
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objective of achieving full cost recovery (The State Government of New South 
Wales 1995).  
6.2.5 PORT INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 
The dynamics of the port sector refers to the competition and interaction between 
ports and port users. This variable has been identified by the EFA. With regard to 
competition, the demand for a service at a particular port can be sensitive to the price 
at that port as well as the price for the same service at any adjacent competitor ports. 
The sensitivity of demand is increased if ports share the same hinterland. Thus, ports 
with higher service quality and lower prices, attract higher demand (Shinohara 2012). 
The level of competing ports tariffs can be changed at the discretion of the  
competing port’s port authority or it can be lowered due to total cost increase in the 
considered port due to port hinterland investment that induce traffic and high 
congestion (De Borger, Proost & Van Dender 2008). In such circumstances, port 
management needs to consider the port charges of adjacent ports when designing 
tariffs. Ports use the information characteristics of port users such as vessel size, type 
of vessel service, whether they engage in liner shipping or short sea shipping, and the 
frequency and type of vessel cargo, to establish differentiated port tariffs 
(Wilmsmeier 2007).  
 In addition, the adequacy and quality of port infrastructure such as berth and 
access channel depth are important variables for user port choice (Paixao Casaca, 
Carvalho & Oliveira 2010). Thus the maintenance of adequate high quality port 
infrastructure demands continuous monitoring of the depth of berths and access 
channels and requires the preparation of a dredging management plan to ensure that 
the requirements demanded by port users are met. As a response to changing global 
industry trends such as the increase in vessel size, ports have embarked on plans to  
modernise port infrastructure that include deepening access channels, turning basins  
and alongside, and lengthening berth facilities. This further benefits port users and 
has a positive impact on the total maritime transport costs (Wilmsmeier, Hoffmann & 
Sanchez 2006). Thus ports continue to invest in port infrastructure development in 
order to curtail competition effects from other adjacent ports and to capture a larger 
share of the shipping market (Anderson, Park, Chang, Yang, Lee & Luo 2008).        
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6.2.6 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS AND 
PORT MANAGEMENT 
The findings of the EFA and CFA on the factors influential to port infrastructure 
design provide important implications for port management in terms of port tariff 
policy and port financial planning. First, when setting port infrastructure tariffs, port 
managers should carefully account for port demand and its variability over a time. In 
other words, port tariffs should be adjusted in response to changes in the demand for 
port services, especially in terms of the trade flow and service quality. Lowering port 
charges make port demand high and resulting higher trade flow means greater use of 
the port and utilisation of port infrastructure. While maintaining higher levels of 
service quality, total costs to the port users need to be reasonable without 
compromising financial benefits. Given the increasing level of competition in the 
port sector as a result of overlapping hinterlands or transhipment hub status, as well 
as the increasing concentration (reduction of players) in the liner market, port users 
especially shipping lines are now in a better position to choose their ports of call and 
service network. For that reason, port authorities need to formulate a monitoring 
mechanism of the pricing practices of adjacent ports upon which the tariff design and 
review decisions of their port can be based upon. In addition, such decisions on the 
level of port tariffs can be used as competitive tools against competing ports while 
maintaining the integrity of the tariff policy with respect to regional competitive laws 
or regulations. Further port infrastructure tariffs, mainly, port dues and berth 
occupancy charges, can be differentiated.     
 Knowledge of pricing theories would support the practical tariff formulat ion 
process. Port managers appear to have a considerable knowledge of cost based and 
market based pricing approaches but the survey results indicate that they have 
limited knowledge of the tariff design process. This is perhaps due to history and 
inertia, where tariff design practices have been originally established by port 
organisations and followed without any modification or, as stated by many scholars, 
this may be because of the lack of accurate costing data with regard to port 
infrastructure and maintenance. In this context, this study suggests that port 
management needs to look at the available knowledge base in the port organisation 
and make use of it in the tariff design process. In addition, port costing data on port 
infrastructure provision needs to be appropriately compiled for use in tariff design. 
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Further, port infrastructure tariffs mainly port dues and berth occupancy charges can 
be offered with some differentiation.  
 Setting the objective of port pricing is important as it informs the making of 
decisions on the tariff structure and level. For example, if the objective is to 
maximise profit or return on investments, tariffs tend to be higher than the socially 
optimal level and the port throughput tends to be lower than the socially optimal 
level (Brooks & Pallis 2008). On the other hand, tariffs need to be set at sufficiently 
low levels if the objective of pricing is to achieve higher port capacity utilisation, 
attract different types of cargo and port users, and promote regional economic 
development. One of the objectives may be to attract a certain type of cargo and or 
port user. For instance, in order to promote container trade, tariff design needs to take 
in to account liner vessels and their characteristics.  
 The analysis results are consistent with the findings of Tovar & Wall (2014), 
whereby the degree to which ports can modify tariffs depends on the demand 
variability implied by forecasted traffic level; and tariff objectives such as achieving 
annual profitability and return on investment (reasonable yields on assets). Demand 
variation should also be taken into account during tariff policy formulation.   
 Port organisations need to be able to self- finance their operation. The financial 
performance of a port in terms of revenue and expenditure statistics should form the 
key basis for the formulation of port tariffs (Frankel 1987). Taking into account the 
revenue and expenditure relating to port infrastructure is important for self- financing 
ports, to ensure that port charges at least cover the cost of infrastructure and facility 
maintenance. As such, many port authorities have attempted to formulate a port tariff 
strategy which attracts more port users while recovering the costs associated with 
port infrastructure investment, operation and maintenance (Park, Min & Sung 2015). 
Mainly in the context of the EU ports, policy directives are in place for the pricing of  
port infrastructure such that the 'public-good' nature of port infrastructure 
development (facilitating trade and regional development) has been replaced with the  
commercial objective of recouping the total cost of the infrastructure provision from 
the port users and direct beneficiaries of the ports (Bergantino 2002). Thus, a 
consideration of the cost recovery for the investment and operating costs of port 
infrastructure should be made when designing port tariffs.  
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 Establishing cost based pricing has direct implications for national port policy. 
National port policies (mainly in the EU) are reorientating from the adoption of 
uniform cost based pricing principles towards incentives that promote cost based 
pricing (Haralambides 2002). Since port policies and administrative structures have 
not been developed historically from the perspective of ports as competitive 
businesses, establishing cost based tariffs will pave the way towards achieving 
financial viability and self-reliance for ports (Heaver 1995). Some port authorities 
have embarked on restructuring their administrative structures to be more 
corporatised and have changed pricing regimes to be more cost based. For instance, 
ports in South Africa have been amalgamated and are now managed as commercial 
business entities (public limited companies), while port dues and berth dues have 
been adjusted to be cost based (Chasomeris 2014). Similarly, all New Zealand ports 
and the major ports in the Australian states of Victoria, Queensland, South Australia 
and NSW have been corporatised and tariffs designed in relation to costs (Bandara & 
Nguyen 2014). Port management needs to have full autonomy to make their port 
tariff decisions (Gardner, Marlow & Pettit 2006).      
 Port managers may need to review their infrastructure tariff policy and ensure that 
revenues generated from offering port infrastructure to port users can sustain future 
port infrastructure provision, maintenance and capacity expansion. The quality of 
port infrastructure also needs to be taken into account when setting tariffs. As port 
users are prepared to pay for efficiency in port infrastructure and services 
(Wilmsmeier, Hoffmann & Sanchez 2006), ports are in a position to increase port 
charges in order to recoup the capital expenditure on port infrastructure.  
Nevertheless, designing an effective tariff structure for the use of port infrastructure 
is often a difficult task due to the fact that, owing to the high capital cost of 
construction, port infrastructure requires a long period of time for cost recovery. 
Thus port management needs to establish an effective strategic management plan for 
the port that enhances port performance and encourages the efficient use of port 
capital investment (Cheon 2007). This is pivotal for port tariff design, as ports that 
can provide efficient port infrastructure are competitive.  
 The findings from the analysis presented in this study also have implications for 
the involvement of government in the port sector, as reflected in the findings 
concerning the governance model and administrative structures. In the landlord port 
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model, there is a substantial government intervention in port decision making, 
particularly if the port administration is operating under a statutory port authority. 
According to the survey results, the involvement of representatives from the 
government (port ministry) in the tariff review and the requirement of the ministry's 
and any regulatory body’s approval for the port tariff, tend to limit the autonomy of 
the port authority and hinder the ability of port management to take a more market 
oriented approach to the management of port services. Thus, relevant government 
bodies need be aware of a port's financial requirements, especially in the prevalent 
climate of public budget constraints, and understand the need to reduce costs to port 
users, improve port service quality and raise the financial position. Thus overall the 
consideration of cost recovery in designing infrastructure tariffs not only eases the 
financial pressure on port authorities but also attracts funding for infrastructure 
development. Ports need to be able to self- finance their operations in the 
contemporary economic situations found in many developing countries.   
6.3 PORT INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING PRACTICES    
Port infrastructure pricing practices have been discussed in the port pricing literature. 
However factors influential to tariff setting practices have not been given much 
attention. This section discusses the main factors influential to infrastructure tariff 
setting practices, the tariff formulation procedure including its participants, the level 
of knowledge by port authorities of port pricing and the knowledge required by them 
for infrastructure tariff design.      
6.3.1 FACTORS INFLUENTIAL TO PORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
PRICING PRACTICES      
Table 6.2 summarises the factors and their associated variables, that influence port 
infrastructure tariff setting practices as derived from the results of the EFA and CFA 
presented in chapter 5. 
 The CFA results show that tariff setting practices are influenced by three factors: 
tariff policy, transparency and stakeholder participation in tariff setting. The factor 
of tariff regulation which contains the variables of regulatory control, government 
approval and adhering to publish tariffs, appears to have an insignificant influence.   
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Table 6.2: Factors influential to port infrastructure tariff setting practices. 
Factors Variables EFA CFA 
Tariff policy  
E3.5 Revising tariffs as per port’s competitive position    
E2.1 Having a policy guideline for tariff design and revision   
E2.2 Having a policy on rebates and discounts   
E3.4 Revising tariffs as per port’s strategic plan    
E4.3 Obtaining inputs from commercial and planning department    
E3.2 Adjusting tariffs with inflation and input cost   
Tariff Regulat ion 
E2.4 Having a tariff regulatory control   
E1.3 Needing government approval for revised tariffs    
E2.8 Adhering to published tariffs    
Transparency 
E2.5 Offering composite tariffs    
E2.7 Offering negotiable tariffs    
E2.9 Offering a lump sum port fee    
Stakeholder  
participation 
E1.4 Obtaining feedback from port users   
E1.5 Obtaining feedback from port operators   
   
 = significant   = not significant 
Source: prepared by the author based on EFA and CFA results 
6.3.1.1 TARIFF POLICY  
As suggested by the EFA results (Table 6.2), the tariff policy factor is associated 
with six variables: revising tariffs as per the port’s competitive position, having a 
policy guideline for tariff design and revision, having a policy on rebates and 
discounts, revising tariffs as per the port’s strategic plan, obtaining inputs from the 
commercial and planning departments, and adjusting tariffs with inflation and input 
costs. These tariff practices are associated with various objectives. For example, one 
of the objectives is to generate an adequate return on investments made on port 
infrastructure, which has been long recognised as the main rationale for including a 
tariff policy in port investment proposals (Bennathan & Walters 1979). A port tariff 
policy is important for port efficiency and any changes in port tariff structures impact 
on port efficiency (Tongzon, 1995). UNCTAD (1996) provides directives in port 
planning for developing countries where a typical port authority can have a statutory 
power over the tariff policy through tariff regulation to safeguard the public interest. 
However this would be only possible when a national port authority manages all the 
ports (The World Bank 2007a).  
 Having a clear policy on rebates and discounts is an important element of tariff 
policy. From the legal viewpoint, rebates and discounts are considered to be price 
discriminatory practices (Geradin & Petit 2006). Offering rebates and discounts on 
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various port charges for the use of port infrastructure and facilities such as berths is a 
form of strategic port pricing (UNCTAD 1996). Most ports implement their rebate 
and discount policy in various forms. For example, Romanian port companies 
publish port tariffs with rebates offered based on specific cargo and vessel types on a 
non-discriminatory basis for all port users (OECD 2011). Non-discriminatory tariffs 
and rebates will lead to the impartial treatment of all port users and may perhaps be 
effective in retaining port users. Offering rebates on port charges has also been 
included in national port policies and regulations in some countries. In the French 
port sector, there is a clear rebate policy for port charges on vessels: rebates on port 
charges for regular liner vessels are up to 50% of a base level port charge depending 
on the frequency of departure, while other types of vessel only receive up to 30% of 
the base level port charge (ISL 2006). An important aspect of rebates of port charges 
is that they are used as an element in port competition strategy. The National Port 
Policy for Malaysia demonstrates that restructuring the rebate and tariff policy for 
Malaysian ports is a vital strategy in the regional port competition (Mak & Tai 2001). 
Rebates can also be used to encourage a port user occupying a port infrastructure 
facility to follow efficient practices, and offering rebates based on user performance 
results in a performance based pricing (UNCTAD 1995b). However, offering rebates 
and discounts has its drawbacks as most port authorities around the world offer 
rebates on port dues, which result in arbitrary tariff structures (Notteboom & 
Winkelmans 2001). Hence, port authorities should be cautious about such tariff 
practices.  
    A tariff policy is a useful tool to attract the private sector into port investment, 
especially when there is high inter-port competition. ADB (2000) indicated that port 
traffic and tariff policy along with other variables such as risk allocation and 
financial requirement are required in order to attract private sector participation in 
port projects. Thus ports with clearly defined tariff polic ies can attract private sector 
investments. For instance in India, following private sector investments in ports, a 
tariff policy for newly developed port infrastructure has been developed (Yahya 
2003).  
6.3.1.2 TARIFF REGULATION 
The second factor influential to port infrastructure practices concerns tariff 
regulation. Important practices related to tariff regulation include the presence of a 
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regulatory control over tariff setting, government approval for revised tariffs and the 
publication of new tariffs. Tariff regulation is initiated as a result of a lack of 
competition between ports and governments imposed tariff regulation as a means of 
controlling monopoly behaviour (Kent & Ashar 2001). However, following the 
private sector participation in the port sector, especially in the provision of port 
infrastructure, the need for tariff regulation has arisen in order to ensure fair 
competition (Ray 2004).  
 One of the ways to regulate tariff setting is to establish a separate regulatory body  
to oversee the tariff regimes of ports (ADB 2000). Public ports and even private port 
operators, especially in a non-competitive port market, are reluctant to limit or lower 
their existing port charges, hence tariff regulation by an independent regulator is 
required for protection against any abuse of port power (The World Bank 2007c). 
For instance, in the Mexican port sector, the Mexican Anti-Trust Institution 
determines the tariff regulatory requirements and more importantly the port dues on 
infrastructure are subjected to price caps which are revised based on the level of 
competition (Estache, González & Trujillo 2002). Similarly, in the Australian port 
sector, two major state ports (Melbourne and Sydney) are subject to monitoring by 
an independent price regulator (Bandara & Nguyen 2014; Everett 2007; Menezes, 
Pracz & Tyers 2007).   
6.3.1.3 TRANSPARENCY FACTOR 
Transparency in port pricing is important as it provides the users with clear 
information on the charging basis and its composition (Asian Institute of Transport 
Development 2001). Transparency is a common factor that has been discussed 
regarding all the aspects of port operation including port accounting systems, 
financial flows, the port regulation mechanism and pricing practices, and receives 
greater attention with regard to port pricing policies. Nevertheless, the shipping 
charges of ocean carriers are characterised by a lack of transparency in their 
calculation methods (Oliveira 2010) and port tariffs imposed by ports on carriers are 
also viewed as not transparent (Meersman, Van De Voorde & Vanelslander 2002; 
Strandenes 2004). Thus, promoting transparency in port pricing has been mandated 
by the Standing Committee on Developing Services for Shipping in Ports (UNCTAD 
1996). A transparent pricing structure is required for any common user facility 
(Wilmsmeier, Monios & Lambert 2010) and is in the interest of port users 
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(Meersman, Van De Voorde & Vanelslander 2002). It is argued that the 
decentralisation and increasing financial autonomy of the port sector have helped to 
create a lack of transparency in port pricing (Daniela 2013), although increasing 
financial autonomy will contribute towards achieving full cost recovery 
(Haralambides et al. 2001). Establishing transparency in port pricing is essential to 
ensure a level playing field within and between ports (European Commision 2007). 
Thus in their port reform processes some national governments have strived to make 
all port activities transparent. For instance, Italian port reforms proposed to enhance 
transparency in terminal concession agreements and determine concession fees on 
rate of return principles (Parola, Tei & Ferrari 2012).  
 One of the tariff practices related to transparency is the offering of negotiable port 
charges that may differ from published port tariffs. The lack of transparency for  
negotiated port charges is viewed as a barrier to the effectiveness of port tariff 
differentiation (Enei 2010). Further, the issue of the lack of transparency in port 
business, particularly in port pricing, results in under-priced port infrastructure and 
inaccurate demand forecasts which can lead to an overcapacity problem in ports 
(Terada 2002). The lack of transparency in the tariffs charged to shipping companies 
hinders the identification of true port costs, as well as the comparison of costs 
between ports, which is critical for shipping lines when selecting ports. The lack of 
transparency in port pricing is an obstacle to the effective planning and management 
of the logistic chain by shippers (Paixão and Marlow 2002). Improvement in the 
transparency of port operation is thus the key to promote healthy competition in the 
port sector.      
6.3.1.4  STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION  
Stakeholders of an organisation include all the individuals or groups who can be 
affected by the decisions of the managers of the organisation. These include 
employees, customers, communities and government representatives (Sternberg 
1997). The stakeholders of a port can include shippers, carriers, adjacent ports, 
logistics companies and governments (national, local and regional). Stakeholder 
participation in pricing decisions can help to improve the transparency of port pricing 
and allow ports to obtain feedback on their prices and service quality. However, 
obtaining feedback from port users such as shipping lines and port operators about 
port tariffs can be a sensitive matter and their views are diverse. An example from 
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the US port industry suggests that port user fees designed to cover dredging and 
harbour maintenance were supported by some stakeholder groups while opposed by 
others (Mcintosh & Skalberg 2010). This also provides a mechanism for relevant 
bodies such as user advisory boards or port user representatives to make informed 
and useful decisions (The World Bank 2007c). It is important that helpful 
stakeholder management practices related to port pricing are developed (Aert, 
Dooms & Haezendonk 2013). Developing and establishing a mechanism to liaise 
with port users, discuss and obtain feedback from port users and port operators on 
port costs and prices would improve the transparency of port charges (Industry 
Commission 1993). If ports can involve stakeholders in the tariff revision process, 
the level of transparency can be lifted and therefore port tariffs will not be subject to 
criticism.  
6.3.1.5 POLICY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS  
Port infrastructure tariff practices tend to vary substantially across ports (Wilmsmeier 
2007). The findings presented in this study have revealed that such practices are 
influenced by four main factors: tariff policy, tariff regulation, transparency and 
stakeholder participation. The degree of influence these factors have on tariff 
practices differs among ports, so different approaches to tariff design practice, 
calculation and tariff levels exist. Thus the implications of these four factors to port 
management cannot be overlooked.  
 To stay competitive a port needs to adopt various strategies. Enhancing port 
performance and efficiency over rivals, while providing port services at reasonable 
cost is vital (Tongzon 1995). With the continuous building of mega-sized  
containerships,  and  thus  hugely excessive  capacity,  the  price  charged  to 
shippers  by  shipping  lines  are  often  relatively low. Thus port tariff design needs 
to consider this industry change and price port infrastructure to avoid market 
distortions. Nevertheless, as infrastructure cost is relatively small compared with the 
freight revenue gained by shipping lines, shipping lines, with the market power, pass 
the burden of port charge to shippers. It is the shippers that have to bear at least part 
of port charges.      
Lowering port charges is important as far as total logistical costs to the user are 
concerned and port costs (port charge) are a significant determinant of the port 
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selection by users (Chang, Lee, and Tongzon 2008; Tongzon and Sawant 2007). 
Therefore revising tariffs as per a port’s competitive position allows a port authority 
to not only retain existing port users but to also attract new port customers.  
Tariff practices related to port infrastructure can be used to achieve specific 
industry outcomes. Offering rebates and discounts is perhaps a popular tariff practice 
objective. For instance, examples of port marketing tactics that are used are to set a 
concessionary rate for feeder vessels calling the port, or to arrange priority berthing 
at a specific port facility. This attracts competitive feeder vessels to use the port and 
in turn the port is able to achieve regional or sub regional transhipment status 
(Frankel 1987). Further, considering logistical costs, the benefits of lowering port 
charges can flow along the total logistics chain to the final consumer of the goods. 
 Port tariff revision should not be done on an ad hoc basis if it is to be an effective 
tool to achieve corporate goals. Port management needs to establish clear policy 
guidelines for tariff revision with particular emphasis on the process and 
circumstances of tariff revision. Tariff revision requires detailed information of the 
financial position and performance of the port. It is intuitive that the performance 
data are usually maintained and possessed by the commercial and planning 
department (or equivalent) of the port management. Thus establishing a streamlined 
process for obtaining inputs from the commercial and planning department for tariff 
revision is a key task when conducting tariff revisions. Further, market based tariffs 
adjusted with inflation and input costs are necessary. This research shows that a 
port’s commercial and planning department mainly contributes to the tariff design. In 
the process of tariff revision, the active involvement of the port’s commercial and 
planning departments is important so that tariff setting can take into account the 
financial and operational performance and conditions of the port. In addition, the 
customer service or marketing department often deals with port customers and is the 
customer's first point of contact. Hence, this department should also be involved in 
the tariff setting and revision process. 
 Port authorities need to be cautious about offering rebates and discounts. The 
main objective of offering rebates on port tariffs is to reta in existing port users and 
attract new port users. Nevertheless such a user-centric pricing practice for port 
infrastructure might not lead to the expected benefits to the port. If the port authority 
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aims to recover the full cost of port infrastructure investment and management, the 
port has to assess the impact of rebates on port users and the resultant revenue flow 
into the port accounts. It follows that such customer-centric pricing strategies need to 
be assessed on the basis of service attributes, customer perceptions, and the 
circumstances of time and place by listening to customers’ comments and feedback 
(Cross & Dixit 2005). Thus ports with highly commercially-oriented port 
infrastructure pricing objectives are required to design their tariff policy with 
directives for assessing the reaction of port users to rebates and the resulting impact 
on port revenues. This is primarily important as port users place different value 
propositions on port costs contributing to port selection decisions. The withdrawal of 
a shipping line from a port due to changes in tariff practice will have devasta ting 
effects not only on the port but also the entire logistics chain, because the commodity 
flow to and from the hinterland and foreland is disrupted. Thus a port authority has 
an unwritten obligation to preserve the logistical flow to and from the port hinterland 
it serves and maintains the interest and security of the all participants along the 
supply chain, such as shipping agencies, freight forwarders, transport providers, 
cargo owners and ultimately consumers.  
    One of the challenges facing public port authorities when setting port tariffs is that 
they only have limited discretion to set the tariffs. In addition, the prevalence of 
regulatory control over port charges also makes port tariff revision cumbersome. The 
requirement of approval of the regulator and the government for revised tariffs 
substantiates this with regard to port authorities that conform to a statutory port 
authority administrative model. However ports with a more autonomous 
administrative model, such as port corporations and limited companies, need to be 
aware of the subjectivity of the regulatory control over the revised tariffs. Thus tariff 
revision should be carried out to conform with the regulatory guidelines and 
requirements. 
    The transparency of port tariffs is often critic ised by port users. While ports adhere 
to published tariffs it is important to communicate the basis of charging. The offer of 
composite and negotiated tariffs perhaps attracts and retains port users but is subject 
to criticism by the majority of port users. Offering a lump sum port fee payable in 
advance for the use of the port infrastructure for a particular time period is an 
effective pricing practice that guarantees a large sum payment, while the use of the 
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port is only limited to a certain number of port users. This allows a port authority to 
better plan its future port operations and provide effective services for port users.  
    Having a policy guideline for tariff design and revision enables the port authority 
to exercise tariff setting and revision consistently. Such a policy can include an 
appropriate policy on rebates and discounts and allows the monitoring of the effect of 
tariff changes more effectively. Furthermore port authorities can include tariff 
revision directives in a port’s strategic plan thereby making tariff revision a strategy 
overseen by port management on a continuous basis. The analysis results recommend 
that port management consider developing a port tariff policy in which the tariff 
implementation and revision process are clearly outlined. More importantly there is a 
regulatory control over port infrastructure tariffs while any revision of charges has to 
be approved by the government, perhaps from the regulator itself. As ports tend to 
obtain the participation of various stakeholders in tariff revision process, the level of 
transparency can be lifted. However there are still transparency issues with regard to 
offering port infrastructure tariffs as ports tend to favor offering negotiated tariffs, 
composite tariffs and lump sum payments possibly with discounted prices. These are 
perhaps ways of revenue management practices in ports or counter-veiling measures 
of inter-port competition. 
6.3.2 PORT INFRASTRUCTURE DESIGN, REVISION AND 
APPROVAL PROCESS 
The tariff policy factor was associated with the variables: having a policy guideline 
for tariff design and revision, revising tariffs as per the port’s competitive position, 
revising tariffs as per the port’s strategic plan, obtaining inputs from the commercial 
and planning section, having a policy on rebates and discounts and adjusting tariffs 
with inflation and input cost. The information provided by port managers to the 
open-ended question on port tariff formulation and the revision procedure revealed 
that most ports have formal internal body for the tariff formulation, revision and 
approval process. The process of port tariff revision and the approval process for 
different governance structures is shown in Table 6.3. 
 Whatever the administrative structure, port tariffs are agreed on by a port 
committee or a board of directors, usually the council of administration of the port 
authority. In municipal ports, the council comprises representatives of the public 
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administrators and the port operators. The survey results indicate that about 60% of 
port authorities have a committee responsible for tariff formulation, review and 
revision, and that the technical aspect of port tariff formulation is the responsibility 
of a port’s commercial section. Respondents revealed that the existing tariff structure 
is revised by a specific port department, often the Business & Operations 
Department, based on the market and certain other conditions and the revised tariffs 
are then approved by a committee of selected members chaired by the CEO. 
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Table 6.3: Port tariff revision and approval: participants and the process. 
Port 
Administrative 
Model 
Internal 
body 
Reviewers 
Government 
Rep 
Approval Body Feedback Process 
Municipal Port 
enterprise 
Port 
committee/b
oard 
Commercial section 
Council 
representative 
- - Internal departmental review→ internal committee → implement  
Statutory port 
authority 
Board of 
directors 
Internal staff/CEO/ 
Ministry 
representative 
Ministry/ 
Regulatory 
approval  
Port users 
Internal review → Board of directors → ministry recommendation → 
regulatory approval → implement 
Commercialised 
port authority 
Board of 
directors 
Port management - Ministry approval Port users Internal review → Ministry approval 
Port department 
Internal 
committee 
Port financial 
section/CEO 
- Ministry approval  Internal review → Ministry approval → implement  
Port corporation 
Board of 
directors 
Each port 
department 
- Ministry approval Port users 
Internal review → Board of directors → customers feedback → 
implement 
Private limited 
company ports 
Board of 
directors 
Internal review/ 
external 
consultants/CEO 
- - - Consultant → CEO → Board of directors → implement  
Source: compiled by author based on survey data 
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 The results of the analysis confirm that the commercial department of the port 
plays a key role in tariff design. In addition, ideas are generated internally by the 
department that owns the tariff and then, after consultation with port users, any 
proposed fee changes are forwarded for internal approval of the Executive 
Committee or the Board, upon which a notice of the fee change is published before 
the fee comes into effect. In addition an internal port tariff committee works with 
port operators to review tariffs based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and usually 
reviews tariffs in the event of new port investments, identifies new port users and 
suggests incentives to offer to port users. This suggests that adjusting port tariffs 
according to input costs and inflation is a common tariff revision practice although 
tariff revision after new investment was not been found to be significant, with the 
agreement of only 3.5/9 respondents. 
 Overall, it can be concluded that in all port administrative structures a port 
committee or a board oversees the tariff design, revision and approval process. 
Various departments of the port contribute to the tariff revision process which 
includes an internal examination of the revised tariffs before forwarding to an 
external examination with port operators and users. Apart from private limited 
company ports, the tariffs of ports operating under the other port administrative 
models are subject to government and/or regulatory approval. Private limited 
company port authorities offer more market based tariffs. Adjusting tariffs to annual 
inflation is a major feature in the tariff revision process among them.  
 
6.3.3 KNOWLEDGE OF PORT PRICING APPROACHES AND THE 
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF PORTS IN PORT 
INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF DESIGN 
Figure 6.1 (same as figure 5.9) summarises the responses of port managers 
concerning the knowledge and applicability of port pricing approaches. Many port 
pricing methods exist. 96% of ports are aware of cost based pricing approaches but 
only 78% agree that cost based pricing approaches are applied to their port tariff 
design. Respondents revealed that they require a more accurate approach to establish 
cost based prices. This is also discussed by Haralambides (2002) who found that 
establishing more accurate cost based tariffs requires proper and transparent 
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accounting systems. Thus, ports need to share their knowledge, experience and best 
practice in this regard. Information and knowledge sharing can be facilitated by 
relevant international and national associations and bodies such as the Port 
Association and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP). It is also recommended that ports outsource their tariff setting 
tasks to external consultants or businesses that have sufficient specialised knowledge 
and expertise in the field. For example, conducting a market survey for port tariff 
revision purposes can be a tedious task for internal port departments where no 
suitable expertise is present.  
Figure 6.1: The knowledge and applicability of port pricing approaches: The view of 
port managers. 
 
 Conducting a proper market survey of port's infrastructure of competitive ports is 
also a requirement for properly designing port tariffs. Thus port tariffs are market 
responsive and further promote competition and efficiency.  
6.4 COMPARISON OF THE REGRESSION AND FACTOR ANALYSIS 
RESULTS  
One of the advantages of mixed method research is it allows for the triangulation of 
the analysis results. Triangulating research findings allows researchers to examine 
the subject from multiple perspectives leading to a better understanding of results 
with newer and deeper dimensions (Jick 1979). The analyses presented in chapters 3 
and 4 are based on two different methodologies, namely regression estimation and 
factor analysis. The former was based on secondary data for port infrastructure 
tariffs, proxies for port infrastructure costs, port demand and dummy variables for 
the port administrative and governance models. The latter was based on primary data 
collected from a survey of port mangers responsible for setting the port tariffs of 
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major ports worldwide. Table 6.4 summarises the results of the regression estimation 
and the factor analysis with regard to the determinants of infrastructure tariffs.  
Table 6.4: Comparative results of the regression estimation and the factor analysis of 
the determinants of port infrastructure tariffs. 
Regression Estimation   Factor Analysis   
Variables Factors  Variables 
 
EFA CFA 
Trade flow*                     Port Demand 
Port’s fi   ci   positio    
Total financial costs to port users    
Perceived service quality    
Trade flow   
- 
Pricing 
Knowledge & 
Applicability 
Awareness of cost based pricing    
Use of market based pricing   
Use of cost based pricing   
Awareness of discriminatory pricing   
Awareness of market based pricing   
- 
Industry 
Dynamics 
Competi g ports’ t riffs    
Competition with rivals   
Variability in ship size   
- 
Tariff 
Objective 
Port capacity utilisation  x 
Regional economic development   
Attracting cargo and port users    
Channel length*  
Cost Recovery  
Covering investment costs    
                            Covering operation costs    
Channel depth* Infrastructure investment cost   
Port administrative model** - -   
Port governance model** - -   
Port location**  - -   
* = Significant with channel dues.       = Significant   = Not Significant 
** = Significant with both channel dues and berth occupancy charge.  
 -  = There is no corresponding variable.  
 
As shown in Table 6.4, the role of trade flow in the determination of port 
infrastructure tariffs is significant and has been confirmed by both analyses. The 
regression estimation results showed that an increase in total trade value of 1% is 
associated with a decrease in channel due of 0.11% on average, while trade flow is a 
higher loading variable in the latent factor port demand.   
Similarly cost recovery has a significant role in tariff determination. The 
regression analysis results indicate a significant relationship between channel dues 
and port costs (proxied by channel length and depth): an increase in channel length 
of 1% would increase the channel/port due by 0.26% and for channel depth, a 1% 
increase in channel depth would decrease channel due by 0.53%. The results suggest  
that longer channels require higher maintenance costs, thus higher channel dues are 
applied, while deeper channels require less dredging and lower channel dues are 
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applied. The results indicate the requirement of cost recovery for channel 
maintenance. Similarly, the cost recovery factor derived from the factor analysis is 
associated with variables such as covering the investment and operational costs of 
port infrastructure, which again confirm the former proposition of cost recovery. 
Thus the two methodologies have produced similar results with regard to both port 
demand and cost recovery.  
 The dummy variables in the regression estimation (the port administrative model, 
port governance model and port location) have a significant impact on the level of 
port infrastructure charges. Unfortunately these variables were not considered in the 
factor analysis, although they were included in the survey stage, due to limited 
responses for each administrative and governance model. In addition, the fact that 
most ports conform to the landlord model also limits such analysis. On the contrary, 
the variables pertinent to factors on pricing knowledge and applicability, industry 
dynamics and tariff objectives were not included in the regression estimation due to 
their type of measurement (nominal). However the EFA and CFA suggested that they 
are significant factors affecting port infrastructure design. Thus, from the viewpoint 
of the research methodology, the comparative analysis suggests that complementing 
the pure quantitative method with a qualitative data analysis technique allowed the 
triangulation of research findings. In addition, the employment of two analysis 
methods to study the same problem allows the study of those variables that cannot be 
included in one of the methods.  
6.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The results of the EFA and CFA presented in chapter 5 and further discussed in this 
chapter above provide answers to the research questions and hypotheses proposed in 
chapter 4.  
6.5.1 RESEARCH QUESTION I: WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF 
APPLICABILITY OF PRICING APPROACHES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORT INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING 
MODELS? 
 Four research hypotheses were proposed for Research Question I:  
RH1: Seaport authorities possess substantial knowledge on port pricing theory 
and principles. 
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RH2: Seaport authorities to a larger extent apply port pricing principles in 
port infrastructure pricing. 
RH3: Seaport authorities often attempt to formulate efficient cost based port 
infrastructure tariff design. 
RH4: The majority of seaport authorities follow a structured procedure for the 
port infrastructure pricing process. 
 The results indicated that the majority (80%) of the port managers surveyed are 
aware of cost based and market based pricing and agreed that they are applied in 
tariff design. The result of the EFA showed that port managers are aware of cost 
based pricing, market based pricing and discriminatory pricing approaches, but only 
market based pricing and cost based pricing approaches are used in their tariff 
design. However the results of the CFA showed that port mangers are only aware of 
cost based and market based pricing and that these have limited application in 
practice. These results support and suggest that both RH1 and RH2 are partially 
supported as seaport authorities only have knowledge on the cost based, market 
based and discriminatory pricing approaches. In addition, although there is no 
strong evidence to support RH2 that seaport authorities apply port pricing principles 
in port infrastructure pricing, the EFA results have indicated that seaport authorities 
to a larger extent apply cost and market based pricing principles in port 
infrastructure pricing. 
 Regarding RH3 (the third research hypothesis), both the EFA and CFA results 
suggest that port infrastructure tariff design is influenced by the cost recovery 
consideration of the port management and this includes covering port investment 
costs and port operation costs. RH3 is fully supported by the results of the analysis. It 
can be concluded that ports often try to formulate cost based infrastructure tariff 
design.    
Regarding RH4 (the fourth research hypothesis), both the EFA and CFA results 
for port infrastructure practices generated a latent factor stakeholder participation 
which is associated with practices such as obtaining feedback from port operators 
and port users on infrastructure tariffs. In addition, the information gathered on the 
tariff formulation procedures of ports indicated the processes of port tariff revision 
and the approval protocols that are followed by ports with different administrative 
structures, and a little divergence was noted in the parties involved internally and 
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externally to the port with respect to the port administrative model. Nevertheless 
there is enough evidence to support RH4 (that port authorities follow a structured 
procedure for the infrastructure pricing process). Thus another significant finding of 
this study is that ports tend to follow a set procedure in the design and revision of 
their infrastructure tariffs. This is confirmed by the existing literature, such as Dowd 
and Flemming (1994), Talley (1994) and Psaraftis (2005) on the port pricing process.    
 
6.5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION II: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL IN DETERMINING PORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
TARIFF DESIGN? 
 One research hypothesis was proposed for Research Question II:  
RH5: Port infrastructure tariff design is influenced by the port’s organisational 
objective, costs, financial position, demand related aspects, competition 
and government policy and regulation.       
 The EFA has identified five factors influential in tariff design: (a) port demand, 
(b) pricing knowledge and applicability, (c) industry dynamics, (d) tariff objective 
and (e) cost recovery as determinants of port infrastructure design. Each factor is 
associated with a set of variables including port objectives, port costs, the port’s 
financial position (which also demonstrates the level of port demand), port user 
aspect and port competition, that affect port infrastructure design. The CFA results 
confirmed that (a) port demand, (b) pricing knowledge and applicability, (c) tariff 
objective and (d) cost recovery are major factors influencing infrastructure tariff 
design. However port industry dynamics such as port user aspects (vessel size 
variability) and port competition are not influential. Thus, it can be concluded that 
port infrastructure tariff design is influenced by the port objectives, port pricing 
knowledge of ports and the application of that knowledge to tariff design, port costs 
and port demand. 
6.5.3 RESEARCH QUESTION III: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS 
AFFECTING PORT INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF PRACTICE?  
 Two research hypotheses were proposed for Research Question III:  
RH6: Port infrastructure tariff practices are influenced by port stakeholders, 
the level of transparency, port autonomy, regulatory regime, port user 
behaviour and the competitive environment that the port operates in.    
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 RH7: The differences in the ownership structure and the administrative 
structure have significant influence on port infrastructure tariff practices.  
 The EFA results suggest four factors that influence infrastructure tariff practices: 
(a) tariff policy, (b) tariff regulation, (c) transparency, and (d) stakeholder 
participation in tariff setting. However the ‘tariff regulation’ factor could not be 
confirmed by the CFA. Tariff policy which includes the revision of tariffs as per the 
port’s competitive position, having a policy guideline for tariff design and revision, 
and having a policy on rebates and discounts, suggests that ports have a specific 
policy that guides their infrastructure tariff setting, and by which the port manages 
some autonomy over the tariff setting. The fact that the tariff regulation factor could 
not be confirmed by the CFA implies that there is little intervention from 
governments and regulatory authorities over port infrastructure tariffs setting. The 
other factors (stakeholder participation and transparency) include rather influential 
infrastructure tariff setting practices, such as offering negotiable tariffs, lump sum 
port fees and obtaining feedback from port users and operators.      
    The survey results could not test the last research hypothesis, RH7, as the small 
size of the sample was a constraint in analysing the data with respect to different 
administrative and governance structures. However the regression analysis of port 
infrastructure tariff determinants suggested that the port administrative structure and 
the governance structure have a significant impact on the level of port tariff.      
6.6 CONCLUSION 
 The results of the EFA presented in chapter 5 based on the data collected from an 
international survey of 67 seaports representing the North and South American, 
European, East and South East Asian and Australasian regions, indicate that the 
factors affecting port infrastructure design are port demand, port pricing knowledge 
and applicability, port and shipping industry dynamics such as competition and 
vessel size, the tariff objective of the port and the consideration for cost recovery. 
The results of the CFA on the same data reject the port and shipping industry 
dynamics factors, but confirm the remaining factors. The analyses also found that the 
underlying factors influencing port infrastructure tariff practices are the existence of 
a port infrastructure tariff policy, tariff regulation, the participation of various 
stakeholders in tariff revision and the level of transparency.  
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 The comparison of the results of the regression analysis presented in chapter 3 
with the factor analysis in chapters 5 and 6 indicates that the factors of port demand 
and cost recovery have a significant influence on port infrastructure tariff design. 
Interestingly, the influence of variables such as the port administrative structure on 
the determination of port infrastructure tariffs have been captured by the regression 
analysis while factors such as the existing port authority knowledge and its 
application to current tariff structures, the port tariff objective, and the influence of 
port industry dynamics such as competition and port user characteristics on 
infrastructure tariff design were only captured by the factor analysis. The two 
analysis methods (the regression and factor analysis) appear to complement each 
other and help to triangulate the research findings.  
 Seven research hypotheses have been tested and the following six conclusions can 
be made based on the results of the data analysis: 
 Seaport authorities have knowledge of cost based, market based and 
discriminatory pricing approaches and to a larger extent, apply cost and 
market based pricing principles in port infrastructure pricing. 
 Cost based and market based pricing appear to be the most widely known 
infrastructure pricing methods. 
 Port infrastructure tariff designs are influenced by port demand, the pricing 
knowledge of port management and its applicability, industry dynamics, the 
tariff objective, cost recovery, the governance model and administrative 
structure and the location of the port.    
 Port infrastructure tariff setting practices are influenced by port stakeholders, 
the level of transparency, tariff policy, port autonomy, government policy and 
regulation. 
 The majority of seaport authorities follow a structured procedure for the port 
infrastructure pricing process.  
 The differences between the ownership structure and the administrative 
structure have a significant influence on port infrastructure tariff practices.    
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7.1 CONCLUSION 
 This study focuses on the factors that influence seaport infrastructure pricing. 
Firstly, an extensive review of the port pricing literature with a particular focus on 
studies of infrastructure pricing was conducted. The literature review found that 
infrastructure pricing has long been a topic for port research with an array of 
different issues such as the relevance and applicability of pricing principles, tariff 
structures, transparency, tariff differentiation and the tariff setting process being 
investigated. Nevertheless limited attention has been given to research on the factors 
that influence the tariff process and practices. Thus this study mainly focuses on 
deriving the determinants of two main port infrastructure charges: port channel dues 
and berth occupancy charges.  
 Secondly, the study carried out an econometric analysis of port infrastructure 
tariffs using cross sectional data for two types of infrastructure tariffs: channel dues  
and berth occupancy charges. The analysis used a sample of 159 ports. The 
independent variables were port infrastructure costs, trade flow, the port governance 
and administrative models and the geographical location of the port. The results of 
the simultaneous equation regression analysis indicate a two-way relationship 
between channel dues and berth occupancy charges. In addition, channel due is 
positively related to channel length, while channel depth appears to be negatively 
correlated to channel due. Thus net effect of these two characteristics of channel 
length and depth affect its price setting. Port demand measured by trade flow has a 
negative effect on channel due, but a positive effect on berth occupancy charges. 
Based on the analysis results, conclusions have been made with regard to the cost 
relatedness of port infrastructure tariffs:  
1. The coefficient for the channel depth is significant and its negative value 
implies that the deeper the channel, the lower the channel due. This suggests 
that channel maintenance costs are generally lower for deeper channels that 
require less dredging, and as a result port authorities set lower tariffs for 
port dues and channel dues.  
2. The coefficient for berth length is significant and its negative value implies 
that, the longer the berth the lower the berth charges per unit. Given that the 
port is fully utilised always, ports with many berths and longer berths can 
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accommodate more ships than ports with fewer and shorter berths and can 
therefore handle more cargo and achieve economies of scale. 
3. Channel dues charged by ports operating under the port authority and port 
corporation administrative and legal structures are lower than those under 
the local government entity legal and administrative structure. 
4. Landlord ports and service ports tend to charge less than private ports, 
implying that the former are supposed to play a dual role, while the latter are 
more profit-driven.  
5. The infrastructure charges of Australian and North-West European ports are 
among the highest in the world. 
 Determinants of port infrastructure charges provide policy directives for port 
management in terms of designing port tariffs. In that port costs, port demand, port 
administrative and governance model, and port region affects the level of port 
infrastructure charge and port management can take decisions on the level of charge 
that they need to impose.  
Thirdly, to gain more insight into the seaport infrastructure tariff design process 
and setting practices, the study conducted a survey of international seaports. The 
survey data from 67 ports in Europe, North America, South and Central America, 
Australia, South Asia and East Asia were analysed using exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The results of the analyses showed 
that port demand, the pricing knowledge of the port authority, port competition, the 
tariff objective of the port and the cost recovery consideration of the port are the key 
factors that influence infrastructure tariff design; while tariff policy, tariff regulation, 
stakeholders’ participation and the level of transparency influence port infrastructure 
tariff setting practices. In addition, tariff regulation has a limited influence over port 
tariff setting practices. Some of these results of the study are also consistent with the 
normative conclusion arrived by Meersman, Strandenes & Van De Voorde (2014) 
that the lack of transparency, the behaviour of various actors participating in setting 
port tariffs related to a port call, the lack of consideration in port pricing tools are 
featured in contemporary pricing structures of seaports. Influential factors on 
infrastructure tariff design and practices provide directives for port management to 
be aware and take necessary precautions to mitigate the issues in port infrastructure 
tariffs implementation. 
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 Several implications for port management in terms of port tariff policy (tariff 
design and revision) and port financial planning can be drawn from these findings:  
1. Infrastructure tariffs should at least aim to help to recover the cost of 
providing port infrastructure services and should contribute to future 
infrastructure development. This allows the port to be financially 
independent from the government budget.  
2. Port management needs to adjust tariffs in response to changes in demand 
for port services, especially in terms of the changes in trade flow and the 
service quality. However in this case accurate forecast of changes in 
demand is a pre-condition for pricing setting.  
3. When determining port infrastructure tariffs it is important to use the port’s 
extensive internal information such as financial conditions, capital and 
operational costs, corporate objectives and the governance model. For this 
purpose, accurate compilation of port financial information, expenditure on 
capital and operational costs, setting up corporate goals aligned with the 
port governance framework are necessary requirements.   
4. Tariffs can be used as effective tools to promote port demand and help 
improve the capacity utilisation rate. Different infrastructure tariffs and 
pricing strategies can be applied to different types of cargo and vessel 
traffic. For this purpose port authorities need to monitor and record cargo 
and port tariff mix and its trends and be able to provide sufficient capacity 
when and where necessary.   
5. Seaports need to revise tariffs as per their competitive position and use 
tariffs as one tool alongside other marketing tools to maintain the loyalty of 
existing port users, and to attract new users. This will only possible if port 
authority can assess its competitive position and monitor its rival ports 
actions and reaction on achieving better market position within the port 
area. Thus port authorities need to device a mechanism to carry out 
continuous dialogue with port users for using the port. 
6. Ports need to establish clear policy guidelines for tariff design and revision 
and enhance transparency in their tariff setting practices.  This can be 
achieved by publishing ports tariff documents annually with time to time 
notification of tariff revisions along with underlying reasons. Further before 
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the revision takes place getting the relevant stakeholders in to a dialogue on 
intended tariff revisions enhances the transparency of tariff setting.       
   In line with the findings above and the results of the examination of the research 
hypotheses proposed by the study, the following conclusions can be made: 
1. Port authorities are aware of cost based, market based and discriminatory 
pricing approaches and to a larger extent only apply cost and market based 
pricing principles to port infrastructure pricing. 
2. Cost based pricing is widely used in port infrastructure tariff design. 
3. Port infrastructure tariff design is influenced by the port’s corporate 
objectives, costs, financial conditions, port demand, the users’ perception of 
service quality and competition.    
4. Port infrastructure tariff setting practices are influenced by tariff policies, 
tariff regulation, stakeholders’ participation and the level of transparency. 
5. The majority of seaport authorities follow a structured port infrastructure 
pricing process.  
6. Different ownership and administrative structures have a significant influence 
on port infrastructure tariff practices.           
7.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research is subject to limitations. These limitations mainly concern the research 
design and an unavoidable systematic bias (Price & Murnan 2004). This study used 
two main analytical methods: regression analysis and factor analysis. The regression 
analysis used port infrastructure dimensions as proxies for infrastructure costs 
because of the unavailability of relevant data. These proxies cannot fully exhibit the 
behaviour of port infrastructure costs. For example, future research may make use of 
data on dredging costs to help reduce the complexities related to the difference 
between the natural depth and the artificial depth of a port's entrance channels. The 
study only considered channel due and berth occupancy charge, which may not 
represent the behaviour of other types of charges such as terminal charges. Thus, 
future studies can extend the empirical framework and include additional charges, 
particularly terminal charges to cargo owners/shippers and charges for other services 
such as pilotage and towage. In addition, future research can also incorporate the role 
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of port competition, the vertical relationship between variables in the supply chain 
and port-regional development.  
 There are also limitations pertaining to the factor analysis using the survey data. 
The survey participants are mainly from EU, North American and Australian ports. 
They represent the top level management of these ports and most of them have 
sufficient experience in tariff affairs. There are no questions on the validity of the 
responses to the survey questions. When compared with ports in develop ing 
countries these ports (the majority of those in the survey) are well organised in terms 
of management, financial planning and port operation, so the findings of the research 
may be more relevant to ports in developed countries. Thus future research needs to 
take into account the differences between ports in developed and developing 
countries.  
 Due to the limited responses from ports representing various port governance 
models and administrative structures, the effect of the port administrative model on 
the dependent variables through its influence on the tariff setting objective, cost 
recovery consideration, port competition and tariff setting practices as found in the 
study may not be representative. To overcome this limitation, future research needs 
to extend the sample size and have a higher survey response rate in order to capture 
the effect of variables impacting on tariff design and practices that can be attributed 
to different governance and administrative models. In addition, future research can 
extend the survey to include other geographical regions and to obtain more responses 
to the questionnaire. The inclusion of more responses from the Latin American, 
Middle Eastern, African and East Asian regions would help obtain more general and 
widely applicable results.  
Further, some of the conclusions drawn from the literature review were not 
adequately addressed and one of these is the use of marginal cost pricing in port 
infrastructure pricing. There was no evidence of the use of marginal cost pricing in 
selected seaports. In addition empirical evidence for setting up an optimal port tariff 
was not found although the literature on port pricing has much emphasis on its 
principle from theoretical and policy perspectives. In addition, the differences 
between port governance models, competition, port user characteristics such as 
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frequency of use, cargo volume and social and economic characteristics of seaports 
need to be considered in future research.  
The methodological framework of the research is mainly designed to identify 
factors influential to infrastructure tariff design and practice and has not assessed the 
intensity of influence. Thus future research on the subject can focus on testing for 
which factors are more influential in determining port charges.  
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APPENDIX I: THE QUESTIONNAIRE  
PORT INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING: 
A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL SEAPORTS 
 
This survey is part of doctoral research on seaport infrastructure pricing. The survey aims to collect information 
on how port infrastructure tariffs are currently set by international seaports. Information collected from the 
survey will be analyzed in order to gain a better understanding of the determinants of seaport infrastructure 
pricing models and to draw implications for port management and policy makers. The questionnaire can be 
completed in less than 15 minutes and all information provided will remain anonymous and be treated as strictly 
confidential. Your participation is valuable to our research and is highly appreciated.   
A. Seaport’s Profile  
This section includes information on the port’s country; ownership, governance and 
administrative structure, and port’s competition level (Please select the option most relevant 
to your port) 
 
A1. The ownership: 
  ☐ Public ownership-Central government  
 ☐Public-State/Provincial government 
 ☐ Public ownership-Municipal government  
 ☐Public ownership-Local government 
 ☐ Public-Private/Foreign partnership   
 ☐ Private/Foreign company 
  ☐ Private/Domestic company   
 ☐ Other (Please specify) Click here to enter text. 
A2. Governance model: 
 ☐ Service Port  ☐ Tool port ☐ Landlord port       ☐ Privatised port 
 ☐ Other (Please specify) Click here to enter text.      
 
A3. Administrative structure:☐ Statutory public port authority ☐ Commercialised 
port authority 
  ☐ Government department  ☐ Statutory Corporation  
  ☐ Government-owned limited Corporation 
  ☐ Public limited company  ☐ Private limited company     
  ☐ Public trust       ☐ Other (Please specify) :   
A4. Please rate the level competition with other ports faced by your port.     
 
A5. The country of the port: (Please state here) Click here to enter text.  
B. Infrastructure Pricing Knowledge  
 Not at all competitive                                        Highly competitive 
Level of inter-port competition  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
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This section includes information on your awareness of port pricing approaches, the 
pricing approaches currently adopted by your port.  
B1. Please rate how well you are aware of the following pricing approaches.   
 
 
 
 
 
B2. Please rate the level of applicability of the above pricing approaches to your 
port’s current infrastructure tariffs .                                            
 
 
 
 
 
C. Port Infrastructure Pricing Objectives 
This section requests information on the port infrastructure tariff objectives of 
your ports. Please rate the level of agreement on the following objectives of your 
port’s infrastructure tariff design.  
 Not at all aware                                          Fully aware 
B1.1. Cost-based pricing  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B1.2. Market-based pricing  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B1.3. Social optimal pricing ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B1.4. Discriminatory pricing ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B1.5. Strategic pricing ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
 Not at all applicable                          Highly applicable  
B2.1. Cost-based pricing  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B2.2. Market-based pricing  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B2.3. Social optimal pricing ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B2.4. Discriminatory pricing ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
B2.5. Strategic pricing ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
 Not at all agree                          Strongly Agree 
C1. Recover the investment costs  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C2. Compete with rival ports  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C3. Attract specific types of cargo or  
port users   ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C4. Increase port capacity utilisation  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C5. Cover the operational costs   
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C6. Promote regional economic 
development  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C7. Achieve higher return on 
investment  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
C8. Other (please mention)                ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
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D. Factors Influencing Port Infrastructure Tariff Design 
This section includes possible factors your port might consider in designing port 
infrastructure tariffs. Please rate the level of importance of each of the following 
factors to infrastructure tariff design for your port.          
E. Infrastructure Pricing Practice: Parties Involved, Transparency and 
Revision of Tariffs  
      This section is about the parties involved, transparency in the formulation, review and revision of 
port infrastructure tariffs.  
E1. Please rate your view on each of the following with regards to the parties 
involved in infrastructure tariffs of your port.                               
 Not at all important                   Highly important 
D1. Infrastructure investment costs 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D2. Infrastructure maintenance costs 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D3. Rate of inflation  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D4. Port’s financial position 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D5. Perceived service quality of 
users   
 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D6. Total port financial cost to users  
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D7. Trade flow ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D8. Number of ship calls  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D9. Variability in vessel size  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D10. Level of  competing ports’ 
tariffs  ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
D11.Government policies & 
regulation 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
          
 Not at all agree                       Strongly agree                                        
E1.1. My port has a committee 
responsible for tariffs  
formulation, review and 
revision  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 
☐ 
8 
☐9 
E1.2. Different departments in my 
port are involved in the tariff  
design or  revision process  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E1.3. My port is required to seek 
approval from the  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
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government/responsible body 
for tariff revision  
E1.4. My port usually gets feedback 
from port users on revised 
tariffs before implementation 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E1.5.  My port gets feedback from 
the port terminal operators on 
proposed tariff changes before 
implementation 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
 
 
E2. Please rate your view on each of the following with regard to the transparency of 
infrastructure tariff setting of your port.                                                                                                                                                
 Not at all agree                      Strongly Agree                                        
E2.1. My port has a specific policy 
guideline for designing and 
revising port infrastructure 
tariffs 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.2. My  port has a clear policy on 
rebates and discounts for  port 
infrastructure tariffs 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.3. My port’s tariffs are available 
to the public ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.4. My port’s tariffs are subjected 
to a public regulatory authority ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.5. My port offers port users a 
composite port infra-structure 
tariff i.e. a bundle price  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.6. My port’s tariff formulation 
and its revision process are 
made publicly available  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.7. My port offers negotiable port 
infrastructure tariffs for vessels 
under certain conditions 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.8. My port is mostly adhere to 
published port infrastructure 
tariffs 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E2.9. My port offers port users a 
lump sum port fee payable in 
advance for the use of the port  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
 
E3. Please rate your view on each of the following factors in infrastructure tariff revision 
of your port.  
 Not at all agree                      Strongly Agree                                        
E3.1. My port revises infrastructure 
tariffs after every new 
investment in port infrastructure  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E3.2. My port adjusts infrastructure 
tariffs annually in accordance 
with the inflation rate and/or 
changes in input costs 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E3.3. My port revises infrastructure ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
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E4. Please rate the level of contribution of the following departments of your ports to 
infrastructure tariff revision.                                  
E5. About your port's infrastructure tariff formulation, revision, approval procedure 
and expectations: 
 
E5.1. How frequently does your port revise its infrastructure tariffs?  
☐ Every six months  ☐ Annually ☐ Every two years ☐ Very rarely   
☐ No specific time line but according to market changes 
☐ Port authority sets a specific timeline for tariff revision 
☐ Other (Please specify) Click here to enter text.  
E5.2. Please briefly describe your port’s tariff formulation, revision and approval 
procedure. 
        Click here to enter text.  
E5.3. Please briefly mention what kind of training, support and assistance your port 
needs in infrastructure tariffs design.  
 Click here to enter text.  
F. Respondent’s Profile  
This section is about your position, attached department in the port and experience in 
port tariff related work. Please kindly provide the following.   
F1. Your position: 
  ☐ Chief Executive Officer     ☐ Managing Director    
  ☐ Port Executive-Department Head      ☐ Port Executive        ☐Other (Please specify) 
Click here to enter text. 
F2. Your administrative division/department:  
tariffs in accordance with the 
change in port’s  demand level 
E3.4. My port revises infrastructure 
tariffs as per the port’s strategic 
plan 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
 
E3.5. My port revises infrastructure 
tariffs depending on  the port’s 
competitive position  
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E3.6. My port revises infrastructure 
tariffs according to the financial 
position of the port 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
 No contribution at all                  Substantial contribution 
contribution E4.1. Navigation & 
Signalling Service 
Department 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.2. Port Operation 
rt t  
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.3. Commercial & 
Planning Department  
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.4. Accounting & Finance 
Department  
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.5. Human Resource 
Department  
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.6. Marketing & 
Publication Department  
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.7. Port Engineering & 
Maintenance Department 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
E4.8. Other  Click her  to 
enter text. 
 
☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7 ☐8 ☐9 
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  ☐ General Administration        ☐ Commercial/Planning 
  ☐ Engineering and Maintenance   ☐ Port Operations                  
  ☐ Navigation & Signalling Service  ☐ Accounting and Finance 
 ☐ Marketing and Publication       ☐ Other (Please specify)              
      
F3. Years of experience in your current position: 
 ☐Less than 1 years   ☐1-5 years  ☐6-10 years ☐11-15 years ☐16 years & above 
F4. Years of experience in work related to port tariffs:   
 ☐ Less than 1 years  ☐ 1-5 years  ☐ 6-10 years ☐ 11-15 years ☐16 years & above 
 
Thank you. We highly value your contribution and time spent on this 
survey. 
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APPENDIX II: EXTRACT FROM OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS E5.2 and 
E5.3. 
The survey is included with two open ended questions. First is pertinent to tariff 
formulation, revision and approval process of the respondent’s port and second is on 
the training requirement for port managers with regard to port tariff designing.  
RESPONSES TO E5.2 
This section presents and review the responses given by port mangers on the above 
two aspects. The results are presented under different port administrative structures.       
The responses received from port managers of statutory public port authorities with 
regard to port tariff design, revision and approval are presented below. Since the 
survey was conducted anonymously, the respondents’ port authorities were not 
identified.       
 ‘Existing tariff structure is used for revision (items, rates) proposed by the 
Business & Operations Department based on the market and certain other 
conditions for consideration and approval by a committee of selected members 
(not permanent) chaired by the CEO normally annually but sometime on a as 
needed basis’. 
 ‘Ideas are generated internally by the department that owns the tariff, then 
consultation with users takes place, then the proposed fee/change is revised for 
internal approval, by the Executive Committee or the Board, then notice of the 
fee/change is published, then the fee comes into effect’. 
 ‘Internal committee works with Port operator to review tariff based on CPI 
review, new investments, identification of new users, incentives to offer’. 
 ‘The port tariffs are agreed by the Port Committee that is the council of 
administration of the Port Authority. The council is made of representatives of 
the public administrations and of the port operators’. 
 ‘Senior staff is responsible to review tariffs annually with the CEO and the CEO 
presents to the Board of Directors for approval’. 
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 ‘Tariff are revised annually with government recommendations based annually 
inflation rate; Annual Executive Board proposal and inside Port Community 
discussion; Submission to Regulatory approval’.  
 ‘The basis of the tariffs is approved by the government . Every port has a little 
action range, about +/- 30%, to apply to the government established tariffs, 
depending to the strategy and the financial situation of the port’. 
 ‘Tariff revision and approval is based on 5 year and strategic plans and 
objectives, Review by bi-state board representing the state governors. 
 ‘We put to our attention: trends in European tariffs and in competing ports' 
tariffs/prices, new solutions and so on. Also cost of infrastructure. Tariffs must be 
approved by a board of directors and the supervisory board’.  
 ‘All rules and regulations must be approved by the Port’s Board of 
Commissioners at a public meeting’.  
 ‘Our tariffs are developed by finance  section, approved by CEO and Board and 
then by the Minister’. 
 ‘Our port tariff formulation and revision include review of prevailing market 
rates domestically and regionally, for similar services offered at competitor 
Ports’.  
a) Increased costs in wages and salaries due to recent settlement of 
wage negotiations which have driven operational costs in Port higher.  
b) remaining competitive by using a conservative increase,  
c) Settlement of Labour Contracts with Unions which will reduce 
operational costs through higher efficiency Impact to the Shipping 
Lines costs and  
d) Maintenance of and acquisition of new equipment and infrastructure’.  
 ‘Approval Procedure Submission of the under-mentioned documents for Board 
approval, then to the Ministry of Transport for concurrence (a) Amended Draft 
Tariff, (b) an amendment sheet highlighting the amendments to the written 
section of the tariff, (c) Comparative table of the proposed tariff changes to the 
previous year’s tariff and (d) Tabular review of revenue impact on port’s 
proposed tariff increase. Plan is to review tariff every six months, however last 
revision was completed in 2010. For 2014 tariff implementation subject to 
Ministerial concurrence’.  
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 ‘The port's competitive position and financial strength are reviewed as well as 
what other ports are doing’. 
 ‘Revision of port tariffs must be approved by port authority assembly’. 
Similarly the views of respondents representing commercialized port authority on 
tariff formulation revision and approval procedure are given below. 
 ‘Next year tariffs are decided by the board of directors on November previous 
year and do the revision accordingly’ 
 ‘Port's published tariffs are reviewed on an annual basis and are approved by 
the port's Board in May of each year. The review of tariffs follows the guidelines 
outlined in port's Pricing Policy Statement and includes a process of engagement 
with port’s stakeholders. Port’s customers are informed of the new tariff rates at 
least one month prior to implementation of the revised rates’. 
 ‘Tariffs are revised annually with regard to rate of return objectives and cost 
increases including finance costs, wages and other supplies. The changes to 
pricing are formulated and documented in the Port’s Strategic Development 
Plan. This document is a budgeting / planning document with a 5 year horizon. 
The document is formulated with input from across the organisation and is 
approved by the Port’s Executive and Board. It is then forwarded to the 
Department of Transport for review prior to submission to the Minister for 
Transport for approval and the concurrence of the Treasurer’.  
 ‘The revision of our Tariff is normally considered annually. With that all 
economic issues are considered and approval must be given by the port’s Board 
of Directors’. 
 ‘Prepared by management and approved by the board’. 
The view of the respondents of port department regarding tariff design, revision and 
approval includes;  
 ‘According to the policy of the port Bureau’ 
 ‘To us, port tariff means port and light dues, and charges on the use of 
government marine facilities. All fees levied are based on schedules contained in 
legal provisions. Thus, amendment to the schedules has to go through legislative 
procedure’. 
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 ‘We try to develop cost based, with annual review, internally approved by CEO 
with ministerial endorsement’. 
 ‘The Financial Branch of the government staff along with accounting expert 
looks after all fee schedules. Technical inputs will be given by respective 
departments such as Marine Department on port operation and Port Works 
Division of the Civil Engineering and Development Department on marine 
structures’. 
The responses from survey participants from a more corporatized port administrative 
model such as a Port Corporation include;   
 ‘Tariffs are reviewed regularly to ensure currency, using financial reports, 
market information and strategic planning. Reviews are completed; pricing set 
and then this is approved by our Board before roll-out to customers’. 
 ‘Existing tariff structure is used for revision (items, rates) proposed by the 
Business & Operations Department based on the market and certain other 
conditions for consideration and approval by a committee of selected members 
(not permanent) chaired by the CEO normally annually but sometime on a as 
needed basis’. 
 ‘Ideas are generated internally by the department that owns the tariff, then 
consultation with users takes place, then the proposed fee/change is revised for 
internal approval, by the Executive Committee or the Board, then notice of the 
fee/change is published, then the fee comes into effect’. 
 ‘Under the Port Law, Pricing Regulatory Commission Price Law, domestic port 
charges on the adjustment notice requirements and standards," the nature and 
extent of the difference between port charges market competition, domestic port 
charges are subject to government pricing, government guidance and market 
adjusted, where cargo dues, vessel expenses (including pilotage fees, tug fees , 
parking fees) government pricing; cargo loading and unloading fees, service 
charges implemented regulated by the market’. 
 ‘Vessel charges (tonnage, mooring and waste fee) according to public pricelist, 
contractual/individual prices with terminal operators depending on terminal 
specifics for land rent and cargo charge’.  
 ‘Port tariff committee to check out port tariff pricing and structure’. 
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Views of respondents of a Public limited company port authority on tariff 
formulation revision and approval procedure include; 
 ‘Internal committee works with Port operator to review tariff (based on CPI 
review, new investments, identification of new users, incentives to offer)’ 
 ‘Annual analysis of all factors, combined with annual budget procedures. Tariffs 
are presented to our user forum and subsequently approved by the Board’.  
 ‘Schedule of fees and charges is formulated within the annual strategic 
development planning process, reviewed by the board of Directors, and then sent 
to the Minister for Transport and state Treasurer for approval. Treasury input is 
directed towards us meeting our dividend and efficiency targets’. 
Views of respondents of a Private limited company port authority on tariff 
formulation revision and approval procedure include; 
 ‘Tariffs are reviewed annually to allow for infrastructural growth, customer 
requirement and return required to shareholder’.  
 ‘Use of consultants to design and review tariffs’ 
 ‘The pricing of tariffs for our port is led by the Chief Financial Officer. The 
process involves use of external consultants for market pricing and building 
blocks analysis. The results are submitted to the Board for their approval’. 
 ‘Based on March Quarter State CPI adjustment. Financial year commencing 1st 
July’. 
 ‘Based on CPI (December to December each year) for revised tariff applicable 
from July next year. Board approval is required for any tariff changes’. 
RESPONSES TO E5.3 
The survey gathered the views of port mangers on the training requirement of the 
port authority in terms of tariff designing. Selected responses are summarized below.     
 ‘Need clear documented policy for formulation and How to implement pricing to 
achieve other objectives other than investment recovery, maintenance’. 
 ‘We have that expertise and communicate heavily with other ports’. 
 ‘Capabilities arise by virtue of professional qualifications held by senior 
managers’. 
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 ‘Not sure we need any training in this regard - we have a very competent 
Finance team backing our Commercial team. We are a very small operation 
(Executives of Six)’. 
 ‘General formulation, strategy and good practices for high competitiveness in 
port tariff design and revision, for some management levels’. 
 ‘Generally we rely on information in the Port Authorities Act and regulations 
and guidance and support from the Department of Transport’. 
 ‘No specific training is conducted. A brief inquiry of  Ports in the general port 
area for us is important’. 
  ‘Market survey of port's infrastructure tariffs of competitive ports’. 
 ‘More accurate approach to cost based prices’.  
 ‘Need international seminars with best practices and its theoretical background’.  
 ‘Need a good data base, analytical tools, experience workforce and the 
knowledge about other ports and the environment is required’.  
 ‘Just need policy advice so we meet the needs of our shareholder (government)’. 
 ‘Need a Pricing Estimator’.  
 ‘Strategy Development Office of the Port Authority examines right time and right 
charge on various kinds of services’.  
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APPENDIX VI: MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS-COMMNADS  
 
 
275 
 
  
276 
 
 
277 
 
 
278 
 
 
279 
 
 
280 
 
 
281 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 
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APPENDIX VIII: EFA SPSS OUTPUT (FINAL MODEL)-FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF DESIGN 
 
Notes  
Output Created 28-MAR-2014 13:27:09 
Comments  
Input  
Data 
C:\Users\ybandara\Documents\World Port Statistics\Survey 
Data.sav 
Active 
Dataset  
DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight  <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows 
in Working 
Data File 
67 
Missing 
Value 
Handling 
Definition of 
Missing 
MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases 
Used 
LISTWISE: Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for 
any variable used. 
Syntax 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES B1_1Costbased B1_2Marketbased 
B1_4Discriminatory B2_1Costbased B2_2Marketbased 
C1Recover_invest_costs C2Compete_rivals  
C3Attract_cargo_users C4Incr_capa_utiliza C5Cover_oper_costs 
C6Prom_reg_ed D1Infra_invest_cost D4Ffinan_posi D5Percei_SQ 
D6Finan_cost_users D7Trade_flow D9Vary_ship_size 
D10Comp_port_tariffs 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS B1_1Costbased B1_2Marketbased 
B1_4Discriminatory B2_1Costbased B2_2Marketbased 
C1Recover_invest_costs C2Compete_rivals  
C3Attract_cargo_users C4Incr_capa_utiliza C5Cover_oper_costs 
C6Prom_reg_ed D1Infra_invest_cost D4Ffinan_posi D5Percei_SQ 
D6Finan_cost_users D7Trade_flow D9Vary_ship_size 
D10Comp_port_tariffs 
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT SORT 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.  
Resources  
Processor 
Time 
00:00:00.00 
Elapsed 
Time 
00:00:00.02 
Maximum 
Memory 
Required 
40024 (39.086K) bytes 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\ybandara\Documents\World Port Statistics\Survey 
Data.sav 
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KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .674 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 670.865 
df 153 
Sig. .000 
 
Communalities 
 Initial  Extraction 
B1_1Costbased 1.000 .724 
B1_2Marketbased 1.000 .838 
B1_4Discriminatory  1.000 .389 
B2_1Costbased 1.000 .755 
B2_2Marketbased 1.000 .704 
C1Recover_invest_costs 1.000 .833 
C2Compete_rivals  1.000 .777 
C3Attract_cargo_users 1.000 .783 
C4Incr_capa_utiliza 1.000 .835 
C5Cover_oper_costs 1.000 .653 
C6Prom_reg_ed 1.000 .682 
D1Infra_invest_cost 1.000 .746 
D4Ffinan_posi  1.000 .644 
D5Percei_SQ 1.000 .749 
D6Finan_cost_users 1.000 .775 
D7Trade_flow 1.000 .749 
D9Vary_ship_size 1.000 .593 
D10Comp_port_tariffs 1.000 .822 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component  Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings  
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Tota
l 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulati
ve % 
1 5.61 31.193 31.193 5.61 31.193 31.193 3.48 19.351 19.351 
2 2.29 12.757 43.950 2.29 12.757 43.950 2.79 15.516 34.867 
3 1.82 10.124 54.073 1.82 10.124 54.073 2.34 13.049 47.916 
4 1.78 9.923 63.997 1.78 9.923 63.997 2.27 12.621 60.537 
5 1.53 8.517 72.514 1.53 8.517 72.514 2.15 11.976 72.514 
6 .811 4.507 77.020       
7 .727 4.040 81.060       
8 .658 3.653 84.714       
9 .584 3.245 87.958       
10 .488 2.711 90.669       
11 .342 1.899 92.569       
12 .290 1.609 94.177       
13 .264 1.465 95.643       
14 .235 1.304 96.946       
15 .225 1.249 98.195       
16 .126 .699 98.894       
17 .115 .640 99.534       
18 .084 .466 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 Component  
1 2 3 4 5 
D6Finan_cost_users .798 -.025 -.346 -.007 .133 
D5Percei_SQ .743 -.255 -.330 .111 -.101 
B2_1Costbased .737 .333 -.290 -.101 .082 
D7Trade_flow .653 -.434 -.255 -.133 -.229 
D1Infra_invest_cost .636 .182 -.155 .236 .479 
B2_2Marketbased .633 .319 .003 -.448 .010 
C3Attract_cargo_users .577 -.301 .525 .028 -.287 
C4Incr_capa_utiliza .546 -.321 .167 .481 -.419 
D10Comp_port_tariffs .540 -.464 .277 -.445 .199 
C5Cover_oper_costs .462 .211 .326 .440 .309 
B1_4Discriminatory  .416 .395 .124 -.044 -.208 
B1_2Marketbased .433 .667 .260 -.275 -.249 
B1_1Costbased .489 .578 .190 -.222 -.256 
C2Compete_rivals  .258 -.379 .634 -.363 .184 
D4Ffinan_posi  .553 -.123 -.561 -.051 -.082 
C1Recover_invest_costs .378 .269 .266 .533 .513 
C6Prom_reg_ed .468 -.157 .159 .517 -.382 
D9Vary_ship_size .427 -.389 .041 -.231 .451 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 5 components extracted.  
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component  
1 2 3 4 5 
D4Ffinan_posi  .792 .068 -.041 .086 -.051 
D6Finan_cost_users .787 .217 .150 .106 .273 
D5Percei_SQ .762 .061 .123 .372 .103 
D7Trade_flow .696 .038 .306 .368 -.185 
B2_1Costbased .644 .510 .009 -.036 .281 
B1_2Marketbased -.017 .912 .008 .026 .073 
B1_1Costbased .081 .839 .007 .085 .077 
B2_2Marketbased .391 .671 .288 -.118 .061 
B1_4Discriminatory  .104 .580 -.035 .165 .117 
D10Comp_port_tariffs .289 .072 .853 .082 -.011 
C2Compete_rivals  -.178 .068 .852 .117 .031 
D9Vary_ship_size .366 -.137 .622 -.097 .211 
C4Incr_capa_utiliza .240 .012 .062 .871 .121 
C6Prom_reg_ed .162 .068 -.059 .783 .185 
C3Attract_cargo_users .042 .247 .520 .669 .045 
C1Recover_invest_costs -.014 .076 .019 .112 .902 
C5Cover_oper_costs .007 .182 .093 .255 .739 
D1Infra_invest_cost .500 .144 .072 -.038 .685 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
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Component Transformation Matrix  
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 .659 .447 .341 .368 .338 
2 -.189 .719 -.506 -.330 .287 
3 -.722 .240 .521 .322 .213 
4 -.082 -.358 -.509 .537 .563 
5 .047 -.312 .310 -.603 .664 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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APPENDIX IX: CFA AMOS OUTPUT (FINAL MODEL)-FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF DESIGN 
Analysis Summary 
Date and Time 
Date: Monday, 29 September 2014 
Time: 5:26:11 PM 
Title 
Cfa b1-d11 model 3: Monday, 29 September 2014 5:26 PM 
Notes for Group (Group number 1) 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 67 
Variable Summary (Group number 1) 
Your model contains the following variables (Group number 1) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
B1_1Costbased 
B1_2Marketbased 
C4Incr_capa_utiliza 
C6Prom_reg_ed 
C3Attract_cargo_users 
C1Recover_invest_costs 
C5Cover_oper_costs 
D7Trade_flow 
D5Percei_SQ 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Pricing_Knowledge_Applicability 
e5 
e9 
Tariff_Objective 
e13 
e14 
e15 
Cost_Recovery 
e16 
e17 
Port_Demand 
e19 
e20 
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Variable counts (Group number 1) 
Number of variables in your model: 22 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 13 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 9 
 
Parameter Summary (Group number 1) 
 
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 14 0 0 0 0 14 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 4 3 13 0 0 20 
Total 18 3 13 0 0 34 
 
Sample Covariances (Group number 1) 
 
D5P
ercei
_SQ 
D7Tr
ade_
flow 
C5Cov
er_oper
_costs 
C1Reco
ver_inve
st_costs 
C3Attra
ct_carg
o_users 
C6Pr
om_r
eg_ed 
C4Incr
_capa_
utiliza  
B1_2
Marke
tbased 
B1_1
Cost
based 
D5Perce
i_SQ 
4.50
5         
D7Trade
_flow 
2.47
9 
4.04
1        
C5Cover
_oper_c
osts 
.652 .497 5.190 
      
C1Reco
ver_inve
st_costs 
.724 -.370 2.858 4.443 
     
C3Attra
ct_cargo
_users 
1.43
8 
1.93
2 
1.172 .831 4.476 
    
C6Prom
_reg_ed 
1.96
6 
1.39
6 
1.598 1.031 1.917 5.444 
   
C4Incr_
capa_uti
liza 
2.38
3 
1.90
6 
1.400 .938 2.910 3.182 4.724 
  
B1_2Ma
rketbase
d 
.172 .215 .684 .511 .800 .339 .124 2.285 
 
B1_1Co
stbased 
.434 .364 .646 .505 .598 .618 .284 1.611 1.830 
 
Condition number = 37.074  
Eigenvalues 
14.808 6.973 3.743 3.431 2.943 2.277 1.373 .991 .399 
Determinant of sample covariance matrix = 4829.061 
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Sample Correlations (Group number 1)  
 
D5P
erce
i_S
Q 
D7T
rade
_flo
w 
C5Co
ver_op
er_cos
ts 
C1Reco
ver_inv
est_cost
s 
C3Attr
act_car
go_use
rs 
C6Pr
om_r
eg_e
d 
C4Inc
r_capa
_utiliz
a 
B1_2
Mark
etbas
ed 
B1_
1Cos
tbase
d 
D5Perc
ei_SQ 
1.00
0         
D7Trad
e_flow 
.581 
1.00
0        
C5Cove
r_oper_
costs 
.135 .109 1.000 
      
C1Reco
ver_inv
est_cost
s 
.162 
-
.087 
.595 1.000 
     
C3Attra
ct_carg
o_users 
.320 .454 .243 .186 1.000 
    
C6Pro
m_reg_
ed 
.397 .298 .301 .210 .388 
1.00
0    
C4Incr_
capa_ut
iliza 
.517 .436 .283 .205 .633 .628 1.000 
  
B1_2M
arketba
sed 
.053 .071 .199 .160 .250 .096 .038 1.000 
 
B1_1C
ostbase
d 
.151 .134 .210 .177 .209 .196 .097 .788 
1.00
0 
 
Condition number = 17.310 
Eigenvalues 
3.274 1.764 1.356 .749 .657 .487 .297 .226 .189 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model) 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 20 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 20): 25 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 27.857 
Degrees of freedom = 25 
Probability level = .314 
 
 
319 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
B1_1Costbased <- 
Pricing_Knowledge_
Applicability 
1.000 
    
B1_2Marketbased <- 
Pricing_Knowledge_
Applicability 
1.041 .417 2.493 .013 par_1 
C4Incr_capa_utiliza  <- Tariff_Objective  1.000 
    
C6Prom_reg_ed <- Tariff_Objective  .760 .140 5.434 *** par_2 
C3Attract_cargo_user
s 
<- Tariff_Objective  .696 .127 5.488 *** par_3 
C1Recover_invest_co
sts 
<- Cost_Recovery 1.000 
    
C5Cover_oper_costs <- Cost_Recovery 1.000 
    
D7Trade_flow <- Port_Demand .902 .207 4.367 *** par_7 
D5Percei_SQ <- Port_Demand 1.000 
    
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
B1_1Costbased <--- Pricing_Knowledge_Applicability .920 
B1_2Marketbased <--- Pricing_Knowledge_Applicability .857 
C4Incr_capa_utiliza  <--- Tariff_Objective .937 
C6Prom_reg_ed <--- Tariff_Objective .660 
C3Attract_cargo_users <--- Tariff_Objective .666 
C1Recover_invest_costs <--- Cost_Recovery .789 
C5Cover_oper_costs <--- Cost_Recovery .749 
D7Trade_flow <--- Port_Demand .744 
D5Percei_SQ <--- Port_Demand .781 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
320 
 
Implied Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
D5P
ercei
_SQ 
D7Tr
ade_
flow 
C5Cov
er_oper
_costs 
C1Reco
ver_inve
st_costs 
C3Attra
ct_carg
o_users 
C6Pr
om_r
eg_ed 
C4Incr
_capa_
utiliza  
B1_2
Marke
tbased 
B1_1
Cost
based 
D5Perce
i_SQ 
4.50
5         
D7Trade
_flow 
2.47
9 
4.04
1        
C5Cover
_oper_c
osts 
.000 .000 5.030 
      
C1Reco
ver_inve
st_costs 
.000 .000 2.820 4.526 
     
C3Attra
ct_cargo
_users 
1.54
5 
1.39
4 
.654 .654 4.434 
    
C6Prom
_reg_ed 
1.68
8 
1.52
3 
.715 .715 2.151 5.393 
   
C4Incr_
capa_uti
liza 
2.21
9 
2.00
3 
.940 .940 2.830 3.091 4.635 
  
B1_2Ma
rketbase
d 
.000 .000 .549 .549 .000 .000 .000 2.285 
 
B1_1Co
stbased 
.000 .000 .528 .528 .000 .000 .000 1.611 1.830 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 20 27.857 25 .314 1.114 
Saturated model 45 .000 0 
  
Independence model 9 246.445 36 .000 6.846 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .343 .920 .856 .511 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model 1.277 .527 .409 .422 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .887 .837 .987 .980 .986 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .694 .616 .685 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.857 .000 20.010 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 210.445 164.416 263.968 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .422 .043 .000 .303 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 3.734 3.189 2.491 4.000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .042 .000 .110 .526 
Independence model .298 .263 .333 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 67.857 75.000 111.951 131.951 
Saturated model 90.000 106.071 189.211 234.211 
Independence model 264.445 267.660 284.288 293.288 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 1.028 .985 1.288 1.136 
Saturated model 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.607 
Independence model 4.007 3.309 4.818 4.055 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 90 105 
Independence model 14 16 
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APPENDIX X: EFA SPSS OUTPUT (FINAL MODEL)-FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF SETTING PRACTICES 
 
Notes 
Output Created 25-MAR-2014 17:27:03 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\ybandara\Documents\World Port Statistics\Survey 
Data.sav 
Active 
Dataset 
DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows 
in Working 
Data File 
67 
Missing 
Value 
Handling 
Definition 
of Missing 
MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used 
LISTWISE: Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for 
any variable used. 
Syntax 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES E1_3Appr_gov_revi E1_4Feedback_users 
E1_5Feedback_operators E2_1Policy_design_revi 
E2_2Policy_rebates E2_4Tariffs_regulatory E2_5Compo_tariff 
E2_7Nego_tariffs E2_8Adhere_publi_tariffs E2_9Lumpsum_fee 
E3_2Adj_tariff_P_LKc E3_4Revis_strat_plan 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi E4_3Comm_Plan_Dept 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS E1_3Appr_gov_revi E1_4Feedback_users 
E1_5Feedback_operators E2_1Policy_design_revi 
E2_2Policy_rebates E2_4Tariffs_regulatory E2_5Compo_tariff 
E2_7Nego_tariffs E2_8Adhere_publi_tariffs E2_9Lumpsum_fee 
E3_2Adj_tariff_P_LKc E3_4Revis_strat_plan 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi E4_3Comm_Plan_Dept 
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT SORT 
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(4) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /SAVE REG(ALL) 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Resources 
Processor 
Time 
00:00:00.03 
Elapsed 
Time 
00:00:00.05 
Maximum 
Memory 
Required 
26824 (26.195K) bytes 
Variables 
Created 
FAC1_88 Component score 1 
FAC2_88 Component score 2 
FAC3_88 Component score 3 
FAC4_88 Component score 4 
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[DataSet1] C:\Users\ybandara\Documents\World Port Statistics\Survey 
Data.sav 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
E1_3Appr_gov_revi 1.000 .658 
E1_4Feedback_users 1.000 .883 
E1_5Feedback_operators 1.000 .853 
E2_1Policy_design_revi 1.000 .750 
E2_2Policy_rebates 1.000 .549 
E2_4Tariffs_regulatory 1.000 .709 
E2_5Compo_tariff 1.000 .674 
E2_7Nego_tariffs 1.000 .639 
E2_8Adhere_publi_tariffs 1.000 .555 
E2_9Lumpsum_fee 1.000 .648 
E3_2Adj_tariff_P_LKc 1.000 .477 
E3_4Revis_strat_plan 1.000 .547 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi 1.000 .646 
E4_3Comm_Plan_Dept 1.000 .502 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.878 27.698 27.698 3.878 27.698 27.698 3.181 22.718 22.718 
2 2.384 17.027 44.725 2.384 17.027 44.725 2.087 14.907 37.625 
3 1.592 11.373 56.098 1.592 11.373 56.098 1.924 13.743 51.368 
4 1.235 8.824 64.922 1.235 8.824 64.922 1.898 13.554 64.922 
5 .921 6.578 71.500       
6 .753 5.377 76.877       
7 .699 4.990 81.867       
8 .640 4.575 86.442       
9 .514 3.672 90.113       
10 .424 3.029 93.142       
11 .359 2.564 95.706       
12 .277 1.981 97.688       
13 .192 1.372 99.060       
14 .132 .940 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
E2_1Policy_design_revi .694 -.246 -.398 -.221 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi .673 -.414 .028 .144 
E4_3Comm_Plan_Dept .627 -.311 -.110 .004 
E2_2Policy_rebates .621 -.393 .035 .087 
E3_4Revis_strat_plan .609 -.269 -.315 .064 
E3_2Adj_tariff_P_LKc .467 -.385 .022 .331 
E1_5Feedback_operators .435 .657 .192 .441 
E1_4Feedback_users .366 .638 .023 .585 
E1_3Appr_gov_revi .367 .545 -.254 -.403 
E2_4Tariffs_regulatory .491 .506 -.219 -.404 
E2_5Compo_tariff .453 -.130 .608 -.286 
E2_7Nego_tariffs .559 .023 .570 -.031 
E2_8Adhere_publi_tariffs .401 .358 -.510 .073 
E2_9Lumpsum_fee .443 .377 .463 -.308 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 4 components extracted. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
Items Factors 
Tariff Policy Tariff 
Regulation 
Transparency Stakeholder 
participation 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi .772 -.052 .213 .051 
E2_1Policy_design_revi .723 .454 .000 -.147 
E2_2Policy_rebates .707 -.033 .219 .008 
E3_4Revis_strat_plan .706 .207 -.065 .029 
E4_3Comm_Plan_Dept .684 .128 .134 -.015 
E3_2Adj_tariff_P_LKc .635 -.222 .063 .144 
E2_4Tariffs_regulatory .067 .806 .190 .139 
E1_3Appr_gov_revi -.042 .793 .113 .123 
E2_8Adhere_publi_tariffs .242 .556 -.267 .339 
E2_5Compo_tariff .223 -.015 .785 -.093 
E2_7Nego_tariffs .277 -.013 .719 .213 
E2_9Lumpsum_fee -.039 .341 .704 .184 
E1_4Feedback_users .032 .159 .014 .926 
E1_5Feedback_operators .007 .199 .236 .870 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 
1 .769 .401 .402 .293 
2 -.561 .551 .077 .613 
3 -.236 -.469 .845 .100 
4 .195 -.562 -.344 .727 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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APPENDIX XI: CFA SPSS OUTPUT (FINAL MODEL): FACTORS 
INFLUENTIAL TO INFRASTRUCTURE TARIFF SETTING PRACTICES 
Analysis Summary 
Date and Time 
Date: Wednesday, 23 April 2014 
Time: 10:49:43 AM 
Title 
Cfa e1-e4 model fit 4 n67 for efa: Wednesday, 23 April 2014 10:49 AM 
Notes for Group (Group number 1) 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 67 
 
Variable Summary (Group number 1) 
Your model contains the following variables (Group number 1) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
E2_2Policy_rebates 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi 
E2_1Policy_design_revi 
E1_5Feedback_operators 
E1_4Feedback_users 
E2_9Lumpsum_fee 
E2_7Nego_tariffs  
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Tariff_Policy 
e2 
e4 
e5 
Stakeholders 
e7 
e8 
e11 
Transparency 
e13 
Variable counts (Group number 1) 
Number of variables in your model: 17 
Number of observed variables: 7 
Number of unobserved variables: 10 
Number of exogenous variables: 10 
Number of endogenous variables: 7 
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Notes for Model (Default model) 
Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model) 
Number of distinct sample moments: 28 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 16 
Degrees of freedom (28 - 16): 12 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 10.010 
Degrees of freedom = 12 
Probability level = .615 
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
E2_2Policy_rebates <--- Tariff_Policy 1.000 
    
E3_5Revis_compet_posi <--- Tariff_Policy 1.004 .219 4.576 *** par_1 
E2_1Policy_design_revi <--- Tariff_Policy .783 .186 4.219 *** par_2 
E1_5Feedback_operators <--- Stakeholders 1.000 
    
E1_4Feedback_users <--- Stakeholders 1.000 
    
E2_7Nego_tariffs <--- Transparency 1.675 .727 2.304 .021 par_3 
E2_9Lumpsum_fee <--- Transparency 1.000 
    
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
E2_2Policy_rebates <--- Tariff_Policy .717 
E3_5Revis_compet_posi <--- Tariff_Policy .896 
E2_1Policy_design_revi <--- Tariff_Policy .573 
E1_5Feedback_operators <--- Stakeholders .849 
E1_4Feedback_users <--- Stakeholders .911 
E2_7Nego_tariffs <--- Transparency .746 
E2_9Lumpsum_fee <--- Transparency .578 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
Tariff_Policy <--> Stakeholders .512 .685 .747 .455 par_4 
Tariff_Policy <--> Transparency .995 .572 1.739 .082 par_5 
Stakeholders <--> Transparency 1.086 .602 1.804 .071 par_6 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
Tariff_Policy <--> Stakeholders .108 
Tariff_Policy <--> Transparency .383 
Stakeholders <--> Transparency .371 
327 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
Tariff_Policy 
  
4.227 1.472 2.872 .004 par_7 
Stakeholders 
  
5.350 1.076 4.973 *** par_8 
Transparency 
  
1.600 .907 1.764 .078 par_9 
e2 
  
4.006 1.042 3.845 *** par_10 
e4 
  
1.050 .792 1.326 .185 par_11 
e5 
  
5.308 1.048 5.064 *** par_12 
e7 
  
2.076 .632 3.282 .001 par_13 
e8 
  
1.100 .553 1.988 .047 par_14 
e11 
  
3.192 .863 3.700 *** par_15 
e13 
  
3.580 1.953 1.833 .067 par_16 
Matrices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Residual Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
E2_7N
ego_ta
riffs 
E2_9L
umpsu
m_fee 
E1_4Fe
edback_
users 
E1_5Fee
dback_op
erators 
E2_1Poli
cy_desig
n_revi 
E3_5Rev
is_compe
t_posi 
E2_2Po
licy_re
bates 
E2_7Neg
o_tariffs 
.000 
      
E2_9Lum
psum_fee 
.000 .000 
     
E1_4Fee
dback_us
ers 
-.815 .331 -.214 
    
E1_5Fee
dback_op
erators 
.614 .755 .095 .405 
   
E2_1Poli
cy_desig
n_revi 
.200 -.228 -.234 -.473 .000 
  
E3_5Revi
s_compet
_posi 
.228 -.484 .134 .071 .025 .000 
 
E2_2Poli
cy_rebate
s 
.526 -.277 -.243 -.244 -.097 .001 .000 
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Standardized Residual Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
E2_7N
ego_ta
riffs 
E2_9L
umpsu
m_fee 
E1_4Fe
edback_
users 
E1_5Fee
dback_op
erators 
E2_1Poli
cy_desig
n_revi 
E3_5Rev
is_compe
t_posi 
E2_2Po
licy_re
bates 
E2_7Neg
o_tariffs 
.000 
      
E2_9Lum
psum_fee 
.000 .000 
     
E1_4Fee
dback_us
ers 
-.890 .474 -.191 
    
E1_5Fee
dback_op
erators 
.628 1.012 .088 .313 
   
E2_1Poli
cy_desig
n_revi 
.200 -.299 -.266 -.500 .000 
  
E3_5Revi
s_compet
_posi 
.274 -.765 .186 .092 .027 .000 
 
E2_2Poli
cy_rebate
s 
.514 -.353 -.271 -.253 -.091 .001 .000 
Factor Score Weights (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
E2_7N
ego_tar
iffs 
E2_9Lu
mpsum
_fee 
E1_4Fee
dback_u
sers 
E1_5Feed
back_oper
ators 
E2_1Polic
y_design_
revi 
E3_5Revi
s_compet
_posi 
E2_2Po
licy_reb
ates 
Trans
paren
cy 
.246 .165 .045 .024 .009 .056 .015 
Stake
holde
rs 
.023 .016 .570 .302 .000 .002 .000 
Tarif
f_Pol
icy 
.027 .018 .002 .001 .093 .603 .157 
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Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 16 10.010 12 .615 .834 
Saturated model 28 .000 0 
  
Independence model 7 151.899 21 .000 7.233 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .333 .961 .909 .412 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model 1.903 .619 .493 .465 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .934 .885 1.014 1.027 1.000 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .571 .534 .571 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .000 .000 9.170 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 130.899 95.457 173.829 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .152 .000 .000 .139 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 2.301 1.983 1.446 2.634 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .000 .000 .108 .740 
Independence model .307 .262 .354 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 42.010 46.424 77.285 93.285 
Saturated model 56.000 63.724 117.731 145.731 
Independence model 165.899 167.830 181.332 188.332 
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ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .637 .667 .806 .703 
Saturated model .848 .848 .848 .966 
Independence model 2.514 1.977 3.164 2.543 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 139 173 
Independence model 15 17 
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APPENDIX XIII: Port Name List – Regression analysis 
Port Region Country Port Name 
 
Port 
Region 
Country Port Name 
African 
Kenya Mombosa 
 
North 
and 
Western 
European 
Belgium Ghent 
Liberia Monrovia 
 
Denmark Aarhus 
Mauritius Port Louis 
 
Denmark Fredrikshavn 
Namibia Walvis Bay 
 
Estonia Paldiski(north) 
South Africa Durban 
 
Estonia Tallinn 
South Africa Cape Town 
 
Germany Hamburg 
South Africa Saldanha Bay 
 
Germany Bremerheven 
South Africa Richads Bay 
 
Holland Vlissingen 
Sudan Port Sudan 
 
Lativia Freeport Riga 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam 
 
Norway Bergen 
Australasian 
Australia Adelaide 
 
Poland Gdansk 
Australia Albany 
 
Poland Gdynia 
Australia Broom 
 
Poland Swinoujscie 
Australia Darwin 
 
Russia St.Petersburg 
Australia Townsville 
 
Spain Valencia 
Australia Lucinda 
 
Spain Bilbao 
Fiji Suva 
 
Spain Pasajes 
New Zealand Taranaki 
 
Spain Santander 
New Zealand Auckland 
 
Spain Coruna 
New Zealand Nelson 
 
Spain Gijon 
New Zealand Timaru 
 
Spain Castellon 
New Zealand Bluff 
 
Spain Cadiz bay 
New Zealand Lyttelton 
 
Spain Aviles 
New Zealand Northport 
 
Spain Alicante 
East Asian  
Brunai Muara 
 
UK Felixtowe 
China Shanghai 
 
UK Southampton 
Indonesia Tanjung Priok 
 
UK Liverpool 
Indonesia Tanjung Perak 
 
UK Portsmouth 
Japan Yokohama 
 
Irland Foynes 
Japan Tokyo 
 
UK Lerwick 
Japan Hakata 
 
UK Scalloway 
Japan Nagoya 
 
UK Grimsby 
Japan Osaka 
 
UK Immingham 
Pilliphines Manila 
 
UK Sheerness 
S.Korea Busan 
 
UK Medway-Chatham 
S.Korea Incheon 
 
UK Belfast 
Singapore Singapore 
 
UK Tyne 
Taiwan Kaohsiung 
 
Germany Wilhelmshaven 
Taiwan Keelung 
 
Latvia Ventspils 
Taiwan Taichung 
 
Latvia Salacgriva 
Thailand Laem Chabang 
 
Latvia Liepaja 
Thailand Bangkok 
 
Germany Wismar 
Vietnam Ho Chin Minh 
 
Norway Oslo 
333 
 
Vietnam Saigon 
 
Norway Harstad 
Myanmar Yangon 
 
Norway Borg Havn 
Cambodia Kompong som 
 
Norway Egersund 
China Qingdao 
 
Norway Hammerfest 
China Dalian 
 
Norway Kristiansandhavn 
Cambodia Phnom Penh 
 
Norway Stavanger 
Latin American 
Costa Rica Limon-Moin 
 
Norway Drammenhavn 
Ecuador Guayaquil 
 
Portugal Setubal 
Argentina Bahia Blanca 
 
Iceland Reykjavik 
Carribbean  
& Central 
American 
Trinidad Port Spain 
    
Puerto Rico San Juan 
    
Medeteranian 
Algeria Skikda 
    Spain Barcelona 
    Turkey Ambarli 
    Greece Thessaloniki 
    Spain Tarragona 
    Cyprus Limassol 
    Bulgaria Varna 
    Bulgaria Bourgas 
    
North 
American 
Canada Montreal 
    Canada Halifax 
    Canada Hamilton 
    Canada St John 
    Canada Trois-Rivieres 
    Canada Saint John  
    Canada Belledune 
    Mexico Lazaro Cardenas 
    Canada Sept-iles         
 
 
 
 
